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This morning a friend and 1 canoed out on a perfectly still and 
silent New Hampshire lake. The only ripple on the water's sur- 
face came from a great blue heron as it languidly took off from a 
patch of water lilies and headed for some secret spot farther into 
the swamp, undisturbed even by canoes. Amid this serenity, 
which seemed to cloak the lake and forests and mountains with a 
preternatural harmony and peace, my friend surprised me with 
the remark that today was Independence Day. 
Whatever noisy celebrations were going on seemed far, far 
away from this quiet world. But being in New England, one 
could not keep from one's mind the images of lanterns being hung 
in the belfry of Old North Church, Bunker Hill, and the shots, 
fired by New England farmers, destined to be heard round the 
world. 
Political freedom is to be cherished indeed. But there is no 
political freedom that is not indissolubly bound to the inner per- 
sonal freedom of the individuals who make up that nation, no 
liberty of a nation of conformists, no free nation made up of 
robots. This book seeks to illuminate this inner personal freedom 
underlying political liberty. When I mention political liberty in 
the following pages, it will be generally as illustration. 
This personal freedom to think and feel and speak authenti- 
cally and to be conscious of so doing is the quality that distin- 
guishes us as human. Always in paradox with one's destiny, this 
freedom is the foundation of human values such as love, courage, 
honesty. Freedom is how we relate to our destiny, and destiny is 
significant only because we have freedom. In the struggle of our 
freedom against and with destiny, our creativity and our civiliza- 
tions themselves are born. 
Rollo May 
July 1981 
Holderness, New Hampshire 

One 
The Crisis of Freedom 

1 
The Present Crisis of Freedom 
Tbe true end of Man... is the highest and most barmonious develop- 
ment of his powers to a complete and consistent whole. Freedom is thp 
fzrst and indispensable condition which the possibility of such a devel- 
opment presupposes. 
' 
- KARL WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT 
"Freedom's just another word for nothin' left to lose. 
" ' ' ' 
- K. KRISTOFFERSON AND F. FOSTER, "Me dT' BOl)by McGee" 
It is a startling fact that freedom has been considered, 
throughout human history, so precious that hundreds of thou- 
sands of human beings have willingly died for it. This love of 
freedom is seen not only in venerated persons like Giordano 
Bruno, who died at the stake for his freedom of belief, and Gali- 
leo, who whispered to himself in the face of the Inquisition that 
the earth does move around the sun, but it is also true for hosts of 
people whose names are forever unsung and unknown. Freedom 
must have some profound meaning, some basic relation to the 
"core" of being human, to be the object of such devotion. 
Many people still assume that they and their countrymen 
should be ready to die for freedom. This feeling typically takes 
the form of patriotism. Other persons who would not agree that 
political freedom is worth dying for would nevertheless state the 
same thing about psychological and spiritual freedom-the right 
to think and to command one's own attitude free from the 1984 
type of spiritual surveillance. For reasons that are endless in their 
variety and that are demonstrated from the beginning of history 
3 
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down to the freedom marches and freedom rides of this century, 
the principle of freedom is considered more precious than life 
itself. 
We have only to glance at the long line of illustrious persons 
to see that, in the past at least, freedom, in the words of Henrik 
Ibsen, was "our finest treasure." Jean Jacques Rousseau was pro- 
foundly impressed by the fact that people will "endure hunger, 
fire, the sword and death to preserve only their independence." 
About freedom he continues: Human beings "sacrifice pleasures, 
repose, wealth, power and life itself for the preservation of this 
sole good."* Kant joined in the defense of freedom against those 
who argued that the terror of the French Revolution showed that 
the masses of people were unfit for freedom. "To accept the prin- 
ciple," wrote Kant, "that freedom is worthless for those under 
one's control and that one has the right to refuse it to them for- 
ever, is an infringement of the rights of God himself, who has 
created man to be free." " 
Similarly Schelling made a passionate defense of freedom: 
"The whole of knowledge has no status if it is not supported by 
something which maintains itself by its own power," and "this is 
nothing but ... freedom." Again, he writes, "Philosophy ... 
[is] a pure product of a free human being, and itself an act of 
freedom.... The first postulate of all philosophy, to act freely 
*A long line of people of wisdom have held that the capacity for and degree of 
freedom are the distinguishing qualities of the human being in contrast to other 
animals. Rousseau, 1 believe, oversimplified the problem of freedom in his crea- 
tion of the "noble savage" and when he stated "man is born free, and everywhere 
he is in chains." Nevertheless, he had some profound insights. He scorned the 
presumption of those who attempt to explain human nature with the same 
mechanics they use for animal nature. The latter "cannot account for man's 
freedom and consciousness of his freedom." 
The difference, Rousseau continues, is "that nature alone does everything 
in the operations of the beast, whereas man contributes to his operations by being 
a free agent. The former chooses or tejects by instinct and the latter by an act of 
freedom ... it is not so much understanding which constitutes the distinction of 
man among the animais as it is his being a free agent. Nature commands every 
animal, and the beast obeys. Man feels the same impetus, but he realizes that he 
is free to acquiesce or resist; and it is above all in the consciousness of this freedom 
that the spirituality of his soul is shown." This is cited by Noam Chomsky, For 
Reasons of State (N w York: Vintage, 1973), p. 392. 
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in its own terms, seems as necessary ... as the first postulate of 
geometry, to draw a straight line. Just as little as the geometrician 
proves the line, should the philosopher prove freedom." In other 
words, the truth of freedom is seif-evident; that is an inalienable 
right. 
Though we shall later consider the empirical definitions of 
freedom, it is noteworthy that Schelling believed that freedom 
was axiomatic, that even to think and talk presupposed freedom, 
and hence no proof was necessary. The capacity to experience 
awe and wonder, to imagine and to write poetry, to conceive of 
scientific theories and great works of art presupposes freedom. 
AU of these are essential to the human capacity to reflect. Indeed, 
in the same vein as Schelling, an intellectual of the modern day, 
Sir Isaiah Berlin, remarks: "Almost every moralist in human his- 
tory has praised freedom." 
" 
Why these unending and extravagant panegyrics? Why 
should freedom be so venerated, especially in a world where prac- 
tically nothing else is granted that devotion? 
1. The Uniqueness of Freedom 
To answer these questions we need to understand the unique- 
ness of freedom. Every other reality in human experience 
becomes what it is by its nature. The heart beats, the eyes see; it 
is their nature to do what they do. Or, if we take something inor- 
ganic like values, we know what the nature of truth is-e.g., to 
state things as close to the reality as possible. And we know the 
meaning, or the nature, of the value of beauty. Each of these 
functions in the human being according to its own nature. 
What, then, is the nature of freedom? It is the essence of free- 
dom precisely that its nature is not given. Its function is to change 
its nature, to become something different from what it is at any 
given moment. Freedom is the possibility of development, of 
enhancement of one's life; or the possibility of withdrawing, shut- 
ting oneself up, denying and stultifying one's growth. "It is the 
nature of freedom," Paul Tillich declares, "to determine itself." 
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This uniqueness makes freedom different from every other real- 
ity in human experience. 
Freedom is also unique in that it is the mother of all values. If 
. we consider such values as honesty, love, or courage, we find, 
strangely enough, that they cannot be placed parallel to the value 
, of freedom. For the other values derive their value from being 
free; they are dependent on freedom. 
Take the value of love. How can 1 prize a person's love if 1 
know the love is not given with some degree of freedom? What is 
to keep this so-called love from being merely an act of depend- 
ency or conformity? "For love can take concrete shape only in 
freedom," writes Jacques Ellul. "It takes a free man to love, for 
love is both the unexpected discovery of the other and a readiness 
to do anything for him." 
" 
Take also the value of honesty. Ben Franklin proclaimed his 
alledgedly ethical principle, "Honesty is the best policy." But if 
it is the best policy, it is not honesty at all but simply good busi- 
ness. When a person is free to act against the monetary interest of 
his or her company, that is the authentic value of honesty. Unless 
it presupposes freedom, honesty loses its ethical character. Cour- 
age also loses its value if it is supposedly exhibited by someone 
who is coerced into it. 
Freedom is thus more than a value itself: it underlies the possi- 
bility of valuing; it is basic to our capacity to value. Without freedom 
there is no value worthy of the name. In this time of the disinte- 
gration of concern for public weal and private honor, in this time 
of the demise of values, our recovery-if we are to achieve it- 
must be based on our coming to terms with this source of all 
values: freedom. This is why freedom is so important as a goal of 
psychotherapy, for whatever values the client develops will be 
based upon his experience of autonomy, sense of personal power 
and possibilities, all of which are based on the freedom he hopes 
to achieve in therapy. 
Freedom endlessly re-creates itself, gives birth to itself. Free- 
dom is the capacity, we have seen, to transcend its own nature- 
an occurrence in which that overused word transcend really fits: 
We begin to appreciate the great fascination that freedom, phoe- 
nixlike in its capacity to rise from its own ashes, exercised on our 
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ancestors. We begin also to experience the dangers in freedom. 
People will cling to freedom, treasure it, die for it if necessary, or 
continually yearn and fight others for it if they do not now enjoy 
it. And it is still true, according to the statistical studies of Milton 
Rokeach, that the majority of people place freedom highest on 
their list in the ranking of values. 
This constitutes the radical difference between the slave and 
the free citizen in ancient Greece and Rome and in the South of 
the United States in the days of slavery. The slaves might have 
been weil taken care of physically, well fed and well treated-in 
fact, often better than if they had supported themselves in free- 
dom. But they did not have the "inalienable" human right to 
assert publicly their own beliefs or even to believe something dif- 
ferent from what their masters believed. Taking the name of the 
master is a symbol of this built-in subordination to someone else 
in contrast to the free citizen; we recall the struggle of the chief 
characters in "Roots" to preserve their original name even on 
tombstones. This also is true in marriage and has been attacked 
by the women's liberation movement. 
Everyone is aware that subordination to a master strikes at the 
core of human dignity of the slave, but we have not all realized 
that it does the same with the master. He who owns a slave is as 
much enslaved as the person he owns; slavery destroys the free- 
dom of both. People will choose-the Grand Inquisitor notwith- 
standing-to lower their standard of living as free persons than to 
be well taken care of as slaves. Rousseau confesses that he is over- 
whelmed by the "marvels done by free peoples to guard them- 
selves against oppression." 
" 
While this uniqueness of personal freedom has been tacitly 
recognized through history, it has remained for the existentialists 
to base their philosophy centrally on the concept. Schelling, an 
early existentialist who repeats again and again "Man was born to 
act and not to speculate," also proclaims, "The beginning and end 
of all philosophy is-Freedom." The contemporary existentialists 
see freedom as the quality most threatened by our modern age 
with its assembly-line objectification of human persons. In Jean- 
Paul Sartre's drama, The Flies, Zeus, frustrated in his attempt to 
exert his authority over Orestes, cries, "Impudent spawn! So 1 
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am not your king? Who, then, made you?" Orestes retorts, "You. 
But you blundered: you should not have made me free." Later, 
Orestes summarizes it ail: "I am my freedom!" he cries. Sartre is 
stating point blank that freedom is not only basic to being human, 
but also that freedom and being human are identical. 
This identity of freedom and being is demonstrated by the 
fact that each of us experiences himself as real in the moment of 
choice. When one asserts "I can" or "I choose" or "I will," one 
feels one's own significance, since it is not possible for the slave 
to assert these things. "In the act of choice, in the original spon- 
taneity of my freedom," writes Karl Jaspers, "I recognize myself 
for the first time as my own true self." "Existence is real only as 
freedom.... Freedom is ... the being of existence." "Only in 
those moments when 1 exercise my freedom am 1 fully myself." 
"To be free means to be one's self." " 
The possibility of changing, which we have said is freedom, 
includes also the capacity to remain as one is-but the person is 
different from having considered and rejected changing. This 
change, furthermore, is not to be confused with changing for its 
own sake, as we shall see presently, or changing for escapist rea- 
sons. Hence, the gross confusion of license, so often pointed at in 
American youth, with genuine freedom. 1 believe that Solzhen- 
itsyn, who, by his own heroic struggle to be free, has earned the 
right to speak of freedom, makes that error when he says: 
Freedom! for adolescents of 14-18 years to immerse themselves in idle- 
ness and amusements instead of invigorating tasks and_ spiritual growth. 
Freedom! for healthy young adults to avoid work and live at the expense 
of society." 
" .. . "< 
Solzhenitsyn's objections confuse freedom with license and irre- 
sponsibility, and with acting out of boredom. He does not see 
what his countryman, Dostoevsky, grasped so well, that freedom 
is always a paradox. 
' 
License is freedom without destiny, without the limits that are as 
essential for authentic freedom as night is to day. As we shall see, 
freedom consists of how you confront your limits, how you 
engage your destiny in day-to-day living. Proteus, the Greek god 
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who could continually assume a different form to escape being 
pinned down, may be a symbol in our day for noncommittal, but 
he is never cited as a symbol for freedom. 
Even those who deny freedom presuppose it. In the act of 
denying freedom, their denial purports to be true-that is, 
dependent not on mere prejudice or their digestion for that day, 
but on objective norms which one is able to accept or reject. And 
what is this capacity to "accept or reject" but our freedom? As we 
shall discuss, determinism, as one point of view, is required and 
given by freedom. In this sense deterministic belief is part of, and 
is made necessary by, human freedom, just as darkness is 
required to make the light discernible. 
There is solid reason, therefore, for concluding that freedom 
is essential to human dignity. Von Humboldt states this inci- 
sively : "I have felt myself animated throughout with a sense of 
the deepest respect for the inherent dignity of human nature; and 
for freedom, which alone befits that dignity." In the Renaissance 
Pico della Mirandola also identifies freedom with human dignity. 
He pictures the creator as saying: 
Neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal have we cre- 
ated thee, so that thou mightest be free according to thy own will and 
honor, to be thy own creator and builder. To thee alone we give growth 
and development depending on thy own free will. Thou bearest in thee 
the germs of a universal life. 
Human dignity is based upon freedom and freedom upon human 
dignity. The one presupposes the other. 
In the Renaissance, however, Pico could use terms that pres- 
ent difficulties in our own era, such as "free will." "Free will," in 
its traditional sense, seems to be a concept that has been the cause 
of years of fruitless arguments. It is the wbole buman being who is 
free, not a part of him or her such as wili. Surely will is impor- 
tant, as we will later indicate when we emphasize freedom as the 
capacity to state "I will" and "I can." But this "I will" speaks not 
from a given faculty, as implied in "free will," but from the whole 
self, including such diverse aspects of the self as freedom to move 
one's muscles, freedom of imagination, freedom to dream, free- 
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dom to commit oneself-indeed, freedom of the total human 
being. Even the capacity not to believe in free will is itself an 
exercise of freedom. ' . 
"Freedom is the passibility of 'self-realization' based on per- 
sonal choice, on free contract and spontaneous endeavor, or indi- 
vidual initiative," as the anthropologist Malinowski puts it. 1 
Freedom is possibility. Kierkegaard stated this a century and 
a half ago, and it is still the best positive definition of freedom. 
Emily Dickinson has intuited it in a poem: 
' ' "" 
' .. 1 dwell in Possibility- _ 
A fairer house than Prose- 
More numerous of windows- , . 
_ Superior of Doors _ 
, Of Chambers as of Cedars- .. ' ' 
... Impregnable of Eye- . - ; 
_ .. - And for an Everlasting Roof _ .. = , ; 
The Gambrels of the Sky 
The word "possibility" comes from the Latin pove, "to be 
able," which is also the original root of our word power. Thus 
begins that long and tortuous relationship, interminably debated 
in the parliaments of the world and fought and bled over on 
countless battlefields, of the relationship between freedom and 
power. Powerlessness, we know, is tantamount to slavery. It is a 
truism that, if people are to have freedom, they must have the 
equivalent personal power in the form of autonomy and respon- 
sibility. The women's liberation movement has argued this point 
with cogency. 
To be sure, one has to discriminate between possibilities: hec- 
tic acting, because it is more corüfortable to act than not to, is a 
misuse of freedom. Nixon is guilty of this, as illustrated in his 
own writings about the "unbearable tensions that build up ... 
tensions that can be relieved only by taking action, one way or 
the other. Not knowing how to act or not being able to act is what 
tears your insides out." This compulsion to act in any extreme 
form is what is meant by "acting out" in therapy and is often 
symptomatic of the psychopathic personality. 
Personal freedom, on the contrary, entails being able to barbor 
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different possibilities in one's mind even though it is not clear at the 
moment which way one must act. The possibilities must be there to 
begin with, otherwise one's life is banal. The psychologically 
healthy person is able to confront and manage the anxiety directly 
in such situations, in contrast to the neurotic, in whom anxiety 
sooner or later blocks off his consciousness of freedom and he 
feels as if he is in a strait jacket. Freedom always deals with "the 
possible"; this gives freedom its great flexibility, its fascination 
and its dangers. 
2. The Hypocrisies of Freedom 
Freedom is now in a crisis so serious that its meaning is 
obscured, and those who use the word are called, often justifi- 
ably, hypocritical. In our day freedom is beset by paradoxes, 
many of which we find surfacing on all sides. James Farmer, 
former director of CORE, writes about World War II: 
Total war was being waged in the name of freedom and democracy. We 
were ail mobilized to fight for the American Way of Life. Yet in the glare 
of the conflagration overseas we could see clearly how much unfreedom 
and inequality went into that way of life. Many victims of the Depression 
were still hungry and terrified; labor all over the country was bound to 
long hours and low wages. And always there was the Negro, a full- 
fledged soldier on the battlefields of France, but at home still the son of 
Ham, a servant of servants unto his brethren. 
"Freedom's just another word for nothin' left to lose" demon- 
strates that multitudes of people whose convictions are expressed 
by such music believe that the word "freedom" is used as bait to 
entice them down heaven knows what primrose path. These peo- 
ple see the hypocrisies, the false dilemmas, the artificial decora- 
tions and gimmicks that now make this once noble word almost 
unusable. From its position as the "most treasured word" in our 
language, the most precious experience of mankind, "freedom" 
has now been reduced in many quarters to a synonym for mock- 
ery. 
Like other erstwhile get words=`truth," "beauty," "God" 
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- the word "freedom" may soon be usable only in irony, as the ' 
poet W. H. Auden illustrates in "The Unknown Citizen." Auden 
;. describes a man against whom there can be "no official com- ' ' 
plaint," who _ 
held the proper opinions for the time of year; .. ;; "' ' When there was peace, he was for peace: when there 
was war, he went. a 
And he concludes this picture of this completely conforming, ' "normal" man with: . 
. Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd: 
" 
._ ' Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard. 
" 
The flagrant denial of personal freedom can be seen in pre- 
cisely the shrillest and loudest protestations of protecting our free- 
dom. One need only glance back at the McCarthys, the Dieses, 
. and the Jenners to appreciate the song written by Kristofferson 
and Foster. We well remember how Joseph McCarthy, the most 
infamous of these self-styled "protectors," was able to crush 
many valuable citizens by scaring the country into believing there 
was a communist under every bed. The cruelty and destructive- 
ness of McCarthy came from his capitalizing on the anxiety peo- 
ple had of losing their freedom. The great danger of freedom is 
its susceptibility to just such hypocrisy: for under the guise of 
saving our liberty, the greatest suppression of our freedom can be ' 
perpetrated. How many tyrants throughout history have rallied 
their supporters under the banner of freedom! 
Such hypocrisy has become almost identified with the use of ' 
the word "freedom" in the minds and hearts of many people. 
When a high-school commencement speaker or a Fourth of July ' . orator harangues us with phrases like "America, land of the free," 
we yawn and look up vaguely to see how he, in the pattern set by ' 
McCarthy, proposes to hoodwink us. The orators are generally 
persons who represent the "haves" in our society and have prof- 
ited well under the present economic system. But most of the ' audience is aware that such orators would be horrified if they 
confronted a real rebellion like that of 1776. 
In the speeches at the political conventions in the summer of 
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1980, it was notable that the more conservative and reactionary 
the speaker, the more he tended to use the term "freedom." One 
is reminded of Jacques Ellul's statement about man, that "he is 
most enslaved when he thinks he is comfortably settled in free- 
dom." " 
One of the presidential candidates in the 1980 election, writes 
Eugene McCarthy, stated his religious belief that the "United 
States was strategically placed by God as an island of freedom 
between two continents in which freedom was either denied or 
un-recognized." This holier-than-thou claim seems to me to make 
a mockery of freedom. 
Freedom is used and abused to rationalize our laissez-faire, 
"free"-enterprise economic system. A trustee of a large university 
who also was the president of one of the leading oil companies in 
this country argued in a private conversation, that his company 
was justified in cutting off the supply of gas to raise the price at 
the time of the shortage during the excessively cold winter of 
1975-1976. His company had the "right" and "responsibility" to 
its stockholders, he stated, to make as much money for them as 
possible. Was he assuming that the preserving of the free-enter- 
prise system is more important than the lives of the human 
beings, the American people who were suffering severely that 
winter, some of them literally freezing to death because of the 
unavailability of gas? "Right" and "responsibility" are moral 
words used here for the immoral purpose of defending an action 
that results in hardship to thousands of people struggling to sur- 
vive the subzero cold. 
The argument that such practices of the free-enterprise sys- 
tem must be defended at whatever price in human suffering is 
dubious indeed. Have we forgotten the wisdom of Richard Taw- 
ney, who pointed out four decades ago that modern "industrial- 
ism is the perversion of individualism"? For the "repudiation of 
any authority [such as social value and function] superior to indi- 
vidual reason ... left men free to follow their own interests or 
ambitions or appetites, untrammeled by subordination to any 
common center of allegiance." Tawney pointed out that a self- 
contradiction is set up in industrialism itself: a "completely free" 
industrial system would destroy its own market and ultimately 
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itself, as we see now happening in the automobile industry in this 
country. This seems to be also occurring in our curious phenom- 
enon of simultaneous rising inflation and unemployment. The 
dilemma hinges on how we use the term "freedom." How impor- 
tant that we rediscover its authentic meaning! 
Justice William O. Douglas, as well as numerous others, has 
remarked that there can be no freedom which does not begin with 
the freedom to eat and the right to work. "Freedom," writes 
Irwin Edman, "involves, as Marx and Robert Owen and Edward 
Bellamy were to discover, the economic conditions of action, and 
in the struggle for democracy economic security has only at late 
last been recognized as a political condition of personal freedom." 
" 
The same hypocrisy and moral confusion about freedom is 
described in a recent editorial in a news magazine. Referring to 
the abuse of privacy and the misuse of political freedom in the 
present and the past few years in this country, the editorial refers 
to a book about the Germans under Hitler entitled Tbey Though 
TÎxy Were Free: 
Like the good Germans, we [in America] continue to think we are free, 
while the walls of dossiers, the machinery of repression, the weapons of 
political assassination pile up around us. Where is the movement to 
restore our freedom? Who are the leaders prepared to insist that it won't 
happen here? 
We hear the haunting final chorus of the movie Nash'VilJe: "It don't worry 
me, it don't worry me. You may say that 1 ain't free, but it don't worry 
me." Is this to be the final epitaph of American liberty? 
The possible demise of freedom in the modern world con- 
cems Henry Steele Commager, a historian whose balanced eye 
and observant mind are beyond question. In "Is Freedom 
Dying?" he cites political and social evidence to demonstrate that 
we are losing our freedom. Already "freedom has lost its exalted 
place in philsophy and policy." Citing the old caution "The price 
of liberty is eternal vigilance," he notes sorrowfully that there is 
little vigilance in our country at present. Commager believes the 
main causes of this demise of freedom are the widespread growth 
of materialism and hedonism in America. 
1 believe that the materialism and hedonism, so often decried 
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by Solzhenitsyn and now Commager, are themselves symptoms 
of an underlying, endemic anxiety. Men and women devote 
themselves to making money when they cannot get gratification 
from making anything else. It is above all a personal dilemma, 
whatever its economic repercussions. Couples develop sexual 
hedonism as an end in itself because sex allays anxiety and 
because they find authentic love so rarely available in our alien- 
ated and narcissistic culture. At present in our country there is a 
general experience of suppressed panic: anxiety not only about 
the hydrogen bomb and the prospect of atomic war, but about 
uncontrolled inflation, unemployment, anxiety that our old val- 
ues have deteriorated as our religions have eroded, about our dis- 
integrating family structure, concern about pollution of the air, 
the oil crisis, and infinitum. The mass of citizens react as a neu- 
rotic would react: we hasten to conceal the frightening facts with 
the handiest substitutes, which dull our anxiety and enable us 
temporarily to forget. 
Commager emphasizes that the price of surrendering our free- 
dom is much greater than most people are aware. For freedom is 
"a necessity for progress," he proclaims, "and a necessity for sur- 
vival." If we lose our inner freedom, we lose with it our self- 
direction and autonomy, the qualities that distinguish human 
beings from robots and computers. 
The attack on freedom, and the mockery of it, is the predict- 
able mythoclasm which always occurs when a great truth goes 
bankrupt. In mythoclasm people attack and mock the thing they 
used to venerate. In the vehemence of the attack we hear the 
silent unexpressed cries "Our belief in freedom should have saved 
us-it let us down just when we needed it most!" The attack is 
based on resentment and rage that our freedom does not turn out 
to be the noble thing inscribed on the base of the Statue of Lib- 
erty or that Abraham Lincoln's "new birth of freedom" has never 
occurred. 
In all such periods of mythoclasm, the great truths yield the 
greatest bootlegged power to their attackers. Thus, the attack on 
freedom-especially by those psychologists who use their free- 
dom to stump the nation, arguing that freedom is an illusion- 
gets its power precisely from what it denies. 
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But the period of mythoclasm soon becomes empty and unre- 
warding, and we must then engage in "the long and lonely search 
for inner integrity," as Jerome Bruner puts it. The constructive 
way is to look within ourselves to discover again the rebom truth, 
the phoenix quality of freedom now so needed, and to integrate 
it anew into our being. This is the deepest meaning of Lincoln's 
"new birth of freedom." " 
For is not the central reason for the near bankruptcy of a once 
glorious concept that we have grossly oversimplified freedom? 
We have assumed it was an easy acquisition which we inherited 
simply by being born in the "land of the free." Did we not let the 
paradox of freedom become encrusted until freedom itself became 
identified with whites in the racial conflict, or with Protestants, 
or with capitalism, and ultimately with one's own personal idio- 
syncrasies ? Thus the decline and fall of a great concept! 
In our Declaration of Independence, there is a joyful enthu- 
siasm for the "self evident" and "inalienable" right of individual 
freedom, which most of us lapped up with our mother's milk. But 
we find even there a pronounced lack of awareness of the social 
problems of responsibility and community-that is, a lack of 
realization of what I call destiny. True, there is the reference to 
the "Creator" and the phrase in this declaration "we ... 
acquiesce in the necessity" after the long list of the oppressions of 
the British king. True, also, that in our Constitution the Supreme 
Court is charged with providing the necessary limits. But adju- 
dication is not enough. The British historian Macaulay wrote to 
President Madison half a century after the Declaration was adop- 
ted that he was worried about the American Constitution because 
it was "all sail and no rudder." Thus, we have, marking the birth 
of our nation, the cheering for "full speed ahead" but with a lack 
of guiding limits. In the condition of "all sail and no rudder" free- 
dom is in continual crisis; the boat may easily capsize. Freedom 
has lost its solid foundation because we have seen it without its 
necessary opposite, which gives it viability-namely, destiny. 
That keen observer of America, Alexis de Tocqueville, wrote 
that people in America imagine that "their whole destiny is in 
their own hands.... The woof of time is every instant broken 
and the track of generations effaced. Those who went before are 
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soon forgotten; of those who will come after, no one has any idea: 
the interest of man is confined to those in close propinquity to 
himself." As a result, Tocqueville states, "I know of no country 
in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom 
of discussion as in America." In European nations like France, 
where the monarchy stood against the legislature, one could exer- 
cise freedom of mind since if one power sides against the individ- 
ual, the other sides with him. "But in a nation where democratic 
institutions exist, organized like those in the United States, there 
is but one authority, one element of strength and success, with 
nothing beyond it." Tocqueville writes eloquently of the "tyr- 
anny of the majority" in America, which 1 call conformism of 
mind and spirit. We have recently seen this exhibited in the last 
election in the power of what is called the "moral majority." 
"There the body is left free, and the soul is enslaved." Tocque- 
ville continues: "The master no longer says, 'You shall think as 1 
do, or you shall die'; but he says, 'You are free to think differently 
from me, and to retain your life, your property, and all that you 
possess; but you are henceforth a stranger among your people.... 
You will retain your civil rights, but they will be useless to you." 
Other people "will affect to scorn you." The person who thinks 
freely is ostracized, and the mass of people cannot stand such 
alienation. 
Have we not too easily and readily seized upon freedom as 
our birthright and forgotten that each of us must rediscover it for 
ourselves? Have we forgotten Goethe's words: "He only earns his 
freedom and existence/Who daily conquers them anew"? Yet des- 
tiny will return to haunt us as long as it is not acknowledged. 
Destiny is eternally present to remind us that we exist as part of 
a community. We cannot afford to ignore "those who went 
before," as Tocqueville puts it, and "those who will come after." 
" 
If we are ever to understand what Milton meant when he cried 
"Ah, Sweet liberty," or what the Pilgrims sought in landing at 
Plymouth rock in search of religious freedom, or any one of the 
' 
other million and one evidences of freedom, we must confront 
this paradox directly. 
The paradox is that freedom owes its vitality to destiny, and 
destiny owes its significance to freedom. Our talents, our gifts, are 
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on loan, to be called in at any moment by death, by illness, or by 
any one of the countless other happenings over which we have no 
direct control. Freedom is that essential to our lives, but it is also 
that precarious. 
_ 3. Therapy: To Set People Free 
. The same crisis of freedom is present in psychotherapy, this 
curious profession which burgeoned so fantastically in America 
during the past half century. The crisis can best be seen when we 
ask: What is the purpose of therapy? To be sure, to help people. 
And the specific purpose differs with the particular condition 
with which the person is suffering. But what is the overall pur- 
pose that underlies the development of this profession of 
psychological helpers? 
Several decades ago, the purpose of the mental-health move- 
ment was clear: mental health is living free from anxiety. But this 
motto soon became suspect. Living free from anxiety in a world 
of hydrogen bombs and nuclear radiation? Without anxiety in a 
world in which death may strike at any moment you cross the 
, street? Without anxiety in a world in which two-thirds of the ' 
people are malnurished or are starving? ' 
Dr. Nicholas Cummings, in his inaugural address as presi- ' ' 
dent of the American Psychological Association, made a wise and . 
insightful statement about the endeavor to avoid anxiety: 
The mental health movement, in promising a freedom from anxiety that 
is not possible, may have had a significant role in the current belief that 
it is rights to feel good, thus contributing to the burgeoning consumption 
of alcohol and the almost universal prescription of the tranquilizer by 
physicians. 
' . 
The mental health movement has emphasized "freedom from 
anxiety" as the definition of health. But finding that that is not 
possible in the general run of life, people have assumed that the 
quickest way to achieve this "freedom" is through alcohol and 
tranquilizing drugs. 
Furthermore, if we did achieve freedom from all anxiety, we 
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would find ourselves robbed of the most constructive stimulant 
for life and for simple survival. After many a therapeutic hour 
which 1 would call successful, the client leaves with more anxiety 
than he had when he came in; only now the anxiety is conscious 
rather than unconscious, constructive rather than destructive. 
The definition of mental health needs to be changed to living 
without paralyzing anxiety, but living with normal anxiety as a 
stimulant to a vital existence, as a source of energy, and as life- 
enhancing. 
Is adjustment the purpose of therapy-that is, should therapy 
help people adjust to their society? But this means adjusting to a 
society that fights the Vietnam war, a society in which the most 
powerful nation spends an enormous portion of its budget on 
armaments allegedly to defend itself from other members of that 
society. Adjustment as the purpose of therapy means that the 
therapist is the psychic policeman for the society, a role that I, 
for one, heartily detest. Ever since Lawrence Frank wrote in the 
middle 1930s on the theme "Society As the Patient," many of us 
have wondered who the psychotic was-the persons to whom the 
title is given or the society itself? 
Is the purpose of the therapist to give people relief and com- 
fort ? If so, this can also be done more efficiently and economically 
by drugs. 
Is the purpose of the therapist to help people to be happy? 
Happy in a world in which unemployment and inflation burgeon 
at the same time? Such happiness can be purchased only at the 
price of repressing and denying too many of the facts of life, a 
denial that works directly against what most of us believe is the 
optimum state of mental health. 
1 propose that the purpose of the psychotherapy is to set people free. 
Free, as far as possible, from symptoms, whether they be psycho- 
somatic symptoms like ulcers or psychological symptoms like 
acute shyness. Free from compulsions, again as far as possible, to 
be workaholics, compulsions to repeat self-defeating habits they 
have learned in early childhood, or compulsions perpetually to 
choose partners of the opposite sex who cause continual unhap- 
piness and continual punishment. 
But most of all, 1 believe that the therapist's function should 
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be to help people become free to be aware of and to experience 
their possibilities. A psychological problem, 1 have pointed out 
.. elsewhere, is like fever; it indicates that something is wrong 
within the structure of the person and that a struggle is going on 
for survival. This, in turn, is a proof to us that some other way of 
behaving is possible. Our old way of thinking-that problems are 
to be gotten rid of as soon as possible-overlooks the most impor- 
tant thing of all : that problems are a normal aspect of living and 
are basic to human creativity. This is true whether one is con- 
structing things or reconstructing oneself. Problems are the out- 
ward signs of unused inner possibilities. 
People rightly come to the therapist because they have 
become inwardly enslaved and they yearn to be set free. The 
crucial question is: how is that freedom to be attained? Surely not 
by a miraculous charming away of all conflicts. 
When I was writing this chapter, a woman of twenty-eight 
came to me so that 1 could refer her to a therapist. Her problem 
was that she could never find the right job. She was intelligent 
and open, a person who, one would think, would be a success in 
the business world. She had had a good job as an executive sec- 
retary with interesting people in an organization she liked and 
believed in, and she did the work very well. But for some reason 
she could not understand, she hated this job, and her hatred took 
a great toll in nervous anguish. She quit the job, enrolled in a 
college, but was bored with studying and dropped out. 
It turned out that her father was an executive, and at home he 
had been exceedingly authoritarian, blustering about the house 
and cursing at her mother, a weak person. The bind in which this 
would-be patient is caught and which radically curtails her free- 
dom is that her father was the only image of strength she had, 
and in spite of her hatred for him, she also identified with him. 
The dilemma, then, is that she identifies with the person she feels 
she hates, and how could she then escape hating her executive 
job? But no other job would be interesting to her either, in as 
much as she identifies success, achievement, strength, and zest in 
life with her father. The upshot was that her freedom to do any- 
thing at all was blocked. 
When a person loses his freedom, there develops in him an 
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apathy, as in the blacks in slavery, or neurosis or psychosis as in 
twentieth-century people. Thus, their effectiveness in relating to 
their fellow men and also to their own natures is proportionally 
reduced. Following Kierkegaard, we can define neurosis and psy- 
chosis as lack of communicativeness, "shut-up-ness," inability to 
participate in the feelings and thoughts of others or to share one- 
self with others. Thus, blind to his own destiny, the person's 
freedom is also truncated. These states of psychological distur- 
bance demonstrate by their very existence the essential quality of 
freedom for the human being-if you take it away, you get radical 
disintegration on the part of the victim. 
Neurotic symptoms, such as the psychosomatic paralysis of 
the leg which one of Freud's early patients developed when she 
could do nothing about being in love with her sister's husband, 
are ways of renouncing freedom. Symptoms are ways of shrink- 
ing the periphery of the world with which one bas to deal to a 
size with which one can cope. These symptoms may be tempo- 
rary, as when one gets a cold and takes several days off from the 
office, thus temporarily reducing the world that one has to con- 
front. Or the symptoms may be so deeply set in early experiences 
that, if unattended, they block off a great portion of the person's 
possibilities throughout all of the person's life. The symptoms 
indicate a breakdown in the interplay of one's freedom and one's 
destiny. 
This brings us to one of the gross abuses of freedom in our 
day: change for its own sake, or change as a flight from reality. 
This abuse of freedom is most egregious in what are called 
"growth centers." Let me hasten to say that impetus for the 
growth-center movement and the work of many individual cen- 
ters 1 believe to be sound and admirable. This impetus is the 
courage to confront one's own self and one's problems in human 
relationships; it is the belief that one can take oneself in hand and 
establish some autonomy in one's life. 
But anyone who reads the "Free Directory of Growth Cen- 
ters" in Marin County can readily see the preponderance of "pos- 
itive thinking" and self-delusion in its most blatant forms. From 
the brief individual ads for the 280 various centers given in this 
directory, one's impression is overwhelmingly of such purposes 
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as "tapping your true potential and creativity," "finding more and 
more joy," "a perfect living guru is a 'must' on the path God- 
ward," and so on. Nowhere could 1 find words dealing with com- 
mon experiences of anyone living in our day-namely, "anxiety," 
"tragedy," "grief," or "death." All is drowned out by endless joy 
and the fearless promises of'triumph and transcendence, a mass 
movement toward egocentric "peace," self-enclosed "love," with 
its somnolescent denial of the realities of human life, the use of 
change for escapist purposes if there ever was one. And what a 
misunderstanding of the ancient religions of the East that in their 
name salvation is promised over the weekend! 
The problem in these growth centers is the complete absence 
of any sense of destiny. Tocqueville is right: they seem to believe 
that all of destiny is controlled by themselves. The individuals 
will totally determine their fate. The leaders seem not to be aware 
that what they are espousing is not freedom at all, but sentimen- 
tality, a condition in which the feeling alone is sougbt ratber than 
reality. 
Such considerations as these lend urgency to our purpose to 
rediscover the meaning of personal freedom. The burgeoning of 
the growth-center movement does testify to the widespread hun- 
ger among modem people for some guidance so that life will not 
have passed them by. The mere existence of these centers- 
which could not survive were they not patronized–demonstrate 
' 
that hordes of people feel there is something missing in their lives, 
some failure to find what they are seeking or perhaps even to know 
what they are seeking. One person, who apparently was well 
acquainted with the situation, wrote, .; . 
l've been ested, esaloned, Moonied, asserted, Krishna'd and Marin'd. 
And now 1 can't remember what a spontaneous feeling really is. 
The root of the tree which has sprouted the infinite number 
of branches in different types of therapy-psychoanalysis, group 
psychotherapy, and even counseling in all its forms-is, of 
course, Sigmund Freud. 1 do not mean to imply there would have 
been no fantastic surge of methods of therapy, many of them <. 
' 
claiming to be anti-Freudian, if Freud had not lived. It is not just 
that great men make history, as Tolstoy one-sidedly argued; but 
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that history, in its various crises, also makes great men. Certain 
persons are called forth to spearhead a trend which is required by 
history. Hence, if there had been no Sigmund Freud at the begin- 
ning of the twentieth century to invent psychoanalysis, it would 
have been invented by somebody else with the same name. 
Psychotherapy in all its branches is a response to the loss on 
a vast scale of people's inner mooring posts. It is symptomatic of 
the breakdown of freedom in our culture, the bankruptcy of our 
culturally inherited ways of dealing with our freedom and des- 
tiny. It is, thus, not by accident that Freud's work came at a time 
when personal inner freedom was becoming all but lost in the 
maelstrom of modernity. Confusion about human destiny and 
confusion about personal freedom go together, and they will be 
resolved, so far as resolution is possible, together. 
Psychoanalysis-and any good therapy-is a method of 
increasing one's awareness of destiny in order to increase one's expe- 
rience of freedom. In contrast to his technical determinism, Freud 
struck a significant blow on a deeper level for freedom. He set out 
to free people from the psychological entanglements they, like the 
executive secretary above, were embroiled in because of their fail- 
ure to confront their own destinies. 
What is most remarkable about Freud is his continuous wres- 
tling with destiny. By showing the impossibility of shortcuts and 
the superficial by-passes to freedom, which break down at every 
turn, Freud required us to search for freedom on a deeper level. 
If freedom is to be achieved it will not be achieved overnight. In 
his theory of reaction formation, for example, he pointed out that 
altruism is the result of repressed stinginess (which surely a great 
deal of it is), and that religious beliefs are an opiate and a way for 
people to avoid facing death (which many of them are), and that 
the belief in God is an expression of yearning for the all-powerful 
father who will take care of us (which for multitudes of people it 
manifestly is). 
If we are to achieve freedom, we must do so with a daring and 
a profundity that refuse to flinch at engaging our destiny. 
' 
II 
. One Man's Passage ... -, 
All 1 do to my disciples is to free them from their own bondage, by ' 
any means their case may need. 
Whether you are bound by a gold chain or an iron one, you are in 
captivity. Your virtuous activities are thegold chain, your evil ones ' 
the iron one. He who shakes off botb the chains of good and evil that 
' 
' .. imprison him, ... he has attained the Supreme Truth. ' ' - FREDERICK FRANCK, The Book of Angelus Silesius 
Let us begin our exploration of freedom with a detailed dis- 
cussion of a man in his middle fifties, Philip, who came for ther- 
apy on the impetus of an intense and crippling jealousy. The ' 
woman, Nicole, with whom he had been deeply in love for sev- 
eral years, as she apparently had been with him, was a writer in 
her middle forties, intelligent, reportedly striking in appearance, 
and the mother of two small children (not his). She had lately 
insisted on the freedom to sleep with other men, arguing that it 
had nothing to do with her love for him. But Philip could not 
bring himself to accept this, and her going to bed with other men 
threw him into agony. Nor could he break away from her. She 
insisted that she would not be monogamous unless he married 
her, a step he also could not bring himself to take since he 
regarded his two previous marriages as partial failures and had 
already raised a family of three children. 
Philip presents the picture of a radically unfree man. He 
resembled, as people who come for therapy regularly do, a Gul- 
liver tied down by endless threads until he could not move one 
way or another. Each fantasy about Nicole, he felt, seemed to 
bind him tighter. 
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An architect, Philip showed me a vivid symbol of his psycho- 
logical distress when, in one of our early sessions, he brought 
photographs of some churches he had designed. The buildings 
gave the impression of a great sweeping movement toward the 
sky, a yearning to pierce the heavens with their steeples. 1 could 
see why such architecture was often called "frozen music." But 
the foundations of these otherwise attractive and impressive edi- 
fices seemed overheavy-the stone and concrete seemed weighted 
down, bound to the earth. As 1 listened to him, this became a 
symbol for him in my mind-a man of powerful idealism, reach- 
ing upward toward the sky which promised freedom, but at the 
same time unintegrated with and hopelessly bound to the mud 
and stones at the bottom. 
Half a year after he and Nicole had met, they had spent the 
summer together at his retreat, her children being with their fa- 
ther. Each morning Nicole had occupied herself with her writing, 
and Philip, in a separate studio on the land, worked on his architec- 
tural designs. Once at the beginning of the summer Nicole raised 
the question of their marrying. Philip had come out flatly against 
it, stating as reasons his previous bad luck in his marriages and 
the fact that, even though he was fond of her two sons, he could 
not conceive of himself as raising another family. Except for this 
interchange, they had had an idyllic summer together. 
He apparently had gotten much tenderness and warmth from 
Nicole. Their sexual relations seemed to be the best he had ever 
experienced-sometimes ecstatic, sometimes giving them both 
the feeling of being totally merged with each other, but always 
rich and nourishing. Their intellectual discussions had also been 
especially gratifying to him, her ideas often giving him solutions 
to his design problems. 
At the end of the summer Nicole had to fly back home half a 
week before him to put her children in school. The next day he 
had phoned her home, but he sensed something strange in her 
voice at the other end. The following day he phoned again, and 
it seemed to him that someone else was in the room. All afternoon 
he called back, only to find her line busy. 
When he did get through to her, she answered his questions 
point-blank. Yes, someone had been there. An intimate friend 
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from her college years had been staying with her for several days, 
and she had fallen in love with him. She had felt "dismissed" by 
Philip's supposed cavalier good-by when she left his farm and had 
.. been in a panic on the plane coming back about how she was 
going to take care of her children alone. The lover from bygone 
days, Craig, was "into" children, having two the same age as 
hers. The fine summer had convinced her how easy and gratify- 
ing it was to live with someone. She was planning to marry Craig 
. at the end of the month and move across country, where Craig 
had promised to get her a job at his company. 
Yes, she still loved Philip. She had thought Philip would be 
upset, but he would get over it. 
- Philip's world collapsed. He was overcome with feelings of 
betrayal. How could she do this after their idyllic summer? Com- 
ing back to the city, he lost fifteen pounds in the next three 
weeks. He resumed smoking, had no appetitie, and had to take 
Seconal to sleep at night. 
When he saw her, he had thrown aside his usual politeness 
and told her in no uncertain terms that the whole plan was crazy. 
He continued to invite Nicole and her children to his house for 
weekends (when Craig was not visiting her) and to take her to the 
. theater from time fo time. During this period, while Craig was in " 
the picture, Philip's potency was blocked off regardless of the fact 
that Nicole wanted to make love with him. "My body doesn't 
trust you," Philip had said. 
Gradually Nicole got over her infatuation. After six weeks she 
was back in love with Philip and had written him, "Yoû know I 
never could leave the place where you are." Philip was surprised 
at the message. He had consciously known no such thing, but it . ' fitted into his own need for security, and he therefore didn't ques- 
tion it. He had given her a nominal research job in his corporation 
that she could perform at home and would yield her enough 
money to live on. He had also made her a gift of several thousand 
dollars, ostensibly because her family needed it to live on. But he 
told me in our sessions that he also did it as "insurance"-she 
" would then be less apt to leave him. He tried to persuade Nicole 
. to go into therapy at that time because of the great emotional 
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confusion she had shown in her affair with Craig. But she would 
have none of it. 
It might seem that his reactions are "normal" in such a situa- 
tion for a man very much in love. But let me throw two other 
incidents into the hopper. 
The incident that was the actual occasion for his coming for 
therapy occurred about a year after the "Craig affair." Philip had 
been under the impression that Nicole was going away to another 
state on an upcoming weekend to lead a workshop. It is interest- 
ing to note, as an example of the ESP that often appears in psy- 
chotherapy, that Philip, the Thursday morning before this 
weekend, had written in his diary about her trip to the workshop: 
There is an ache in my heart. 1 am consumed by jealousy-a feeling of 
fear that 1 am losing Nicole. I have fantasies about her going to meet 
some man and spending the weekend with him.... I have the feeling 
she sticks with me only because I have a little money-which I know is 
utter nonsense.... But 1 am very lonely. 
Philip had felt that he had to phone her on Sunday-so he 
stated to me-to décide on some plans on a trip they were to 
make. He got her phone number at her "workshop" from her 
babysitter. A man answered. Philip became aware that there had 
been no workshop at all, and that she had gone to spend the week- 
end-precisely as he had fantasied it-with this man at his home. 
Nicole on the phone refused to talk to him about where she was. 
She got angry when he asked whether she was staying with a man 
and hung up. 
Exceedingly depressed and anxious, Philip had to leave the 
next morning for a five-day speaking trip. During thèse days he 
was filled with a maelstrom of émotions of anger, hurt, and 
betrayal. He resolved to break off the relationship as soon as he 
got back. 
But during the last day, when he was flying back home, it 
occurred to him that perhaps he was being too harsh. Were there 
ways in which he, as a love partner, could accept this fact of 
extrarelationship sex? He had thought that one way would be to 
identify with the other man, imagine him as his friend. Then he 
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would, in fantasy, be glad of the other man's pleasure with 
Nicole. He could also do what the younger generation did in the 
1960s-decide that pure authenticity, pure feeling, is the impor- 
tant thing. Perhaps in a relationship like Nicole's and his this was 
the only criterion. Are we living in a new age, he asked himself, 
when promises and rules and roles are all thrown overboard? 
These "principles" seemed,to me to be rationalizations with a ' masochistic feature about the whole. But 1 did not want to cut off ' 
any associations by labeling experiences, especially so early in our ' 
therapy. ' 
As soon as his plane landed, he went directly to Nicole's 
home. In their talk Nicole said, as Philip later wrote it down in 
his diary, 
The weekend was not that important. What was good was that he gave 
me a lot of space by myself. What you, Philip, should understand about 
me is that I believe sex does not necessarily involve intimacy. The sex 
bored me. I was more attracted to women than to men. l've considered 
' 
being celibate for a while. You don't understand me that way. And that's 
all 1 want to say about the weekend. 
' 
During their lovemaking later that day she had whispered in 
his ear that she loved him more than she'd ever loved anyone, and 
. ,,, that she loved no one else. If he could get that through his head, 
she believed their problems would be solved. 
A third incident occurred when Nicole, after spending an 
especially tender and ecstatic weekend with Philip at his home, 
asked him to drive her down to meet some friends from the col- 
lege where she used to teach. The friends would then drive her 
the remaining fifty miles back to her home. She seemed nervous, 
and it turned out that she was to meet only one friend, Wilbur, 
who had been her passionate lover up until the time she moved 
, .. ,, from her previous town to her present home. She had often told 
' 
Philip of the oceans of tears she had shed in the fruitless attempt 
to persuade Wilbur to leave his wife and marry her. As they 
. ' arrived at the appointed house, Philip wished her luck-meeting 
" an old lover is always an occasion-but he added that he hoped 
she would not go to bed with Wilbur. 
One Man's Passage 29 
After he had left them, Philip found himself deeply stirred 
up, smoked one cigarette after another, and spent a day and an 
evening filled with jealousy. At dinnertime he phoned Nicole's 
house and learned that she had been in to make her children's 
dinner and then had hurried out again. About midnight he 
reached her and poured out his jealousy over the phone. She 
reassured him that she no longer loved Wilbur; she found him 
very immature and wouldn't marry him on a bet. Philip then 
asked the inevitable question: Had she gone to bed with him? She 
replied that she did not like the question and refused to answer. 
Philip naturally assumed that she had, and then another quarrel 
ensued like the countless ones before. 
Why didn't Philip break off this relationship? The fact that he 
felt himself deeply in love will not suffice for an answer. For a 
period of eight to ten months Nicole and Philip had both been 
committed to the relationship. But ofren-and before that- 
Nicole felt she needed her "space" and her "freedom." Were they 
both afraid of genuine intimacy? Was part of her attractiveness to 
him the fact that she did lead him on by jealousy? But if he could 
not stand her hopping in and out of bed with other men, why did 
he not find some other woman to love? If he was convinced that 
he could not marry her, why did he not act on that? In fact, why 
could he not act in any way at all? Except for these childlike 
outbursts toward Nicole and the painful gnawing he felt within 
himself, he was paralyzed. 
He was, furthermore, entirely aware of the fact that his jeal- 
ousy crippled him. It had been his Achilles heel all his life. 
Although he had initiated his two divorces, he felt that whatever 
the source of his jealousy, it was also a source of the breakup of 
those two marriages. And although a longish period of therapy 
he had undertaken some ten years ago had helped him a great 
deal, he had not been able to get to the roots of the jealousy. It 
seemed to have begun in the first years of his life, before he could 
talk and, therefore, before the development of his consciousness. 
Philip and 1 had only six weeks in which to work (I had to 
leave for the summer months). But he was anxious that 1 see him 
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as often as I could in a kind of "crash" program on the problem of 
his jealousy. This limitation of time accounts for the fact that 1 
use some techniques here that 1 do not ordinarily employ. 
1. The Fear of Abandonment t 
Philip's mother, now dead, seems to have been a borderline 
schizophrenic. She had been given to hysterical blowups and had 
been completely unpredictable in her emotions. Sometimes she 
treated Philip with tenderness and care, and the next hour she 
would turn into the personification of cruelty. An early memory 
of Philip's was from when he was three or four and the family was 
moving to a house several blocks away. Philip had felt that he had 
to go on his tricycle to show the movers where the new house 
was. His tricycle fell over on the brick sidewalk, and he skinned 
his knee. He went home to show his mother the injured knee. But 
she, apparently nervous because of the moving, threw a glass of 
water in his face. 
For the first two years of Philip's life, the only other person 
in the household was his sister Maude, two years older, who was 
definitely schizophrenic and was later to spend some time in a 
mental hospital. The relations with this sister, to which we will 
refer below, seem to be secondary only to his relations with his 
mother. This sister had died just several weeks before Philip 
came to me and seems to play a curious and important role in his 
therapy. Philip's father was away most of these first years, and 
did not like infants in any case. 
Thus, Philip endured his first years in the world learning to 
deal with two exceedingly unpredictable women. Indeed, he 
must have had inescapably imprinted on him that he needed not 
only to rescue women, but that one of his functions in life was to 
stick by them, especially when they acted their craziest. Life, 
then, for Philip would understandably not be free, but rather 
would require that he be continuously on guard or on duty. He 
recalled coming home from school and having to "case" the house 
on tiptoe to see what kind of mood his mother and sister were in, 
which would determine which tack was demanded of him. (As an 
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aside, he remarked that often in driving down to Nicole's he had 
tried to list the pros and cons of various responses she might have 
so he would be prepared ?.e., he was mentally "casing the 
joint.") Freedom in such a situation would be like Michelangelo's 
half-finished statues of slaves: freedom witbin the bonds of slavery. 
Nicole seemed, like Philip's mother, to be warm and tender at 
certain times and cruel at others. She not only did not make any 
attempt to keep her extrarelationship affairs private, but she 
apparently even went to the extent of making it impossible for 
Philip not to know about them-for example, by having him drive 
her down to meet and go off with Wilbur when she could have 
taken a cab. At her house she made a practice of leaving her cal- 
endar, on which were written her dates with other men, out on 
the desk where Philip could not help seeing it. "I have the right 
to do what 1 wish with my own body," she had said. The fact 
that these things were done "on principle"-i.e., on her belief 
that she was being "honest"-only made it all the harder for 
Philip to bear. 
After the first two sessions, 1 found myself mulling over sev- 
eral aspects of Philip's problem. First, the unpredictability of 
Nicole-which was a repeat of an old pattern, established by his 
mother, that apparently cemented him to Nicole-seems to have 
been one of the central things which made her so attractive to 
Philip. Another reason he could not break free was his sense of 
responsibility for the woman; his survival as a child had depended 
on how he responded to his mother and sister. Both of his pre- 
vious marriages had been with women who "needed" him. He 
had a strong sense of duty to take care of women; the more crazily 
they behaved, the stronger was his need to take responsibility for 
them. These things were in some way twisted into the cords that 
bound him to Nicole and enslaved him. Then there was the tend- 
erness and nourishment that Nicole did actually give him, as did 
Philip's mother; Nicole did seem to be loving and warm during 
the many good times she and Philip were together. But these 
obvious points need to be brought together in a pattern in Philip 
that 1 had not yet grasped. 
Nicole can be seen as his destiny, now visited severely upon 
him. In this sense Philip's problem is not a negative roadblock. It 
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is, rather, an opportunity-indeed, a requirement-to work 
through the remaining problem with his mother and sister. This 
" has to be done if he is to take another step, a giant step, in his 
achievement of personal freedom. 
It is surprising how often neurotic problems seem "fateful" in 
that they appear at a given time in one's career as demands that 
. the individual confront this or that particular complex within 
oneself. From this viewpoint, psychological problems are bless- 
ings in disguise. They come not by accident, but by an inner 
destiny that arises out of the needs of the person himself. 
One of the things that gave us hope of getting to the origin of 
Philip's problems was the death of his disturbed sister several 
weeks before he came to see me. Simultaneously with her death, 
he had had an attack of very painful neuritis, which felt "like a ' sword thrust through my neck." One day in an early session, he 
had been talking about the pain and loneliness of his first two 
years of life, and he remarked that it was a relief to cry. At the ' 
utterance of the word "relief' the pain suddenly struck him in full 
force. In a few seconds he was writhing on the floor, grabbing at ' his neck as though to choke off the unbearable anguish. When the 
pain left and 1 helped him up, 1 asked whether he felt like contin- ' 
uing our session. He answered, "Yes. 1 have to get through this 
problem no matter how much it hurts." The pain, he felt, was 
. his dead sister punishing him, as though she were crying out, 
"Where do you come off being so healthy and successful when 1 ' had to suffer so?" 
But 1 took the pain to be something more than this physical 
torture. 1 felt it was a prediction of the pain he would have to 
" endure psychologically if we continued our work. His determi- 
nation to continue, come hell or high water, was an inspiration to 
- - me. = 
' . 2. The Acknowledging of Destiny ' i= . 
', In an early session in our work, 1 asked Philip to bring a photo 
of himself taken during those crucial first two years. The picture 
.. _ ' he brought showed him at about a year and a half being photo- 
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graphed with his sister, Maude. Her attention was elsewhere, but 
his hand tightly grasped hers, his wide eyes looking intently at 
the photographer. 1 could already see in that photo the dilated 
eyes that spoke of anxiety, the need in this child to keep a sharp 
sentinel's view of the world around him at all times. He must 
have imbibed with his mother's milk the fateful "truth" that one 
cannot basically trust the world. 
The world, made up of his schizoid mother's hysterical state 
and his sister's disturbed mind, was the only world Philip had 
known for these two years. How was he to adapt to such a diffi- 
cult and cruel destiny? There was no reason why it should have 
been Philip rather than one of a million other infants who was 
born into this house with a disturbed mother and psychotic sister. 
There he had found himself, and there he was left to grow up as 
best he could. It is sad to say but true: there is never any recom- 
pense for ills suffered as an infant. 1 
One might think such an original environment would lead 
only to schizophrenia for Philip also. But already as a child of two 
he had escaped such severe disturbance by developing compen- 
sations-like his ability to detach himself when in danger, his 
capacity to keep his real thoughts secret, and his knack of getting 
along with everybody and placating other people by being charm- 
ing. The hypersensitivity-indeed, the almost psychic quality- 
' 
that people often develop in such unfavorable situations could be 
related to Philip's talents which led to his becoming a highly suc- 
cessful architect and a man with many friends and enough lovers. 
But one cannot make such compromises without penalty. The 
neurotic payment came from the fact that whenever a relationship 
got below a certain depth, Philip became panicky. 
In such cases, the metaphor of "imprinting" comes into my 
mind. A newborn duck, when the myelinization of the duck's 
neurological pathways is right, will follow and stick to whatever 
object it first sees. I have watched a full-grown duck following a 
rabbit around because that was the creature to which it had been 
originally imprinted, even though the irritated rabbit regularly 
turned and nipped the duck to drive it away. The unfortunate 
duck, seemingly welded to a way of life that was continuously 
punishing, continued following the rabbit. Paradoxically, when 
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the imprinting is made especially difficult for the creature being 
imprinted-say, by such punishment of the duck-the attach- 
ment becomes even stronger. 1 felt like crying out to the duck, 
.. "For God's sake, go away and find your own mother! Don't con- 
tinue just being bitten and hurt." 
" 
Sometimes in my patients I see a similar blind, irrational 
attachment to a way of behaving to which the person has been . conditioned by his fate at a very early age. The metaphoric rela- 
tion of imprinting to human beings is that, in their early attach- 
ment to their mothers, human babies seem to follow their original 
attachment with a similar blind fidelity. And this behavior may 
be made even stronger by punishments or other difficulties put in ' 
its path. 
. Use of terms like "self-punishment" and "masochism" are to 
no avail. The original way the infant was taught to behave wins 
out. When the child becomes a little older, this emerges as the 
. impossibility of basic trust, to use Erikson's words. Dr. John : 
Bowlby, who has made the classic studies of attachment and sep- 
. aration of infants, writes: 
The way in which attachment behavior develops in the human infant 
and becomes focused on a discriminated figure is sufficiently like the way 
in which it develops in other mammals, and in birds, for it to be 
included, legitimately, under the heading of imprinting. 
Although there is doubt as to whether this original "imprinting" 
can be overcome, the person can build new experiences around 
and over it and thus compensate for an original unfortunate expe- 
rience. - 
Even though he was in his fifties, Philip was still striving to 
find a "good" mother to make up for the "bad" mother of his 
experience, to bring him justice after the cruel first two years. He 
had gone through his life lonely, yearning for a love that would 
fill the large area of emptiness in his breast. He had lived on the 
edge of becoming the kind of person who goes on year after year 
looking in the face of every woman he meets with the silent ques- 
tion : Are you the one who will make up for my loss? One of my 
tasks in therapy with Philip was to get across to him that this 
struggle he was engaged in was bound to be self-defeating. 
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The first and fundaJnental challenge for such a person is to 
confront his fate as it is, to reconcile himself to the fact that he did 
receive a bad deal, to know that justice is irrelevant, that no one 
will ever make up for the emptiness and the pain of those first 
two years. The past cannot be changed-it can only be acknowl- 
edged and learned from. It is one's destiny. It can be absorbed 
and mitigated by new experiences, but it cannot be changed or 
erased. Philip only adds insult to injury by going on the rest of 
his life knocking his head against the same stone wall. Fortu- 
nately, psychotherapy can be a vehicle through which human 
beings may become more aware of and compensate for such 
implanted destiny. 
. 1 pointed out to Philip how hanging on to this way of life was 
also hanging on to his mother. It is an expression of the hope that 
someday Mother will reward him, someday he'll find the Holy 
Grail. Now he'lI get the original care which was missing; now 
he'll get that restored! But there's no way to restore it, no matter 
how much of a loss it is. Bad fate, yes. But that's the way it is. 
The lost mother image, the lost chance, the great emptiness 
within him-they are all going to remain there. These things are 
the past; there is no way of changing them. You can change your 
attitutude toward these tragic happenings, as did Bettleheim, 
describing his "ultimate freedom" as his command over his atti- 
tude toward the storm troopers in the concentration camp. But 
you can't change the experiences themselves. 
If you hang on to an illusion of such change, always hoping 
for "pie in the sky by and by" you cut off your possibilities. You 
then become rigid. You don't let yourself take in the new possi- 
bilities. You trade your freedom for a mess of emotional pottage. 
And this way, as a corollary, you never use your anger construc- 
tively. You lose a tremendous amount of power, energy, and pos- 
sibility. In short, you lose your freedom. 
But is there no constructive value in coming to terms with 
one's early fate? Yes, there is-and a value potentially greater 
than what one gives up. The struggle to come to terms with such 
. early relationships as Philip suffered as an infant has much to do 
with the emergence of creativity. Would Philip have developed 
these talents which led to his high status in the world of architec- 
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.,. ture if he had not experienced such a disturbed family life? Alfred 
Adler believed, indeed, that creativity was a compensation for 
such early trauma. 
We know that creative people often come out of such unfor- 
. tunate family backgrounds. Why and how they do is still one of 
the mysteries the answer to which the Sphinx of creativity has 
not revealed. We do know that unfortunate infants like Philip 
have never been permitted to take life lightly. They learn from 
the hour of birth not to accept Jocasta's advice: "Best take life 
easily, as a man may." They cannot coast along or rest on their 
laurels. 
This exceptional achievement following a disturbed child- 
hood has been documented in many cases. In his study of creativ- 
ity Jerome Kagan writes: 
.. Such freedom of the artist is not born. It is made in the pain of adolescent 
loneliness, the isolation of physical handicap, or, perhaps, the smug 
superiority of inherited title. The freedom that permits "generation of 
possibilities" ... is the beginning of a creative product. 
Similarly, Richard Farson finds his "calamity theory" fits 
such situations: 
Many of our most valuable people have come from the most calamitous 
early childhood situations. Investigations of the childhoods of eminent 
people expose the fact that they did not receive anything like the kind of 
child rearing that a person in our culture is led to believe is healthy for 
children.... Whether in spite of or because of these conditions, it is 
clear that these children not only survived, but reached great heights of 
achievement, many after having experienced the most deplorable and 
traumatic childhoods. 
The tension in these personalities between high aspiration and 
disappointment may well be the necessary matrix out of which 
creativity-and, later, civilization-is born. This type cannot 
slide into any "well-adjusted" syndrome. There is the outstand- 
ing exception of J. S. Bach, but his contentment-if it was that- 
seems to have been a combination of fortunate social conditions. 
The "well-adjusted" persons rarely make great painters, sculp- 
tors, writers, architects, musicians. Coming out of such a con- 
fused early childhood as Philip's, this creative capacity may be 
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considered a later compensation. The question is: Can a person 
like Philip seize these possibilities-these new reaches of freedom 
not without cruel fate, but despite fate-and weld them into a sig- 
nificant building, a statue, a painting, or some other creative 
product? 
There is another boon worth more than the loss in Philip's 
confrontation with his mother. If he can accept this deprivation 
of the care he had rightfully expected, if he can engage this lone- 
liness face to face, he will have achieved a strength and a power 
that will be a foundation more solid than he ever could have 
achieved otherwise. If he can accept this aspect of his destiny, the 
fates will work with rather than against him. In this way one lives 
with the universe rather than against it. 
These last things about the values in engaging one's destiny 1 
did not express at this time directly to Philip, for 1 did not want 
him to accept his destiny in order to achieve creativity. That never 
works. I did strongly emphasize the need to engage and accept 
these cruel things in his background. 1 wanted him, to put it in 
our words rather than the words of the therapy, not to accept 
destiny for anything, but simply because it is. 
3. The Confronting of Mother 
At my suggestion, Philip had a conversation with his dead 
mother in my office. In the fantasy, his mother was sitting in the 
opposite chair. 
PHII3P: Mother, you and I have come to the end of the road. I'm no 
longer going to cringe before you. In the past, if ever any of us 
children disagreed with you, you'd scream, get hysterical, and run 
to the window as though you were going to jump out. I used to 
lie awake at night when you were ranting and raving down- 
stairs. You had us ali scared to death. But you and I have reached 
the end of that road. Hereafter l'mgoing to speak out directly and 
straight. I am no longer afraid of youas God knows I used to 
be. And l'm not going to lie or prevaricate to get out of saying 
what Î think. Remember that time I received the award for that 
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design of tbe church in New York City? You were there. The first 
thing you said to me, when you saw the model, was "Philip, I 
bad all those ideas forty years ago." You took it all away from 
me. 1 felt repressed as hell. But rm not going to let you do that 
_ any more. 
He went on about how as a child he had never been able to 
feel any peace, and about his mother's part in the fact that being 
at home meant for him continuous anxiety and sharp pangs of 
psychological pain. 
1 asked him now to sit in his mother's chair and speak for her. 
' MOTlŒR: Pbilip-boy, you may not believe it, but I was very proud 
of you. When you'd win those contests in school, Id take the pro- 
grams home and treasure them. /'d tell all tbe neighbors whenever 
you'd be on TV. I got a postcard photo of that very church for ' 
which you got tbe award, and Id show it to everyone who came 
to tbe house. 1 said tbat about the model because I was so scared. 
" ' ' With all those college professors around, wbo was I? Don't forget, 
. " ' 
1 grew up as an orphan. I bad no self-esteem at ail. I was always 
tired from taking care of you children and trembling inside me 
.. witb tbe fear tbat your father would leave me for good-like be 
, later did. 1 ktlow 1 had a bad temper... and Im glad you stand ' 
up against it now. I used to lie awake nigbts regretting my blow- 
ups and making resolutions to stop them. But the next day my ' . 
temper would be as bad as ever. You were my favorite cbild. I ' 
..J tried not to sbow it top much to tbe others, but you were. My 
oldest son. Whenever you'd design a building near us, l'd go to see 
it even wbile they were putting it up. Whenever you'd write ' 
sometbing, I would look at it and bold it proudly, even though 
, most of wbat you wrote I couldn't understand. You went with a 
crowd of intellectual big shots 1 never could feel at home with at 
all. But it was so hard to say these things when I was alive. I 
don't know wby. 
PHIUP [moving to the other chair without my suggesting it]: 
Mother, 1 want to s et tbe record right. Ive been deceiving myself 
witbout even knowing it. 1 think I did know all of my life that 
1 was your favorite, but 1 never would admit it. To be rejected 
made a better excuse-,to tell everyone how misunderstood I was, 
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how I triumphed over great odds. The misunderstood genius, 
nobody to help me, and so on. 1 want to tell you now 1 do appre- 
ciate you. You had a lot of courage, which you passed on to me. 
You taught me what care is even though you couldn't let yourself 
use it very often. Remember that time when I was very small I 
broke a light bulb on a stone and theglass spattered into my eyes? 
You took me to tbe doctor, who took most of it out. He was quit- 
ting and you said, "Please go over his eyes once more. " He did, 
and he found some more glass. Consequently, now I am not blind. 
Yes, you had courage, and you never quit while you lived. I want 
to thank you for these qualities. 
Back in his own chair, Philip sat silently, looking down at the 
rug. After a few minutes he turned to me and said, "I never in a 
thousand years would have imagined that would come out." 
4. Little Philip 
1 got out the photo of Philip that 1 had asked him to bring me 
early on in our work. 1 said, "Philip, this little boy is in that 
period which you walled off, encapsulated. Please call him back 
to mind now. Have him sit in this other chair. Talk to him, and 
let him talk to you." 
In this conversation between Philip and his fantasy counter- 
part of many years ago, the little boy first told how frightening it 
was to exist day by day in that atmosphere in the house with two 
hysterical zombies. It was constant inconstancy, unpredictabil- 
ity, insecurity, and especially loneliness. "Little Philip" (as Philip 
now called him) told how tremendously alone he felt, with the air 
so emotionally frigid that he'd go to bed at night with a feeling 
that no other person was in the house. The other two persons 
seemed a million miles away. Generally, the only connection he 
had with his mother and sister was in his having to be prepared 
for the times they'd get upset. 
But the most remarkable thing in that session was the meta- 
morphosis of Little Philip. As Philip mostly listened in this 
strange conversation, Little Philip seemed to get over his anxiety. 
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He now sat in the Lotus position, appearing like a little Buddha, 
wise beyond his years. Did this wisdom corne from his having 
observed everything that had happened in those first two years, 
and then having kept all these thing bottled up in his heart? 
Little Philip became a kind of guide and friend to Philip. Now 
he sat beside Philip. He was calm, cheerful, but not laughing, 
emanating peacefulness, as though he had, all these years unbe- 
knownst to the grown Philip, triumphed over the problems that 
trou bled the grown Philip so much-fear of abandonment, the 
unpredictability of women, the cruelty of being left alone. 
"Yes, he bad triumphed over these problems," 1 said, "since 
you-for he is you-did not succumb, but succeeded in life 
despite your problems." 
" 
Then Philip began to weep slowly, but he kept talking. "Little 
Philip says, 'I'll stay with you.... We'II be companions and 
friends.... When you want comfort, I'll be there, or when you 
. just want to talk something over, I'll stick with you." 
" 
Philip's crying-I pointed out to him-seemed not to come 
from sadness but rather from gratitude at his finding this new 
part of himself. At last this reunion. Was not his crying simply 
an overflow of emotion, which everyone feels at the reliving of 
these early experiences? He nodded. 
As a fantasy figure, but furnishing real comfort, Little Philip 
was later to go along with Philip on his plane trips across the 
country, on his way down to see Nicole, and everywhere Philip 
needed him. Indeed, every place Philip was, there also was Little 
Philip. He was always available, always ready to give the com- 
ments that were necessary, a constant companion, but mostly just 
a presence that greatly expanded Philip's self. 
It all seemed a surprising discovery to the grown Philip. He 
said, as though he were the first person ever to experience this, 
"l'm not lonely any more. My loneliness seems to have been 
mostly my own abandonment of my early self." During the next 
weeks, whenever he would find some occasion to be jealous of 
Nicole, Philip had only to call to mind this friendly companion, 
and the little Buddha seemed to fill the emptiness that otherwise 
would have been a hollow in which anxiety and jealousy could 
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fester. "I'm not abandoned any more!" Philip had said with 
amazed delight. 
Philip was experiencing the birth in consciousness of a new- 
though old-part of his self. It was a dawning of awareness of 
new possibilities which had in effect been there all the time. This 
could be for Philip a giant step toward his personal freedom. 
And it was actually the beginning of Philip's giving up his 
clinging to loneliness, the beginning of "accepting acceptance," 
the uniting of himself with that early self that he had had to lock 
up in a dungeon in order to survive when life was not happy but 
threatening. Although this does not alter the original lack of basic 
trust, it does surmount it in the literal meaning of that term. 
S. Anger as a Path to Freedom 
What we hear most about the psychology of anger is that it 
clouds our vision, causes us to misunderstand each other, and in 
general interferes with the cairn necessary for a rational, clear 
view of life. People point out that anger curtails one's freedom. 
All this is true. But it is one-sided; it omits the constructive side to 
anger. 
In our society, we confuse anger with resentment, a form of 
repressed anger that eats steadily away at our innards. In resent- 
ment we store up ammunition to "get even" with our fellows, but 
we never communicate directly in a way that might resolve the 
problem. This transformation of anger into resentment is, as 
Nietzsche so emphatically proclaimed, the sickness of the middle 
class. It corrodes our stature as human beings. 
Or we confuse anger with temper, which is generally an 
explosion of repressed anger; with rage, which may be a patho- 
logical anger; with petulance, which is childish resentment; or 
with hostility, which is anger absorbed into our character struc- 
ture until it infects every act of ours. 
1 am not referring to these kinds of hostility or resentment. 1 
am speaking, rather, of the anger that pulls the diverse parts of 
the self together, that integrates the self, keeps the whole self alive 
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and present, energizes us, sharpens our vision, and stimulates us 
to think more clearly. This kind of anger brings with it an expe- 
rience of self-esteem and self-worth. It is the healthy anger that ' 
makes freedom possible, the anger that cuts one loose from the ' 
unnecessary baggage in living. 
Philip told me about a trip that he and Nicole had made to 
Trinidad. One particular evening they had planned to go danc- 
ing. But upon returning to their room after several cocktail parties 
and wine at dinner before continuing on to the dance, Philip had 
unexpectedly passed out on the bed. Nicole, as usual desirous of 
dancing, was enraged. Philip awoke a few hours later to find him- 
self, in the fog of half consciousness, making love to Nicole. She 
had gotten more and more upset at his having passed out and had 
pulled off his trousers and told him while he was still in a semi- 
conscious state that she wanted to make love. 
Still foggy and trying to orient himself to the gap in time, he 
asked her what she had been doing while he was blacked out. 
She answered, "I went out on the lawn in front. There was a 
man from North Carolina. We got to talking, then fucking. He 
fucked me for a whole hour." 
In his fogginess Philip didn't know whether her story was true 
or made-up. All night long he was prey to this ambivalence. In 
the morning he asked her what she had meant by the story, and 
she, blushing, had said it was meant to be funny. 
R. M. : What did you feel about the story? ' 
PHILIP:Just that 1 wasgreatly upset by it. 
' 
R. M.: You didn't see its cruelty? 
' 
PHILIP: No, 1 didn't see it as cruel. I only know that every time 1 
think of some stranger fucking her for an hour, it's like a red bot 
poker being shoved into my heart. 
R.M.: Imagine Nicole sitting in this chair. She's just told you this 
story. What are your feelings? Speak them out to her. [A string 
of epithets toward Nicole comes from Philip, some about his anger 
at her, but mostly about how much she had hurt him. Yes, you 
... . bave felt her cruelty all the way along. Nicole's values are not 
. " ' . your values. It's a conflict of two deerent value systems. If, as 
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you say, her father left when she was four and she never had a 
firm father after that, she would naturally be confused about how 
to deal with men. She'd take revenge by punishing men as a 
whole. And you're also being punished for not marrying ber. But 
none of these is our real problem here. You've left out your role 
in all this. Who was it who tried to buy Nicole off by giving ber 
money? Who talked of insurance? Who puts himself through all 
of this pain, bears it all just to see Nicole again? Who humiliates 
himself time and time again just to be with her? Who follows 
these other fellows into her bed and, so long as he gets the nipple to 
suck, the lover to make love to, accepts the humiliation of it all? 
[Philip seems taken aback.] Sure, it was a cruel story Nicole 
told you in Trinidad. But you notice you didn't feel its cruelty- 
only how much it hurt you. The reason you don't feel it is you 
can't admit your own cruelty-ruelty to yourself most of all. 
Today you are surprisingly like the little boy begging Maude and 
Mother, "Slap me, beat me, anything you wish, so long as you let 
me keep on living here!" Yes, 1 know that back in that home you 
had to be deceitful to survive, you had to cover up what you really 
felt and thought. You surrendered your freedom. You always tried 
to foresee what the other person's reaction would be before you 
spoke. You hid behind such laudable words as "responsibility, 
" 
"dutiful," "noble son," and so on. But you must have hated those 
roles with Maude and your mother. 
PHILIP: Christ, yes! 
R. M. : Imagine Maude sitting in the chair now. She's been dead two 
months. Tell her what you really felt. 
PHILIP: Okay. Maude, I always hated coming to see you. I never 
dared say it-you were in enough pain. I pretended to be the nice, 
responsible brother. You talked about your bowel movements, how 
_ much you hated ail the doctors, how your niece was stealing your ' 
money, and all the people who had betrayed you. 1 kept secretly 
looking at my watch to see how much longer I had to endure this 
paranoid stuff.... 
Venting this anger gave Philip partial freedom. At least he 
began to know he could say what he feels. But it was still a free- 
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dom within a jail. There was lacking the surge of anger that leads 
, to a changing of one's life, the willingness to cut loose all the 
barges one is pulling, to throw aside all one's luggage and one's 
overscrupulous cares. 
Back in this country, a week after their trip to Trinidad where 
Nicole had told him the story about having intercourse with the 
man in the front yard, Philip had asked her point blank whether 
the story was true or made up. Surprised, she said that of course 
it was made up, and asked him rhetorically whether he knew 
anybody who would have actually done that? He had replied, 
"Yes, my sister." 
This opened up a new dimension: the identification of Maude 
with Nicole and the probability of some projection on Nicole that 
actually came from his sister. Maude had been promiscuous-she 
had picked up men on the street. Philip was deathly afraid of 
being like Maude. Hence, his overcontrol, his fear of cutting 
loose. These were a protection against his sister's schizophrenic 
impulses. 
R. M.: Philip, I notice tbat you show Nicole how much she burts you. 
You react like Pavlov's dos--you make sure she sees hozu you ' 
bleed. But you don't tell her how you really feel. You never simply 
say to ber, "Look, 1 love you and I don't want you running . around the country baving sex with otber men. 
" 
. ' P?t.m:1 thougbt 1 had said that. 
R. M.: I haven't heard it. l've heard only how much her sleeping witb 
so and so hurts you, bow ail your lacerations are bleeding from 
bergoing away for that weekend. 
- PHILIP: 1 don't want to make demands on her. 
_ R. M. : You think you're not making demands on her by showing ber ' 
ail this blood? The only difference is, showing the blood is the more 
painful way for both of you. 1 hear you saying to the world "If 1 ' 
am hurt, they shouldn't do what tbey are doing" and "It's better 
... ' to feel hurt than to make otbers cry." Whenever they do start to 
cry-your mother, Maude, or Nicole-you capitulate.... You 
always prefer to be hurt rather than to take care of yourself even 
if it hurts someone else. 
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6. The Green-Blue Lad 
At about this time in our therapy the green-blue lad appeared 
in Philip's fantasies. This figure?f indeterminate age but 
somewhere in his late teens-emerged as a personification of 
Philip's anger. Unknown to Philip until 1 told him, green and 
blue are the colors in Chinese tradition that signify anger and 
fear.* But the green-blue lad was not dour and glowering, as most 
people in our culture would expect since we are that way when 
angry, but, paradoxically, was completely open and honest and 
full of energy, never stooping to find the best possible face to put 
on regardless of what he was talking about. Most surprising of all, 
he was the stimulator of Philip's sense of humor. The green-blue 
lad laughed at defeat, somewhat like Zorba the Greek. He could 
pick himself up undaunted when knocked to the ground; he could 
"risk it all in one pitch and toss," to crib Kipling's line. He seemed 
to be free of ali conformist luggage. He was spontaneous and 
seemed to move as though dancing and to be all the time on the 
point of breaking into laughter. 
A couple of weeks after the green-blue lad made his appear- 
ance in Philip's fantasies, Philip wrote the following in his diary, 
which he read to me: 
The green-and-blue lad comes to me when l'm feeling low, when l'm 
not able to do much except react. 1 may be low like Dickens' character 
Uriah Heep, cringing, ready to do anyone else's bidding. Suddenly, the 
green-blue lad appears and changes me by contagion. Just by my seeing 
his face and his energetic movements, 1 suddenly become a strong man, 
laughing at trouble and defeat. My self-esteem is reborn. I feel strong, 
able to cope. There is then no such thing as defeat for me, for the issue 
is within me. Even a defeat on the outside in life is a victory for me 
within because 1 have done it. The green-blue lad and 1 know only the 
word can; we know only possibilities. There is no such word as impassible 
for the green-and-blue fellow and me when we stand together. 
*1 am told by Dr. Harold Bailen, doctor both of American medicine and acu- 
puncture, that green is the color in Chinese tradition that signifies anger and its 
opposite, peace. Blue is the color that signifies fear and its opposite, courab_. In 
Chinese tradition one must go through these to get to joy. Red, the color of fire, 
is also the color signifying joy. 
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' 
Someplace in the session when the green-blue lad had first 
appeared, Philip had said, "If Nicole wants to continue her pres- 
ent bed-hopping, the hell with her. I'll make my life with some- 
one else." " 
.. He left that session in a state of ecstasy. It was one of those 
moments of breakthrough in therapy when it seems that nothing 
can stop the client from asserting his freedom and from taking 
hold of his life and remaking it. I watched him from my window . 
as he walked down the street. He seemed six inches taller. _ 
Simultaneously with the appearance of anger, the gnawing . 
jealousy in Philip vanished. 1 knew it would come back partially, 
but never as strongly or as overwhelmingly as it had been. The 
dread in Philip of being abandoned also vanished. He knew that 
if one person abandoned or rejected him, there were others who 
would not. Furthermore, he could choose with whom he wanted 
to be intimate from here on. 
It may seem strange to some readers that the green-blue lad 
was for Philip the personification of anger and that he appeared 
at this particular time. To understand this we must realize that 
many people who come for therapy have lost their freedom 
because of their repression of anger, a repression generally caused 
by their learning early in life that any anger will be severely pun- 
ished. They regularly adopt the pattern that Philip showed to 
start with: being deceitful, covering up what they really think, 
learning not to speak out directly but to foresee what the other 
person's reaction would be before they speak. The resentment 
into which their anger has been transformed in its repression is 
often a central cause of their lack of integration and their contin- 
uing to surrender their freedom and their possibilities of choice. 
Whereas resentment is almost entirely subjective, this kind of 
constructive anger, symbolized for Philip by the green-blue lad, 
is generally objective. As long as Philip felt only resentment 
toward his mother, everything he would have said about her 
would have been negative. But when, in therapy, he got angry at 
his mother in his fantasy, this led him, to his great surprise, to 
reveal how he secretly was appreciative and proud of his mother's 
care for him and her gifts to him. We recall his objective state- 
ment that his mother had done the best she could bringing up the 
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children with no help. It may seem that this is an "excuse." 1 do 
not think so. 1 think, rather, that it is an endeavor to ground the 
anger on the conditions which caused the anger in the first place. 
In other words, one is angry against destiny. 
The concept of destiny makes the experience of anger neces- 
sary. The kind of person who "never gets angry" is, we may be 
sure, the person who also never encounters destiny. When one 
encounters destiny, one finds anger automatically rising in one, 
but as strength. Passivity will not do. This emotion is not neces- 
sarily negative; recall that the green-blue lad was permeated with 
humor and robustness. Encountering one's destiny requires 
strength, whether the encounter takes the form of embracing, 
accepting, or attacking. Experiencing the emotional state of anger 
and conceiving of destiny means that you are freed from regard- 
ing yourself as too "precious"; you are able to throw yourself into 
the game, whatever it may be, without worrying about picayune 
details. 
Anger was, for Philip, a path to freedom. The times when he 
had become angry, we notice, were times when he had gained 
valuable insights, which he then expressed constructively-for 
example, the time when he told Nicole off about her plans to 
marry Craig and move across the country, which he had called 
"the craziest plan I ever heard." 
Experiences like Philip's is analogous to a ship putting out to 
sea. It is cast loose from the dock, and, sailing in the open wind, 
it then gets its power from cooperation with wind and sea and 
stars, as we get our power by living in cooperation with destiny. 
Our freedom, like the ship's, thus comes from engaging destiny, 
knowing that the elements are there ail the time and that they 
have to be encountered or embraced. Constructive anger is one 
way of encountering destiny. 
But often sailors find that they have to fight the elements, as 
in the case of a storm at sea. We find our freedom at the juncture 
of forces we cannot control but can only encounter-which often, 
like the ship fighting the storm, takes ail the strength we have. 
Now it is not only sailing with, it is sailing against the sea and the 
storm winds. 
The constructive anger we have been speaking about is one 
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way of using our power to choose our way of encountering des- 
tiny. The possible responses to destiny range from cooperation 
with at one end of the spectrum to fighting against at the other. 
Our anger empowers us in the struggle against destiny. As Beet- ' hoven cried, "I will seize fate by the throat!" And out of that came ' the Fifth Symphony. 
7. Loneliness and Rebirtb 
' 
Several sessions later, Philip came to his last hour, at least for ' 
the time being, feeling sad, lost, and especially lonely. These 
moods-typical for patients in the last session-are mainly an 
expression of the confusion and loneliness at parting from the 
therapist, the helper. The sadness is despair on being cast loose, 
alone, into the world. It gives us a final chance to look into the 
client's despair. 
Philip cried a little, which seemed to free him, and he then 
talked freely about this despair. "I feel that everybody has died. 
Mother is dead. Maude is dead. Nicole seems at the moment to 
be dying. And my relation with you will be dead. Everyone died 
.; at once." " 
1 reminded him that 1 would be here in the fall and available 
to him if he wished to talk with me. Furthermore, 1 hoped we 
would remain friends. Then 1 asked him about his loneliness. 
"I feel like one single spruce tree standing at the North Pole, 
with nobody or nothing around for a million miles..... At the 
North Pole a great honesty strikes me-I mean loneliness." He 
smiled over that slip of speech, and after thinking a little he 
added, "Yes, 1 guess it is a great `honesty'-the honesty that 
comes from being alone and feeling it alone. No mothering 
there." " 
His slip of speech says something important. Loneliness is 
honesty in one sense. In honesty you have to separate yourself 
from the impersonal mass-you are saved from conformism. To 
be honest is to be lonely in the sense that you individuate your- 
self, you seize the moment to be yourself and yourself alone. 
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There is an initial loneliness about being oneself, speaking out of 
one's own center. 
1 responded to him, "Isn't that the loneliness that we all expe- 
rience at times, the kind that is inseparable from the human con- 
dition ? If you dare to be honestly yourself, you will be lonely. At . 
each moment in our self-consciousness we are alone. No one else 
can genuinely come into our sanctum sanctorum. We die alone. 
No one escapes. This is destiny in its deepest sense. When we 
recognize this, then we can overcome the loneliness to some 
extent. We recognize that it is a human loneliness. It means we 
are all in the same boat, and we can then choose to, or not to, let 
others into our life. Lo and behold, we then have used the alone- 
ness to be less lonely." 
" 
For some reason not clear at the time but obvious later, Philip 
then told me about his three years at Robert College in Istanbul, 
where, on his graduation from college, he had gone to teach. The 
second year there he had felt painfully lonely, due chiefly to the 
isolation in a foreign land where the English-speaking group was 
small and boring. And teaching English to Turkish boys was not 
that absorbing. Philip had followed his usual defense: he threw 
himself into his work with ever greater zeal. But the harder he 
worked, the more isolated he felt. Finally he collapsed and had to 
go to bed for a couple of weeks. This he called his "nervous break- 
down." 
He had then changed his life style, he told me. He began to 
draw. He wandered around, drawing poppies in the fields and 
old mosques in Istambul. He gave up his habit of rigidly planning 
his life and began to take the flow of energy as it came. But ai] 
without aim or sense of direction, isolated, feeling often like a 
nonentity since all his old ways of proving his worth no longer 
worked. 
R. M. : Please close your eyes and imagine yourself back at that time 
in your life. Listen to the things around you, the buzzing of bees, 
the songs of birds that spring. Be that young man who had 
that "breakdown. "... What is he doing? 
PHILIP: He's just standing around in the college compound. He feels 
empty, lost.... There's a group of people nearby, mostly boys 
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from the school. He walks a little bit toward them.... Is it time 
. for supper? ... There's nothing he wants to do... no direction 
at all.... He's like a deaf and dumb person ... he doesn't say ' 
anything..... 
R. M.: What would you do with him? 
PHILIP: l'd walk over.... l'd put my arm around him.... l'd 
say, "We like you, Phil. "... l'd go with him to supper.... ' 
R.M.: Others must have liked this young man, too. 1 see that you 
behave lovingly toward him.... What part of you is identified 
with this young man? 
PHILIP: My heart, my muscles.... I feel him all the way through 
me. 
' 
R.M.: You see, you can give him love and tenderness. [Now Philip ' starts to weep again.] Is your crying because you have become ' aware that others could have liked and loved you and you 
. wouldn't even have known it? ... Aren't those tears ofgratitude 
_ tbat you can now absorb these things? 
Philip then told me that that spring, when he'd been without 
goals, undirected, and had given up his rigid mapping, had been 
'_ i the prelude to the "best summer 1 ever had. 1 started out on my . summer vacation úp toward the Caspian Sea with no plans, no 
fixed guides to follow. By accident 1 met a group of fifteen or 
sixteen artists traveling and doing art as a group, and 1 got a job 
with them as a sort of fancy handy man. 1 traveled and made 
sketches with them all through the villages along the Caspian Sea. 
This was the birth of my becoming an architect. 1 fell deeply in 
love that summer. 1 lost my virginity with the greatest of joy. It 
was a fabulous summer!" 
Should we cail this "accident," as Philip describes his meeting 
this group, really an expression of destiny? 1 think so. When he 
gives up his rigid and compulsive demands on life, when he can 
"let go and let be," unexpected possibilities may open up in 
unpredictable ways which otherwise would never be known to 
him. These are aspects of destiny become conscious. 
Our therapeutic question is: Why did these associations about 
the "fabulous summer" come up at that particular moment? 
Because Philip subconsciously associated that summer with his 
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present moment. He is telling me symbolically that his present 
situation is similar to that spring and summer and will, he hopes . 
and believes, lead from despair to joy, will lead to "the best sum- 
mer 1 ever had." " 
In that hour with Philip, 1 wanted to support his confidence 
without taking away the force of his despair, since despair may 
well lead to the deepest insight and the most valuable change. For 
Philip it certainly did that in the incident of the "nervous break- 
down" and the subsequent summer in which, as he put it, he 
experienced more sheer joy than ever before. It is true that most 
people shrink when in despair or depression-they tend to retreat 
into their hopelessness. 1 hoped that Philip would experience his 
despair constructively, as an opportunity. The despair can then . 
act upon the person like the flood in Genesis: it can clear away 
the vast debris-the false answers, false buoys, superficial prin- 
ciples-and leave the way open for new possibilities. That is, for 
new freedom. 
We know in psychotherapy that times of despair are essential 
to the client's discovery of hidden capacities and basic assets. 
Those therapists are misguided who feel it incumbent upon 
themselves to reassure the patient at every point of despair. For 
if the client never feels despair, it is doubtful whether he ever will 
feel anything below the surface. There is surely value in the 
client's experience that he has nothing more to lose anyway, so he 
may as well take whatever leap is necessary. That seems to me to 
be the meaning of the sentence from folklore "Despair and confi- 
dence both banish fear." " 
III , .. 
. The Dynamics of Freedom 
. 
1 have no need to see and to test in order to be set free. I am free even 
. in the confusion of servitude. 1 enjoy the freedom of the future, genera- 
tions in advance. And when ! 1 die, I shall die a free man, for I bave 
.. 
. 
fougbt for freedom my whole life long. 
' . 
. - NIKOS KAZANTZAKIS, Freedom or Death .. 
' 
z 
Man is free, in so far as he has the power of contradicting himseif and 
_ his essential nature. Man is free even from his freedom; that is, he can 
surrender hù humanity. 
' 
- PAUL TtLLICH 
_ 
, Freedom, by its very nature, is elusive. The word is difficult ' 
to define because of its quicksilver quality: freedom is always 
. 
moving. You can state what it is not or what you desire to get free 
from-which is why the phrase "freedom from" should never be 
disparaged. But it is difficult to designate what freedom is. Thus 
. we always hear of the struggle for, the fight for freedom. But 
_ when someone tells us "how I found freedom," we have a feeling ' ' 
that something is being faked. Kazantzakis rightly states, "The " 
greatest virtue is not to be free, but to struggle ceaselessly for 
freedom. " 
Freedom is like a flock of white butterflies bestirred in front 
of you as you walk through the woods: rising in cluster they flit 
. off in an infinite number of directions. "Using the word 'free- 
. dom,' 
" Loren Eisley writes, "immediately eliminates the entity 
. it is meant to describe." In other words, once you become self- 
konsciously sure of your freedom, you have lost it. 
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Hence we find ourselves almost always describing what free- 
dom is not rather than what it is: "I am free tomorrow" means I 
do not have to work; "I have a free period" means I do not have 
any class then. Malinowski points this out: "freedom is frequently 
and persistently conceived of as a negative quality. Freedom is 
very much like health or virtue or innocence. We feel it most 
intensely after we have lost it." The dictionary does nothing to 
relieve our frustration. In the eighteen different meanings in 
Webster's, fourteen of them are negative, such as "not held in 
slavery" or "not subject to external authority." Of the remaining 
four, one is "liberty"-which deals with political freedom-and 
the others are simply tautological, such as "spontaneous, volun- 
tary, independent." 
Freedom is continually creating itself. As Kierkegaard puts it, 
freedom is expansiveness. Freedom has an infinite quality. This 
ever-new set of possibilities is part of the reason psychology has 
by and large evaded the subject, for freedom cannot be pinned 
down as psychologists are wont to do. 
In psychotherapy the closest we can get to discerning freedom 
in action is when a person experiences "I can" or "I will." When 
a client in therapy says either of these, 1 always make sure he 
knows that 1 have heard him; for "can" and "will" are statements 
of personal freedom, even if only in fantasy. These verbs point to 
some event in the future, either immediate or long-term. They 
also imply that the person who uses them senses some power, 
some possibility, and is aware of ability to use this power. 
1. Freedom of Doing, or Existential Freedom 
* 
Knowing that the ultimate meaning of freedom will elude us, 
let us still endeavor to define the term as best we can. The first 
* I use the term existential freedom to ean the freedom that occurs in our day-to- 
day existence. I do not wish it confused with existential philosophy. 1 have learned 
much from. the tenets of existential philosophy, but the particular view of freedom 
offered here is my own and should not be identified with the philosophy of that 
name. 
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definition is on the psychological level, the domain of everyday ' 
actions: 
Freedom is the capacity to pause in the face of stimuli from many direc- 
tions at once and, in this pause, to throw one's weight toward this 
response rather than that one. 
This is the freedom we experience in a store when we pause 
over the purchase of a necktie or a blouse. We summon up in our 
imaginations the image of how we will look in this or that tie, 
what so-and-so will say about it, or how the color will fit such 
and such a suit. And then we buy the tie or we move on to some- 
thing else. This is freedom of doing, or existential freedom. 
This freedom is shown most interestingly in the supermarket, 
when we push our carts through the aisles between the tumul- 
tuous variety of packages and cans of food on the shelves, each 
one silently shouting through its bright-colored label "Buy me!" 
We see the shoppers with expressions of hesitancy, vacuity, won- 
der, pausing for some inspiration as to which of all these foods 
. will be good for dinner tonight. The shoppers seem hypnotized, 
charmed, preoccupied. Like patients on a wârd in a mental hos- 
pital, they do not see me as 1 walk directly across their line of 
vision. The expressions of wonder and hesitancy are a readiness, 
an invitation, an openness to some stimulus on the shelves to per- 
suade them to throw the balance this way or that in making their 
choice. 
This first freedom is experienced by each of us hundreds of 
times every day. It is decked up in respectable terms like deci- 
sionlchoice when we discuss freedom in psychology classes-if we 
ever discuss freedom in psychology classes at all. 
The most profound illustration of this kind of freedom is our 
ability to ask questions. Take, for example, my asking a question 
after listening to a lecture. The very fact that the question comes 
up in my mind at all implies that there is more than one answer. 
Otherwise there would be no point in asking the question in the 
first place. This is freedom; it implies that there is some possibil- 
ity, some freedom of selection in what 1 ask. The speaker then 
pauses for a few seconds after l've asked it, turning over in his 
mind the possible answers. 
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We sense that there is, in asking and answering questions, a 
good deal more going on, and it is of a richer nature, than the 
mere responding to various stimuli and selecting a response. 
Questioning implies some value judgment, some investment of 
the person's life, some invitation to share, to make contact, some 
challenge to consider a new idea. 
So we must move on to the second level of our definition. 
Solzhenitsyn sees the trend toward superficiality in any definition 
that includes only the freedom of doing. In his speech at Stan- 
ford, in accepting the American Friendship Award from the 
Hoover Institution, he stated: 
Regrettably, in recent decades our very idea of freedom has been dimin- 
ished and grown shallow in comparison with previous ages; it has been 
relegated almost exclusively to freedom from outside pressure, to free- 
dom from state coercion-to freedom understood on the juridical level, 
and no higher. 
2. Freedom of Being, or Essential Freedom 
Whereas the "freedom of doing" refers to the act, the "free- 
dom of being" refers to the context out of which the urge to act 
emerges. It refers to the deeper level of one's attitudes and is the 
fount out of which "freedom of doing" is bom. Hence, 1 call this 
second kind of freedom essential freedom. This is illustrated in 
Bruno Bettelheim's testimony concerning his two years in a con- 
centration camp during the Second World War. He had no free- 
dom of doing at all; he was powerless to change the actions of the 
SS. But he did have what he calls "ultimate freedom," the free- 
dom to choose his attitude toward his captors. This freedom of 
being, or essential freedom, involves the ability to reflect, to pon- 
der, out of which the freedom to ask questions, whether spoken 
or not, emerges. 
A prisoner in San Quentin, interviewed by Philip Zimbardo, 
gives us our springboard here. This prisoner was a Chicano and 
a poet. He could not take the pushing around in the prison, and 
hence for five years he had been held in solitary confinement, 
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which, with a strange irony, is called in San Quentin "Maximum 
, Adjustment Center." 1 quote from his words in the interview: 
_ They have separated me from my family, deprived me of touching my ' 
young boy. They have hidden the sun, moon and stars from my view, 
exchanged their concrete and steel for earth and flowers and everything 
warm and soft. 
The wind through my hair is replaced by their rules in my ears. 
Ail tears are forbidden on the tier. The strength in my muscles is 
bound by chains and shackles. 
They have tried to negate my existence-and almost succeeded. 
. They have left me with nothing, nothing except an inner core, a ' secret, private place they have not yet found how to get to. 
The speaker of these words is obviously not trying to select 
among "stimuli." This is clearly a different kind of freedom, 
, expressed in such phrases as "inner core" and "a secret, private 
place where they have not yet found how to get to." He goes on: 
It is where 1 think of who I am, where 1 try to understand the what 
and why of my enemies, and where 1 keep alive my will to live in a hell 
where 1 am made to feel like a nothing, at best an animal, a wild animal 
in captivity. 
We notice that he does not say, "What shall I do," but rather "I 
try to understand." He is engaged in a succession of leaps in his 
own thoughts, leaps which imply breakthroughs to a new dimen- 
sion in his relation to himself. This is clearly not a freedom of 
doing; it is a freedom of being. 
He tells us also-and this is of great importance-that this is 
where he keeps alive his will to live. This is a freedom that invig- 
orates, that inspirits, and he rightly interprets it as that to which 
he owes his survival in the agonizing loneliness of solitary con- 
finement. He concludes: 
.. 
Although 1 sometimes get depressed and feel Iike giving up, the dis- 
.. covery of my thoughts gives me joy. For until they find a way to take my 
thoughts away, I am free. 
Knowledge is freedom, and is the source of hope in this most hopeless 
of all places. 
A man can live without liberty but not without freedom. 
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In that mind-blowing last sentence, he is using the terms as 1 
have chosen to define them in this book, "liberty" referring to the 
political state. We could survive if we had to live under fascism 
or in prison, hate it as we may. But freedom is essentially an 
inner state. This "core," this "secret place," is absolutely neces- 
sary for our survival as humans. It is what gives the person a 
sense of being; it gives one the experience of autonomy, identity, 
the capacity to use the pronoun "I" with its full range of meaning. 
1 do not wish to have this inner freedom confused with the 
sentimentally subjective statements of it. In the Civil War play 
Sbenandoab, there is a song and dance performed by a black boy 
with the words "Freedom's just a state of mind." Was freedom 
just a state of mind for Martin Luther King? Was it just a state of 
mind for the freedom marchers? Was it just a state of mind for 
Washington and the Continental Army at Valley Forge? Is it just 
a state of mind for those in the women's liberation movement? 
There is no authentic inner firedom that does not, sooner or later, also 
affect and change human history. This includes Bruno Bettelheim's 
"ultimate" freedom, the affecting of history coming in his insight- 
fui books after the concentration camp. It includes the freedom 
described by the prisoner in San Quentin, its effect on history 
consisting, for one thing, in our quoting him here. The subjective 
and objective sides of freedom can never be separated from each 
other. 
1 propose that the prisoner we quoted is freer than his guards 
at San Quentin. In a poem he wrote in prison we find the words, 
"though we're wrapped in chains/The jailor is not free!" No one 
can deny that Epictetus, as a slave, was freer than this owner and 
master. Our prisoner also is experiencing freedom as an inner 
condition of life, the source of his human dignity and the source 
of his strength to write poems, "Scratched out from the pit of 
prison with a worn pencil from my cell." 
The prisoner's statement "the discovery of my thoughts gives 
me joy" is a profound comment with far-reaching implications for 
our lives as well. His freedom is not a freedom of security, but a 
freedom of discovery. The joy of the discovery of one's own 
thoughts is a truth that we rarely hear from anyone who has not 
hammered it out on the anvil of years of solitude. 
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. The prisoner in San Quentin also tells us that his "knowledge 
is freedom" and his "source of hope." In the freedom of being, 
new possibilities continually surge up, possibilities of new discov- 
eries about oneself, new flights of imagination, new visions of 
what the world and living in it might be. Talamantez does not 
say "hopé for" something; he proclaims that to have the freedom 
to know is itself hope, regardless of whether anything concrete 
eventuates or not. 
What 1 am here calling the freedom of being, or essential free- 
dom, is parallel, 1 assume, to what Augustine called "freedom 
major," as his "freedom minor" is parallel to what 1 call freedom of ' 
doing. Essential freedom is the essence out of which other forms 
of freedom flow. 
, _ Schelling similarly writes: "In the concept of freedom we have 
what Archimedes sought but did not find, a fulcrum on which 
reason can rest its ladder, without therefore placing it in the pres- 
' ent or in a future world but only in the inner sense of freedom, ' because it unites both worlds in itself and must also be the prin- 
ciple of explanation for both." 
w 
As the prisoner in San Quentin demonstrates in his interview, 
this essential freedom is the source of his joy and his spirit. The 
former is shown in his own words "[it] gives me joy." The spirit 
is shown in his courage, his hope, the very fact that he survived 
and preserved his sanity and his sense of possibility in a situation 
in which many people would long before have given up in despair 
and probably taken refuge in psychosis. He says in a poem writ- 
ten while he was in prison that insanity was his constant compan- 
ion, but he managed to avoid it by his absorption in his writing. 
Survivors of the concentration camps give similar testimony 
to this essential freedom and to the fact that the inmates who 
could choose their own attitudes toward the SS were not spiritu- 
ally enslaved. This is pragmatic proof, if it were necessary, of the 
reality of their essential freedom. 
Picasso provides us with an illustration of freedom of being in 
contrast to freedom of doing. In 1904 Cézanne had advised other 
painters to "interpret nature in terms of the cylinder, the sphere, 
thé cone." Picasso, a young artist prodigy at the time, had 
absorbed the rules and discipline of his craft. He could draw 
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beautifully, and he knew the laws of perspective and proportion. 
All these are "givens," which I will refer to as destiny. Picasso 
had come to terms with this discipline: in his early blue period, 
especially in those paintings of Spanish peasants, every expres- 
sion is superbly drawn. This, however, is still freedom of doing, or 
existential freedom. 
But Picasso, an artist of courage and zest, struggled against 
the boundaries. Was there a way of transcending the old rules, a 
way of pushing on to new dimensions? 
In 1907 came tlie breàkthrough with his painting Les Demoi- 
selles d'Avignon. This marked the birth of cubism. No longer was 
it a question of drawing arms and legs accurately in an academic 
sense; no longer was it a matter of rendering the fingers exactly 
as they are in reality. The challenge now was to see the human 
body as embodying the forms of nature, which Picasso did in this 
painting with a completeness never before achieved. The ques- 
tion now was how the lines of the arms and legs of the women in 
this painting relate to the space, how they fit on the canvas and 
with each other. The "cylinder, the sphere, the cone" were now 
visible before us. The cones that we see when we look at moun- 
tains, the curved lines that mark the sand where waves sweep in, 
the perpendicular lines of the plains cut by the vertical lines of 
trees rising up from horizontal lines of the fields-all thèse are 
part of our bodies and ourselves as shown in the amazing balance 
with which we walk, the rhythm with which we breathe and with 
which our hearts beat.* * 
This breakthrough of cubism, foreshadowed by Van Gogh 
and Gaugin, and certainly by Cézanne and Matisse, demonstrates 
the freedom of being in contrast with the freedom of doing. The 
"leap" was to a new context in which paintings were to be seen. 
It changed the attitudes with which we look at painting, and it 
changed the questions artists ask about their work. It cast a new 
light on our relation to nature. 
Cubism opens up a host of new possibilities and gives a new 
unity to ourselves and our universe. The new way these artists 
* We are not saying that cubism is the highest form of art or that everyone must 
like it, but only that it represents an important-and, for our day, crucial- 
development. 
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. related to space in the first decade of this century, for example, 
. predicted the "space age," which was to be taken up and re- " 
expressed by intellectuals and scientists in the 1960s. It illustrates 
how one artist speaks for the whole community of his colleagues 
as well as for himself and for his culture. 
' 3. Is There a Conflict between Freedom of Doing and Free- 
dom of Being? 
An interesting question confronts us here. Are freedom of 
doing and freedom of being contradictory? Why is it that some 
people achieve essential freedom only when everything in the " 
existential world becomes unfree? This seems to have been the 
experience of the survivors of the concentration camps. Sol- 
zhenitsyn testifies that this was true in his years in the Russian 
work camps-when all freedom of doing was taken away, he felt 
himself pushed back to the level of essential freedom. It was, 
moreover, the experience of freedom marchers who were thrown 
into prison, as shown by the several books that subsequently 
came out by the marchers with titles like I Found My Freedom in 
Jail. Saint Paul states that in bondage the Christian is freed, a 
. sentence that seems hopelessly paradoxical at first but takes on 
meaning the more one thinks about it. : 
Do we get to essential freedom only when our everyday exis- 
tence is interrupted? For as long as most human beings can settle 
for bread and comfort, they will do so, the Grand Inquisitor 
argues. But when bread and comfort are no longer available, are 
people then-and only then-pushed to their essential depths of 
experience? If we answer "yes" to these questions, we deny the 
popular idea that human beings move up through a hierarchy of 
needs from the biological to the psychological to the spiritual. It ' would mean, rather, that people evolve by conflict and struggle, 
and there is no simple and placid evolution from lower needs to 
higher ones. When lower needs are not met, they are forced into 
higher needs. Fasting as a way of reaching religious truth is one 
example of this. "Calamity theory," as Richard Farson elucidates 
it, is another example. It says in effect that in calamity, in hard- 
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ship, many people are forced to look inward and to take the nec- 
essary leaps to higher levels, as we have noted above. 
Is confinement, including the simple fact of having time to 
think, one aspect of what is necessary for the experience of essen- 
tial freedom? Talamantez was, of course, in jail. John Lilly also 
thinks confinement is essential in his experiments in isolation 
tanks: the person floats in complete darkness in a tank in which 
he is weightless and without any stimuli from the outside world. 
Then apparently radical and often highly positive things happen 
to some people in their sense of freedom of being. When human 
beings can no longer escape-when they can no longer run about, 
go to this movie or that, surrender to their TV addiction, or fill 
their time with diversions-when these escape avenues are no 
longer open to them, they must listen to themselves. 
But here we arrive at a fascinating question: Is not our destiny 
itself our concentration camp? Is not the destiny that impinges upon 
us that which forces us to see our bondage? Does not the engaging 
of our destiny-which is the design of our life-hedge us about 
with the confinement, the sobriety, indeed, often the cruelty, 
which forces us to look beyond the limits of day-to-day action? Is 
not the inescapable fact of death, whether we are young or old, 
the concentration camp of us all? Is not the fact that life is a joy 
and a bondage at the same time enough to drive us to consider the 
deeper aspect of being? This is the greatness of life and our "quiet 
desperation," which Thoreau talks about, in the same instant. 
James Farmer tells of the struggles of CORE to help black 
people turn the simple proclamation of freedom put on paper by 
Abraham Lincoln into real and actual freedom. Out of the battles 
he and his followers went through and the violence they had to 
endure, Farmer writes: 
In the very act of working for the impersonal cause of racial freedom, a 
man experiences, almost like grace, a large measure of private freedom. 
Or call it a new comprehension of his own identity, an intuition of the 
expanding boundaries of his self. 
He identifies this as the "radical source" of freedom; 1 call it the 
freedom of being. He describes one incident in which he and his 
followers endured the brutality of police, and "the men and 
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women who stood between me and the lynch mob gradually, 
during the course of those two violent days, made the decision to 
act instead of being acted upon." 
" 
" 
4. Growing in Freedom 
... 
Our capacity as human beings to imagine, to think, to won- 
der, to be conscious are all degrees of freedom. "In the realm of 
the mind," wrote Bertrand Russell, "there are no limits." In our 
imaginations we can instantaneously transport ourselves back 
three thousand years and listen to blind old Homer reciting his 
tales around a campfire in Macedonia. Or we can take our place, 
again instantaneously, on a stone seat in the theater of Dionysus 
in classical Athens and be enthralled by the dramas of Sophocles 
and Aeschylus. Or we can project ourselves into the future any 
number of years we wish. The fact that all of these acts can be 
done instantaneously-that we can conquer space and time 
simultaneously-is itself indicative of the nature of freedom. 
Personal freedom can be seen as the range of movement possible 
for the organism. Saint Thomas Aquinas stated that there are 
four kinds of existence. First are inert things, like rocks, which 
simply exist. Second are the things that exist andgrow, like plants 
and trees. Third are things that exist andgrow and move about, like 
animals. Fourth are creatures that exist, grow, move, and think, like 
human beings. (For us the term consciousness would be more accu- 
rate.) Each of these stages represents a radically increased free- 
dom, seen in the range of movement, over the preceeding one. 
As Swiss biologist Adolf Portmann phrased it, we are born 
with freedom in the sense of the potentiality for movement of the 
infant. "The free play of the limbs, which gives to the human 
nursling so much richer possibilities than the new-born monkey 
or ape reminds us that our own state at birth is not simply help- 
less but is characterized by a significant freedom." This freedom 
of movement, which, contemporary experiments demonstrate, 
begins even in the uterus, is given a great boost when the umbilical 
cord is cut, and continues as the newborn grows. One leap ahead 
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in the infant's range of movement is when the child can crawl, 
another leap when it learns to walk, another when he or she goes 
off to school. Ali of these are quantum increases in the range of 
movement of the human child-in nautical terms, the "cruising 
range." The movement is increasingly psychological as well as 
physical, the psychological having its roots in the great leap in the 
child's learning to talk. 
All of these "leaps" from birth on, these events in which one 
differentiates oneself from parents, can be seen as psychological 
rebirth experiences. Hence, they are anxiety-creating as weil as 
challenging. At adolescence there are other quantum leaps that 
increase the young person's range of movement, most notably in 
the sexual realm. One experiences the "alarming possibility of 
being able," as Kierkegaard puts it. Going off to college, marry- 
ing, earning a living, moving to a new city-all can be seen as 
increases in the person's range of freedom. 
Freedom is a moving out while retaining the human bond to 
the persons, particularly the mother, at bome. There is a delicate 
balance between these two poles. If there is too little wandering 
out and too much dependence on the home, freedom is being 
surrendered in favor of security, which turns out then to be an 
escape from freedom. If there is too much wandering out and too 
little security at home, the person may get pathologically anxious 
and may retrench in other ways that cut off his or her freedom. 
Each of these new levels of movement consists of the enlarging of 
one's cruising range by cutting the biological ties with home and 
mother and father and establishing psychological and spiritual 
ties in their place. We saw, in the case of Philip, as he came to 
terms with past and present in his talk with his mother, that he 
no longer talked about what she should have done for him, but 
rather what she did do for him. He admired and valued her. 
Obviously his mother had not changed: the change in memory 
really came from a change in Philip's attitude. At his stage in life, 
the dynamic question is very rarely "What happened?" but rather 
"Wbat is your attitude toward what happened?" The achievement 
of freedom now makes it possible for Philip to change the context 
for viewing his mother. It is freedom of being. 
The last and ultimate leap in this growth of movement, in this 
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.. pilgrim's progress, occurs on one's death bed, when, as Otto 
Rank puts it, we go through the last stage of differentiation. 
In therapy-the central purpose being, as 1 have said, to help 
. , the patient discover, establish, and use his or her freedom-I find ' it important, when the patient pleads total powerlessness, to 
remind him that he put one foot in front of the other to get to my 
office. And he can leave. On that range of freedom, minute as it 
is, we can begin building. 
Each step in the growth in differentiation carries a new sense 
of responsibility equivalent to the new freedom. The sense of 
response-ability, as the word may be understood, involves an 
awareness of others' needs as we live in the community of the 
family or the village together with a capacity to respond to the 
needs also of one's own self. We choose our way of responding to 
the other people who make up the context in which our freedom 
develops. The paradox that one can be free only as one is respon- 
sible is central at every point in freedom. But the converse is just 
as true: one can be responsible only as one is free. This is the 
reason why the argument that we are totally determined breeds 
irresponsibility. You have to have some sense that your decisions 
genuinely matter to take responsibility for them. 
The sense of responsibility begins in the relation of infant to 
mother: as he grows older, the infant learns that mother has her 
own needs. She does not come every time he cries, and he cannot 
bite his mother's nipple without eliciting a look of pain on her 
face. Thus growth always has two simultaneous sides: freedom 
and responsibility, one equivalent to the other, one necessary for 
the other. We do not let our three-year-old child cross Broadway 
in New York by himself; he has not yet developed sufficient 
responsibility to be permitted this freedom. 
Albert Camus expresses this well: 
' 
The aim of art, the aim of a life can only be to increase the sum of 
freedom and responsibility to be found in every person and in the 
world." 
Since it limits freedom, responsibility is one aspect of the des- 
tiny pole. So long as we are born of woman (in contrast to clon- 
ing) we shall have to come to terms with mother not only as a 
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source of food, but increasingly as a person carrying her own 
destiny. Freedom for oneself increases as one's awareness of the 
destiny of others increases. 
It is significant that the new capacity for freedom related to 
movement is actualized as a form of art. Human beings dance- 
ballet and folk and jazz and ballroom and T'ai Chi-as an expres- 
sion of aesthetic possibilities. Each art form is developed as a rit- 
ual to express one's exhilaration and freedom. "To us," writes 
Alan Oken in the Age of Aquarius, "rock music represents freedom 
... the freedom to feel, to be one with a higher collective force, 
to move together in one cosmic rhythm." One "dances for joy," 
or to express sexuality or religious feelings, as in the whirling of 
Muslim dervishes, or to "drum" up emotion for battle, like the 
war dances of the Native Americans. 
Movement and the expansion of freedom are symbolic expres- 
sions of the individual's career from birth to death. 
IV 
The Paradoxes of Freedom 
See bow everytbing instantly creates its opposite! War continues in the 
midst of peace. Want is born from abundance. In one and the same 
laboratory, the same men searcb for wbat will kill and wbat will cure, 
cultivating both good and evil.... 
' 
- PAUL VALÉRY 
Freedom, we have stated, is fraught with paradoxes because 
of its unique character. Before there could be any freedom to walk 
on the streets or to raise cattle in frontier towns, for example, law 
and order were necessary. Security is the opposite of freedom, 
yet a certain degree of security is essential if freedom is to exist at 
all. Spinoza held that the purpose of government is to preserve 
sufficient security so that each man may live without fear of his 
neighbor. "Have to," the anthropologist Dorothy Lee speaks 
paradoxically, "is strangely freeing." 
" 
1 use the word paradox to describe the relationship between 
two opposing things which, even though they are posited against 
each other and seem to destroy each other, cannot exist without 
each other. God and the devil, good and evil, life and death, 
beauty and ugliness-al1 these opposites appear to be at odds with 
each other. But the paradox is that the very confrontation with 
the one breathes vitality into the other. Life is more alive, more 
zestful, when we are aware of death; and death has significance 
only because there is life. God needs the devil. Freedom comes 
alive only when we see it in opposition to destiny, and destiny is 
significant only when it is in opposition to freedom. The oppo- 
sites fructify each other: each gives dynamism, power, to the 
other. 
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The emotions elicited in us by a paradox are surprise and 
amazement. The assertion that God cannot exist without the 
devil catches short those who believe life is a one-way ticket to 
paradise. That male and female need the differences between 
each other gives pause to those who dabble in simplistic hopes for 
a future brave new androgyny. 
Heraclitus proclaimed that people "do not understand how 
that which differs with itself is in agreement: harmony consists of 
opposing tension, like that of bow and the lyre." This he illus- 
trated by the bow and cord; one can shoot with the bow because 
of the tension set up by the string pulling against it. Or the frame 
of the lyre and its strings. Each of these opposites is useful to us 
by virtue of the tension set up between the two forces. 
The paradox we confront in this chapter is that between free- 
dom and destiny. It can be stated in many ways. One is that 
freedom gets its vitality, its authenticity, from its juxtaposition 
with destiny. And destiny, such as in death, is important to us 
because it perpetually threatens our freedom; the Grim Reaper 
stands at the far end of any path we take. But no matter how 
scant at any given moment our freedom is, new possibilities 
beckon us in our dreams, in our aspirations, in our hopes and 
actions, and the possibility pushes us to acknowledge, encounter, 
confront, engage, or rebel against our destiny. 
The paradox is fundamental in psychotherapy, a point not 
realized by most therapists. Philip, for example, attained his per- 
sonal freedom only when he came to terms with the paradoxes of 
his life. The chief one was his love-hate relation with his 
mother. But there were other derivative paradoxes such as his 
dependency-love relation with Nicole. The major experiences 
such as birth, death, love, anxiety, guilt are not problems to be 
solved, but paradoxes to be confronted and acknowledged. Thus 
in therapy we should talk of solving problems only as a way of 
making the paradoxes of life stand out more clearly.* Just as the 
*One of the most sensitive and skillful of the British analysts, D. W. Winnicott, 
writes perceptively that he wishes to draw "attention to the paradox.... My 
contribution is to ask for a paradox to be accepted and tolerated and respected, 
and for it not to be resolved. By flight to a split-off intellectual functioning it is 
possible to resolve the paradox, but the price of this is the loss of the value of the 
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acceptance of normal anxiety is necessary if we are to be able to 
free ourselves of neurotic anxiety, so the acceptance of the normal 
paradoxes of life-love-hate, life-death-is necessary if we are to 
achieve freedom from the compulsive and neurotic aspects of our 
problems. . The confusion with regard to freedom in our day is that we 
have conceived of freedom as a bow with no string to hold it in 
tension or a lyre with no frame to give it tautness and hence pro- 
duce music. We were c.eated free, the American Declaration of 
Independence tells us, and hence we assume there are no limits. 
Freedom thus has lost its viability; it has vanished like the flame 
going out in our fireplace just when we need it most. 
1. The Grand Inquisitor 
The most penetrating and profound picture of the paradox of 
human freedom versus security is presented by Dostoevsky in his 
legend of the Grand Inquisitor in The Brothers Karamazov. The 
legend begins in Seville in the sixteenth century with the burning 
of a hundred heretics in the town square. This "magnificent auto 
da fé," as Dostoevsky calls it, was presided over by the cardinal of 
the church, the Grand Inquisitor, in the presence of the king, the 
knights, and the ladies of the court. All of the townspeople were 
there, and they heaped faggots on the fires under the dying here- 
tics. 
The next morning, before the burning recommenced, Jesus 
returned to Seville. "He came softly, unobserved, and yet, 
strange to say, everyone recognized Him.... The people are 
irresistibly drawn to Him, they surround Him, they flock about 
Him, follow Him. He moves silently in their midst with a gentle 
smile of infinite compassion.... The crowd weeps and kisses 
the earth under His feet. Children throw flowers before Him, 
sing, and cry 'Hosannah.' 'It is He-it is He!' 
" 
paradox itself" (Playing and Realiy [Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1974]; italics are 
Winnicott's). And again: "I should like to put in a reminder here that the essential 
features in the concept of transitional objects and phenomena ... is the paradox, 
and the acceptance of the paradox" (Ibid., p. l04).. , 1 ÷ . 
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Coming out of the cathedral, the Grand Inquisitor, a tall and 
erect man of ninety with sharp eyes "in which there burns a sin- 
ister fire," observes everything. After watching for a few 
moments, he motions his palace guards to arrest Jesus and throw 
him into prison. That night under the cover of darkness, the 
Inquisitor comes to the prison and speaks to his silent prisoner: 
"Is it You? you? ... Why have you come to hinder us? ... 
Tomorrow I shall condemn you and bum you as the worst of 
heretics. And the very people who have today kissed your feet 
... at the faintest sign from me will rush up and heap embers on 
your fire." 
The kernel of his accusation is that Jesus taught people free- 
dom, promised them freedom, expected them to be free. "Did 
you not often say then, 'I will make you free'? ... Yes, we've 
paid dearly for it," the old man goes on. "For fifteen centuries we 
have been wrestling with your freedom, but now it is ended and 
over for good.... Let me tell you that now, today, people are 
more persuaded than ever that they have perfect freedom, yet 
they have brought their freedom to us and laid it humbly at our 
feet.... You gave them a promise of freedom which in their 
simplicity and their natural unruliness they cannot even under- 
stand, which they fear and dread-for nothing has ever been 
more insupportable for a man and a human society than freedom." 
" 
Jesus' great mistake, the old Inquisitor argues, was His refusal 
to accept Satan's magical power. "Turn [these stones] into bread, 
and mankind will run after you like a flock, grateful and obedient, 
though forever trembling, lest you withdraw your hand and deny 
them your bread.... Oh, never, never can they feed themselves 
without us! No science will give them bread so long as they 
remain free. In the end they will ... cry, 'Make us your slaves, 
but feed us.' ... I tell Thee that man is tormented by no greater 
anxiety than to find someone quickly to whom he can hand over 
that gift of freedom with which the ill-fated creature is born." 
Although the Grand Inquisitor argues that human beings will 
choose bread and the security that bread symbolizes rather than 
freedom, he is no simple materialist. He is aware that the 
Church, to take away man's freedom, must take charge of the 
human conscience, appease it, and relieve men and women from 
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the burden of the knowledge of good and evil. For moral choice- 
or the freedom of conscience-is the most seductive thing of all. 
Human beings must have some stable conception of the purpose 
of life or else they will commit suicide. Indeed, human beings 
` 
_ need three things, he states, ail of which the Church furnishes: ' ' 
"myster, miracle, and authority." These relieve people not only ' from physical hunger but from the struggles of conscience-and, 
1 would add, relieve them of wonder, awe, independence, and a 
sense of autonomy. In the world the Grand Inquisitor presents, 
the yearning for security on ali levels of life has triumphed. " The people will be told what to believe: the Church will 
inform them when they can sleep with mistresses or wives and 
when they can't. The Grand Inquisitor presents an enticing pic- 
ture : there will be no crime anymore and, therefore, no sin. Yes, 
the Church will have to lie to do these things, he admits-partic- 
ularly when it tells people they still follow Christ; and this 
"deception will be our suffering," the Inquisitor puts it. The 
Church has been following Satan, he admits, the "wise and dread 
spirit, the spirit of self-destruction and non-existence." The 
Church made this bargain eight centuries before, in 756, when 
Pepin the Short, King of the Franks, granted Ravenna to Pope 
Stephen III, thus establishing the pope's temporal power. ' But all this will enable the Church to "plan the universal hap- 
piness of mankind." The Church will devote itself to "uniting all 
in one unanimous and harmonious anthill." Humans are like "pit- 
iful children," but "childlike happiness is the sweetest of ail." 
" 
Every sin will be expiated if it is done with the Church's per- 
mission. If the people are obedient-obedience has now been 
elevated to the highest virtue-they will be allowed to have chil- 
dren of their own. Everyone, the millions of them, will be happy. 
Everyone, that is, except those who direct this great program. 
Only we, "the hundred thousand who rule over them," will be 
unhappy, says the Inquisitor, only those "who guard the mys- 
tery," only those who have taken upon themselves "the curse of 
the knowledge of good and evil." 
" 
He finally looks directly into Jesus' face and challenges Him, 
"Judge us if you can and dare.... 1 too prized the freedom with 
which you have blessed men.... But 1 awakened ... and joined 
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the ranks of those who have corrected your work.... I shall burn 
you for coming to hinder us. For if anyone has ever deserved our 
fires, it is you. Tomorrow I shall burn you. Dixi. 
" 
What strikes us most sharply is the contemptuous image the 
Inquisitor holds of humankind. Human beings are weak, base, 
vicious, vile, ill-fated, pitiful, helpless, sinful, and tend toward 
rebellion if they are not kept rigidly in restraint. The highest 
moral principle for such creatures-and what the Church 
teaches-is absolute obedience. Then human beings will express 
their childish mirth, contentment, and other emotions, all within 
the jurisdiction of the Church: "I swear," cries the Inquisitor to 
Jesus, "human beings are slaves by nature." They cannot, on 
their own power, confront the "curse of the knowledge of good 
and evil." Thus, the Inquisitor pushes mankind back again into 
the preconscious state of innocence in the Garden of Eden. No 
stronger demonstration that freedom is a sign of the nobility of 
human beings could be imagined than this, that without it they 
are so base. 
The legend of the Grand Inquisitor asks sharp questions of 
each of us. Do we choose comfort rather than risk, stagnant cer- 
tainty rather than creative doubt? Do we choose to remain in a 
dull and uninteresting job because the pay is certain, or choose to 
remain in a destructive marriage because of fear of loneliness if 
we left, or choose to cling to the security of the doll's house, as 
Ibsen would put it? Do we choose to walk out on marriage quar- 
rels rather than confront the inevitable misunderstandings and 
blows to one's narcissism in working the problems out? 
The Grand Inquisitor confesses, symbolically, that he knows 
the paradox of freedom is all too real. They-the officiais of the 
Church-must face the paradox, even though they may succeed 
in protecting humankind from it. The paradox, he admits by 
implication, is present in ail persons who seek to realize them- 
selves. But the Church will protect humankind as a whole from 
self-realization, from going through the crises of freedom that 
should occur in everyone's growth. They will keep humankind as 
children who never taste failure, struggle, aspiration, rebellion, 
and the joy of life that comes from a sense of human dignity. 
They never will understand the irony in that enticing character 
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in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, the Indian who quotes 
Shakespeare continually and wanders about longing to suffer. 
Those "children" of the Grand Inquisitor will never be gripped 
by the drama of King Lear or know the delight of A Midsummer 
Night's Dream or be shaken by Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. 
2. Freedom and Rebellion . 
z 
The thing that stirs the Grand Inquisitor, that threatens his 
smug complacency, is the human spirit of rebellion. He is ob- 
sessed with it; he comes back to it again and again. "Man was 
created a rebel," he states regretfully, "and how can rebels be 
happy?" and "What though he [man] is everywhere rebelling 
against our power, and proud of his rebellion? It is the pride of a 
child, and a schoolboy." "Humankind are slaves of course," he reas- 
sures himself, "though rebellious by nature." He vows that such 
oppositional efforts will be useless, "though man might be a hun- 
dred times a rebel." 
' ' 
There is good reason for his concern. Rebellion is the one way 
human beings can demonstrate that they are not what the Grand 
Inquisitor called them: "slaves, base, vile, weak and cowardly." 
This stubborn, oppositional tendency in humankind raises 
the question, Is the possibility for rebellion necessary and inevi- 
table for human freedom? 1 answer yes. Freedom, we have seen, 
is known only when something opposes it, takes it away. Hence 
the word freedom exists always in the company of such verbs as 
resist, oppose, rebel. 1 do not mean rebellion in the sense of fixation 
on childish patterns of defiance nor in the sense of shèer destruc- 
tiveness, or rebellion for its own sake or for the sake of diversion- 
ary excitement in one sector of one's life to avoid commitment in 
another. 
1 mean the capacity for rebellion as the preservation of human 
dignity and spirit. 1 mean the act of coming to terms with one's 
own autonomy, learning to respect one's own "no." Thus, the 
capacity to rebel is the underpinning of independence and the 
guardian of the human spirit. Rebellion preserves the life core, 
the self as conscious of its existence as a self. The capacity to rebel 
"' 
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gives one's cooperation efficacy. Otherwise one is simply inert 
human weight rather than a cooperating human being. And if one 
senses these characteristics as important in himself, he must, if 
only to preserve his own psychological integrity, grant this sense 
of dignity and the respect that it rightly demands to other persons 
in the world as well. "Without rebellion," wrote Bertrand Rus- 
sell, "mankind would stagnate, and injustice would be irremedial. 
The man who refuses to obey authority has, therefore, in certain 
circumstances, a legitimate function, provided his disobedience 
has motives which are social rather than personal." 
Our Declaration of Independence puts it politically: "That 
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these 
ends [Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness], it is the Right 
of the People to alter or to abolish it." Our nation was born in 
1776 by virtue of the spirit of insurgency of our forefathers. 
This rebellious quality was the turning point in Philip's ther- 
apy. His cry "If Nicole wants to continue her present bed- 
hopping, the hell with her-I'll make my life with someone else" 
was the crucial step in his asserting his freedom from his neurotic 
tie to her. 
Even in creativity the "rebellion" is present in a different 
sense. Every act of creation is preceded by an act of destruction, 
as Picasso was fond of saying. The scientific aspect of creativity 
is not different here from the artistic; the essential characteristic 
of a creative contribution is that it transcends prior experience 
and contains a revoit against it. Concerning inner values, it is 
significant that this capacity to preserve one's freedom by insur- 
gency is present in artists. Henry Miller expresses this beauti- 
fully : 
When 1 reflect that the task which the artist implicitly sets himself is to 
overthrow existing values, to make of the chaos about him an order 
which is his own, to sow strife and ferement so that by the emotional 
release those who are dead may be restored to life, then it is that I run 
with joy to the great and imperfect ones, their confusion nourishes me, 
their stuttering is like divine music to my ears. 
The function of the artist in overthrowing existing values is to 
construct a new order, and he sows ferment so that emotionally 
dead people will be restored to life-a laudable purpose, indeed! 
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No wonder Joyce proclaims that the artist creates the uncreated 
conscience of the race. 
Rebellion may be discerned in the rebirth experience we 
endure at every point of psychological growth. The "normal" 
rebellion is, of course, most clearly seen in adolescence, in the 
fight against what one's parents stand for in favor of creating a 
new, free world of one's own. In psychotherapy it is often the 
function of the therapist to support this rebellion of the adoles- 
cent against his parents when the young person himself has not 
yet developed enough courage to declare his independence and to 
begin to take responsibility for his own life. 
Frantz Fanon argued in two persuasive books that rebellion 
for the blacks of Africa is the only way they will earn their free- 
dom. Rebellion is the anvil on which these blacks can hammer 
out their new ability to assert "I can" and "I will." Freedom to 
govern oneself is not conferred simply by the erstwhile master 
signing a decree of independence and moving out. ("Freedom is 
not a cake that drops into one's mouth and is there for the swal- 
lowing, but a citadel to be stormed with the saber. Whoever 
receives freedom from foreign hands remains a slave," Kazan- 
tzakis proclaims.) 
An African trained in France as a psychiatrist, Fanon's belief 
was that Africans must go through this stage in which they com- 
mit their all to some ideal, that is more important to them than 
life itself. By "earn" Fanon meant the developing of the dignity, 
the sense of interdependence, and the collective mythology that 
one experiences in the trenches-all of these psychological expe- 
riences forming the structure on which a free nation composed of 
free individuals can be established. This rebellion is most signif- 
icantly an inner process that changes the character of the people wbo 
bave become free, a process tbat involves the building of human dignity 
into each one of the now free persons. 
The sense of solidarity binding each member to the group, 
the collective consciousness now oriented toward freedom in the 
whole community-these are a necessary part of the welding 
together of people who have been slaves into a nation conscious 
of itself. Some feminists hold that the strident quality in the 
movement is inevitable, and that the liberation movement cannot 
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escape being oppositional since it has to fight so much opposition. 
The struggle may be women's way of earning their own freedom 
and equality. When, in Ibsen's drama The Doll's House, Nora 
finally walks out of her house and marriage, one breathes a deep 
sigh of relief. For at last she has been able to rebel against a 
destructive and stultifying entanglement. 
If I have the possibility of rebellion, it is implied at the same 
time that 1 do not need to rebel. 1 am free to choose to cooperate 
instead. Then my cooperation has a reality and an authenticity, 
It would not be thus if I were coerced into cooperating-i.e., if I 
had no possibility of rebellion; the cooperation of a slave is not 
cooperation at all, but slave labor. 
Or 1 can rebel nonviolently. Whatever one thinks about Gan- 
dhi's nonviolence, it was essentially a form of rebellion. Martin 
Luther King wrote in 1958: 
We will take direct action against injustice without waiting for other 
agencies to act. We will not obey unjust laws or submit to unjust prac- 
tices. We will do this peacefully, openly, cheerfully because our aim is 
to persuade. We adopt the means of non-violence because our end is a 
community at peace with itself. 
King knew what a high price this might entail. But it would 
achieve the sense of dignity, the rebirth, the self-esteem among 
the blacks-it would earn freedom for his people. He stated later: 
The way of non-violence means a willingness to suffer and sacrifice. It 
may mean going to jail. If such is the case the resister must be willing to 
fill the jail houses of the South. It may even mean physical death. But if 
pbysical death is the price a man must pay to free his childnn and his white 
bretbren from a permanent deatb of tbe spirit, then nothing could be more redemp- 
tive. " 
What is the inner dignity, the experience of rebirth, that 
occurs as one takes one's stand? Let us note two cases. 
Something happens inside a person, Pat Cusick says, when he is arrested 
for the first time. He crosses a barrier. It's an emotional experience which 
jars and confuses him; later, after the emotional impact has worn thin, 
he is left with a new sense of bimself as a citizen. Pat sensed this, at least, and 
suspected that it was true of others. They had all broken a law. They 
had contended that they were obeying a higher law. Be that as it may, 
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they had broken a law of society, of the town. In doing so, they had 
crossed a barrier. Now that they had a police record they were freer than 
ever to follow the dictates of their consciences. 
James Farmer wrote that the blacks who 
refused to be victimized any longer by the troopers, had been trans- 
formed into a community of men, capable, despite the severest limita- 
tions, of free and even heroic acts. Their subsequent activity at the polls 
and in initiating a school boycott suggests that this kind of freedom, 
though essentially personal, will inevitably lead to social action, and that 
freedom once won is not readily surrendered. 
Again, Farmer speaks from his experience: 
' 
If we do not encourage impoverished communities to engage in direct 
action-picket lines, boycotts, rent strikes-all the money and loving care 
in the world will not succeed in providing them with a dignified life. 
... Our people must feel that they are shaping their own lives; that they 
have forced changes in the politics of the powerful. You cannot engineer 
freedom. A freed man is not yet free. 
Thus people do earn their right to be free. They experience 
the birth of themselves inwardly, shape themselves, experience 
the dignity of an independent human being. Farmer goes on to 
picture this inner change as a religious rite. 
We might think of the demonstration as a rite of initiation through which 
the black man is mustered into the sacred order of freedom. It is also a 
rite the entire nation must undergo to exorcise the demons of racial hate. 
If in a spasm of emancipated exuberance these rites should cause 
inconvenience or violate the canons of cultivated good taste or trouble 
the dreams of some good-livers-I think it is forgivable.... exuberance 
and ... inconvenience are small prices to pay when a nation is undoing 
historic wrong. 
Freedom is an art demanding practice, and too many of us are unprac- 
ticed. 
Freedom is not an end; it is a beginning and a process. We feel further 
from the end now than we did before a decade's progress was wrought. 
... This is part of the fact that freedom is never static, never gained 
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once and for all; and this is because essential freedom is an inner state 
that must be re-affirmed in each act. 
We need here to emphasize, as we have throughout this book, 
that destiny, which is always present as the limiting factor, may 
make the struggle to attain freedom more difficult than at first 
envisioned. This certainly was true of the feminist movement; 
the members did not put their roots down deep enough to sustain 
the later shocks. 
Farmer is right in stating that essential freedom is an inner 
state that is reaffirmed in each act. He writes that the struggle is 
surely more complex than they had foreseen, but the "complexity 
is splendid; perhaps that is freedom too." Freedom of being is 
gained only when the persons can feel in their own muscles, in 
their own hearts, that they have risked themselves, that they have 
"leaped," that they have gained the sense of dignity necessary for 
the real experience of freedom. Thus, they will develop their col- 
lective mythology as we developed ours in 1776. In the words of 
the ex-slave Frederick Douglass: 
Those who profess to favor freedom and yet deprecate agitation are men 
who want crops without plowing up the ground. They want rain with- 
out thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar 
of its many waters. The struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a 
physical one; or it may be both moral and physical. But it must be a 
struggle. Power concedes nothing without demand. It never did and it never 
auill. 
3. Freedom as Participation 
Freedom is a species phenomenon-that is, ail human beings 
experience it to some degree. But it is also a cultural creation, and 
hence there are many variations in the meaning and significance 
of freedom throughout the world. In these years the most crucial 
distinction is between freedom in the West and in the East. 
In the Western world we experience freedom as individual 
self-expression. In the East, on the other hand, freedom is expe- 
rienced as participation. In the latter, one lives more in the con- 
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text of the community, and one's freedom comes from 
participating in the group.* 
* 
When Shirley MacLaine's trip with a small group of Ameri- 
cans to China was shown on television, there was one amazing 
interchange about art. MacLaine asked the Chinese Maoist 
guide-who was obviously friendly and wanted to answer the 
questions as completely as possible-what would happen if some 
citizen had an inner, personal vision that he wanted to express in 
a poem or painting? The guide immediately answered that they 
would put him in a group and recondition him tô be more in line 
with Maoism. MacLaine hastened to respond that she had not 
meant that there was anything wrong with this hypothetical per- 
son, just that he had a vision of his own. The nonplused guide 
finally answered something along the same line as before. What 
1 found fascinating was that the guide was obviously perplexed 
and couldn't really take in the meaning of the question. 
In the Eastern societies freedom is mediated by tradition, a 
group phenomenon in which thé person participâtes. In contrast 
to Henry Ford's notorious proclamation "History is bunk," East- 
ern societies venerate tradition and ancestors; their freedom exists 
by virtue of their tradition rather than in spite of it. This means 
there is an upset greater than in the West when college students 
and women cast off tradition in favor of modernism. In seeking 
to be free, they may in fact lose their freedom since it consists of 
their participation in their group and its tradition. 
Freedom today is a pressing and urgent issue all over the 
world-for the East and especially for the West, for men and 
especially for women. The objection that our view of freedom of 
the individual would not make sense in India is beside the point. 
*Freedom as participation was iHustrated to me by Professor Richard Falk, who 
speaks out of his personal expérience of several years of contact with and espe- 
cially extensive visits to the Near East. In discussion groups so characteristic of 
religious life in the mosques in the Near East, for example, where the group sits 
in a circle, there is automatic participation. Everyone may speak up; each partic- 
ipant helps as he sees fit to add clarity or depth to the religious leader's viewpoint. 
No one expects personal credit for the point he makes; one merely tries to help 
the group along. There is no hierarchy in the Western sense. 
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The fact that Easterners have a different kind of freedom does not 
mean that for them freedom is nonexistent or meaningless. 
Anthropologist Dorothy Lee points out that, while only in West- 
ern culture are the terms freedom and free will used extensively, 
other cultures she has studied achieve the same thing by other 
means. They may express their freedom by valuing the autono- 
mous activities of the individual, or by insisting on the worth of 
the person, or by guarding the originality of each human being, 
or by furthering other routines or patterns in their culture which 
results in the same thing as our Western emphasis on freedom. 
Eastern society tends to generate more warmth, more com- 
munal feeling. In the efforts to answer the question of why the 
Japanese factories could produce automobiles so efficiently, it was 
brought out that the factory worker in Japan enjoys some genuine 
aspects of community. Once the worker has begun to work at a 
given factory, he is assured of a job for life. If the product is 
discentinued, he must be given another post. When the managers 
and workers arrive for work in the morning, they engage in com- 
munal setting-up exercises. They then belt out in unison a song 
describing their loyalty to their factory and the excellence of the 
products it produces. "It seems silly to Westerners," says one 
executive of Matsushita, "but every morning at 8:00 A.M., ail 
across Japan, there are 87,000 people reciting the code of values 
and singing together. It's like we all are a community." 
The Japanese worker gets a sense of freedom from being val- 
ued ; workers are consulted often, and the books of the company 
are open to the union at all times. Later in this book we shall point 
out the close relation between human spirit and human freedom, 
and it is relevant in this regard that the authors Pascale and 
Athos, of the excellent book The Art of Japanese Management, 
speaking of the Matsushita Corporation as representative of the 
Japanese attitude, write: "Spiritual is an unlikely term in a narra- 
tive of corporate life. Yet nothing else suffices to capture the 
strong belief system that underlies Matsushita's philosophy." 
Matsushita states, "Profits should not be a reflection of corporate 
greed but a vote of confidence from society that what is offered by 
the firm is valued." In view of our reference above to Tawney's 
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criticism of laissez-faire practices, it is relevant that Matsushita 
insists that the "management of his corporation serve as develop- 
ers of character, not just as exploiters of human resources." 
But when tradition-and, therefore, the order of the socie- = 
ties-breaks down, Eastern countries are apt to resort to force in 
an effort to hold the structure of society together. Eastern socie- 
ties are thus more open to Marxism with its collective emphasizes 
and its outright attack on individualistic concepts of life. Lenin 
spoke of that "quaker prattle about individual rights." Maoism is 
the obvious example of how naturally Marxism fits into the East- 
ern concept of freedom by participation. 
The Russian poet Yevtushenko illustrates the communal feel- 
ing in a way which has nothing to do with communism as such 
but shows an unusually strong concern for interdependence in 
. 
the community. His poem is entitled "On the Question of Free- 
_ dom": 
You talk to me of freedom? Empty question . 
under umbrellas of bombs in the sky 
It's a disgrace to be free of your own age 
A hundred times more shameful than to be its slave 
Yes l'm enslaved to Tashkent women 
. and to Dallas bullets and Peking slogans 
and Vietnam widows and Russian women 
with picks beside the tracks and kerchiefs over their eyes .. 
Yes l'm not free of Pushkin and Blok ' 
. Not free of the State of Maryland and Zima Station , . 
Not free of the Devil and God 
' 
.__ 
" Not free of earth's beauty and its shit 
Yes l'm enslàved to a thirst for taking a wet-mop ' 
" 
, ' to the heads of all the bickerers and butchers of the world ... ; 
_ Yes l'm enslaved to the honor of busting the mugs . :, " 
of all the bastards on earth ., 
And maybe l'Il be loved by the people for this 
For sending my life 
' 
(not without precedent in this iron age) 
' 
gloreing unfreedom from . 
' 
tbe true struggle for freedom 
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But the tension between the Eastern and Western approaches 
to freedom is shown in the fact that this Russian poet Blok, whom 
Yevtushenko mentions, attacked the Soviet authorities in the 
early days of communism in 1921 for taking away "creative tran- 
quility ... not the freedom to play the liberal, but the creative 
will-the secret freedom. And the poet is dying, because there is 
no longer anything to breathe." This "creative will-the secret 
freedom" sounds like the Western concept of freedom. 
There will always be tension between freedom as individual 
self-expression and freedom as participation. In America we cling 
to such diverse forms of institutionalized self-expression as lais- 
sez-faire doctrines in economics and industry, the Horatio Alger 
myth in which anyone who has enough "spunk" can outstrip his 
competitors and marry the boss's daughter, our mottos of the self- 
made man and "every man for himself and the devil take the hind- 
most," and our ego psychology. It is even present between the 
lines in the Declaration of Independence: "We hold ... that ail 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights." 
Especially in America, the land of individualism par excel- 
lence-with our pioneer spirit and our Horatio Algers and our 
Gatsbys-we have underestimated the significance of commu- 
nity. The East can provide us with a corrective, and this is what 
is happening with the advent of Buddhism and Zen and Taoism 
into the West. But this is very different from renouncing our own 
tradition-as though it were possible to leap out of our own skins 
and into another's. 
We need to develop our forms of community in the West in 
ways that spring out of our own natures. In an article entitled 
"Freedom As Participation," Peter Stillman holds that both 
Hegel and Arendt believed that "in order to be free, individuals 
must participate actively, continually and directly" in the public 
domain. He continues: 
For Hegel and Arendt, only revolutions that aim at freedom as partici- 
pation and that concurrently see the value of structured participatory 
institutions can be successful at gaining power, attaining ideals worth 
attaining, and transforming the polity. 
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Our tradition of self-realization in the West is one of our great 
ideas. It has brought forth some magnificent creations-of which ' 
Western science is not the least, if the most dramatic-no matter 
how open to criticism these creations may be. The landscape 
paintings of the East generally show human beings as small and 
insignificant. But no one can glance more than once at Greek stat- 
ues or Renaissance paintings without realizing that the individual 
person is of great significance. The Hebrew-Greek sources out of 
which our Western ideal of freedom was born furnished a new 
vision of the dignity and value of the individual person. These 
seminal concepts must not be overlooked-for example, the 
Hebrew concept that man cooperates with God as God works 
through human history, and the Greek love of individual wisdom 
and veneration of a courage that transcends life itself. The yearn- 
ing of educated persons in Eastern cultures for these contribu- 
tions of the spirit of the West is partially a demonstration of this. 
V 
On Human Destiny 
The free man is he who wiJJs without arbitrary se Ç-uvill.... He 
believes in destiny, and believes that it stands in need of him.... He 
must sacrifice bis puny, unfree wili, that is controlled by things and 
instincts, to hisgrand will, which quits defined for destined being. 
- MARTIN BUBER 
As freedom and destiny, 50 arbitrary self will and fate belong 
together. But freedom and destiny are solemnly promised to 
one another and linked together in meaning. 
- MARTIN BUBER 
Metapborically, freedom in its essence is the acceptance of the chains 
which suit you and for which you are suited, and of the harness in 
which you pull towards an end chosen and valued by yourse/f, and not 
imposed. It is not, and never can be, the absence of restrictions, obli- 
gations or law and of duty. 
- BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI 
What is the relationship between freedom and determinism? 
Both of them operate in our day-to-day lives. If we refused to 
accept either freedom or determinism, we would diminish our 
possibilities for living. Without determinism and the predictabil- 
ity of plane schedules that goes with it, for one example, our lives 
would be lost in anarchy. But without freedom and the exuber- 
ance that goes with it, without poetry and flights of imagination 
that freedom entails, we would be swallowed up in apathy. 
1 read everything on the topic I could find, and I pondered 
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the question at length; but, as Omar Khayyàm put it, "Evermore 
1 came out by the same door 1 went in." 
One morning, having gotten up early to go to my study, 1 
walked out to get the morning newspaper, which is thrown on 
the curb in front of our house. When 1 was about fifteen steps 
from the house, in this relaxed, preworking mood, there sud- 
denly came into my mind-so clearly that it seemed like someone 
speaking out loud-these sentences: Freedom and determinism give ' birth to each other. Every advance in freedom gives birth to a new deter- 
minism, and every advance in determinism gives birth to a new freedom. 
Freedom is a circle within a larger circle of determinism, which 
is, in turn, surrounded by a larger circle of freedom. And so on 
ad infinitum. 
' 
Immediately there crowded also into my mind the demonstra- 
tions for this hypothesis. Take Freud and his description of the 
unconscious. In his deterministic theory of the mind, he demon- 
strated that our needs are determined by unconscious childhood 
experiences and that our so-called "rational" values are really not 
rational, but are compensations for their opposites in our uncon- 
scious, irrational urges. Freud seemed to be taking our freedom 
_ away. 
. But soon we began to see that the real effect of Freud's deter- 
minism was to increase the breadth and depth of the human 
mind. He was, in our present terms, simply clarifying one aspect 
of destiny. For hereafter the mind would include not only the 
.. conscious, rational mind, but also the subconscious, the precon- 
__ _ scious, the unconscious, and, with an assist from Jung, the collec- " 
' tive unconscious. Lo and behold, the determinism in Freud's 
theory actually gave us far-reaching possibilities for freedom in 
self-development, freedom in directing our minds, and freedom 
in enjoying the ecstatic possibilities of intellectual exploration. 
Another illustration was Darwin and the determinism of his 
.. theory of evolution. A great hue and cry of protest greeted Origin ' 
of Species. Was Darwin, trying with his determinism to make us 
,l;' ail into a bunch of monkeys? But after the anger had cooled, we 
began to see that Darwin's new theory, deterministic as it was, 
actually gave us a new intellectual freedom for understanding our 
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past and new freedom in possibilities, especially in the twentieth 
century, for controlling and directing our evolution. 
Ali this ran through my mind in a few seconds. Immediately 
after that flood of ideas, I picked up the newspaper and started 
back toward the house. But in the few seconds it took to retrace 
my steps, I became acutely aware of a fragment of poetry running 
through my mind: 
... "Other friends have flown before- 
On the morrow be will leave me...." 
1 had no idea where this intrusive and surprising couplet came 
from, and at that moment I had not the slightest hint as to what 
it meant. 
But 1 became aware that I was instanteneously filled with anx- 
iety. My frightened mind was now totally occupied by thoughts 
completely contrary to my exhilaration of minutes before. 1 
began to recognize an old shadow-companion, an enemy-friend 
who always put in his leering appearance at just such moments. 
The context surrounding this verse in my mind indicated that it 
expressed the anxiety projected by this uninvited and obtrusive 
guest who spoke so stridently 1 could not help but listen. It was 
as though my enemy-friend was saying, "Come off it. Forget 
these new ideas you've gotten, which you fondly imagine were 
original. People have knov/n these things for centuries. Forget it 
ail and go in and enjoy your breakfast." 
Now very anxious but exhilarated, I hurried into the house 
not to eat my breakfast, but to scribble down these ideas before 
they should be lost in the confusion that anxiety creates. 
Later on in the morning, I recalled where the couplet came 
from. It was the last two lines of a stanza in Poe's "The Raven." 
As every schoolboy knows (although later we may have forgotten) 
the scene of the poem is Poe's room late at night. Oppressed with 
feelings of loneliness and alienation, and possibly under the influ- 
ence of drugs, Poe carries on a conversation with this raven who 
flew into his room and perched on his window sill. Poe gradually 
begins to feel an affection for this strange bird, and he fears, in 
the couplet mentioned, that the bird will desert him-"On the 
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morrow he will leave me." But the raven answers this one word, 
as he does at the conclusion of half of the stanzas in the poem: 
"Nevermore." " 
Being a psychoanalyst, I could not resist pondering the signif- 
icance of this word "nevermore." Could it mean "nevermore" will 
we escape from the human paradox? That is, when we gain 
, 
' ' 
enough freedom to get new insights, new visions, will we be 
.., 
' 
attacked by the anxiety that accompanies freedom like a shadow? 
We may block off our new thoughts by apathy or by dogmatism, 
. hanging on to the tried and true ideas that never upset anyone. 
..' Yet whatever form of denial we choose, this "nevermore" says 
, that we never will be completely free from this human paradox: 
. ' that with the freedom presupposed in every new idea, there 
. comes the équivalent anxiety to plague us. This is the curse and 
the blessing of being human-that we are free but destined at the ' 
same moment. But at the same time this "destiny," of which this 
black bird was a part, is saying something helpful: that its pres- 
ence, as Poe experienced it, will "nevermore" desert us. 
1. From Determinism to Destiny ....' . 
True and useful as the hypothesis may be that freedom and 
determinism give birth to each other, 1 became aware that it also 
had a serious difficulty. This difficulty hovered around the nature 
. of the word determinism. Does not that term severly limit the real- 
ity with which we deal, which is shown in this very example? " Does not the word determinism omit the richness, the hopes and 
fears, the very human anxiety mediated by the "enemy-friend"? 
' Deterntinism is borrowed from physics and is particularly ade- 
quate to describe physical movements on the model of billiard 
balls: when one ball hits another, it imparts to it a completely 
predictable direction and movement. To the extent that one is 
unaware of his physiological and neurological reactions, the term 
determinism may also fit those realms as weil. Hence, determinism 
is at least partially adequate in describing the conditioning of Pav- 
lov's dogs and Skinner's pigeons. But when consciousness enters 
the picture, as it does with human beings, we find ourselves 
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forced to search for a more inclusive word, a word that will do 
justice to the infinite number of nuances in human experience. 
Also, being limited itself, the word determinism forces us into 
a limited view of freedom. One of the reasons our concept of 
freedom has become so confused is that we have tried to cut it 
down on a Procrustean bed until it is parallel to determinism. 
The only kind of freedom that turns up then is that of picking 
and choosing, the freedom of doing. It is called in psychology 
classes "decision-choice," and it can be reduced to discrete items. 
But there is then no place for ultimate freedom, as Bettelheim 
calls his freedom in the concentration camp or what I call in this 
book essential freedom, the freedom of being. 
And the inadequacy of the term determinism is shown in the 
fact that it leaves no place for mystery. It takes no special acumen 
to see that mystery is a part of all human experience. It is a mys- 
tery that any of us was born at ail and, especially for me, a mys- 
tery that 1 was born at eleven o'clock at night in a little village in 
Ohio; a mystery that sometimes we meet a particular person with 
whom we fall in love; and a mystery that we ultimately die at an 
unpredictable place and by unpredictable means. "The sense of 
the mysterious stands at the cradle of true art and true science," 
said Albert Einstein. 
It is important to see that the mystery does not deny that 
there are causes. But the argument that we will sooner or later 
discover the determining elements in the situations that now seem 
mysterious does not apply, since the mystery has to do with the 
pattern by which these elements are related to each other, not the 
elements themselves. Hoau a person responds to a situation 
already involves his freedom, and that freedom may combine a 
number of different causes. This is what Freud called "overdeter- 
mined," determined by many causes at once. Falling in love may 
be determined by one's libido, one's culture, one's early family 
background, one's personal plans, or a combination of several of 
these things. A "pattern" means that different events or causes 
are put together in a particular form, as a snowflake is put 
together in a certain pattern of crystals. This form cannot be bro- 
ken into parts, for the form is precisely the relationship between the 
parts, as Pythagoras said. We need a new word to do justice to 
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' 
such human phenomena, a term that can take in the richness, the ' 
complexity, the mystery, the artistic elements in form. 
Hence 1 reserve determinism for inanimate things like billiard ' balls. For human beings 1 will use the term destiny. Paul Tillich 
writes that human freedom is "a finite freedom with ail of its 
potentialities being limited by the ... opposite pole, destiny." ' 
Determinism is one part of destiny. That we have to die, that 
, we are conditioned, that we can so easily be taught to behave like . robots-is not all of this part of our destiny? We reflect on our 
lives, we anxiously anticipate our death, we are conscious of the ' fact that we never know when we are to leave this earth or how- 
_, does not all this refer to destiny? 
. The radical shift from determinism to destiny occurs when ' the subject is self-conscious about what is happening to him or 
. ' 
' 
her. The presence of consciousness creates the context in which 
the human being's responses to his or her destiny occur. Albert 
Camus describes the relation between consciousness and destiny 
in his essay "The Myth of Sisyphus": 
That hour like a breathing space which returns as surely as his suffering 
... is the hour of consciousness.... [Man] is superior to his fate. He is 
stronger than his rock.... If there is a personal fate, there is no higher 
destiny.... Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods 
and raises rocks.... Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that 
night-filled mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward 
the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus 
happy. ".. _ 
. ' 2. What Is Destiny? ' 
' 
" 
We saw in the case of Philip the confrontation of one man 
with his destiny. We observed that he had been searching for 
someone who would make up for his having been born into an 
unwelcoming world consisting of a disturbed mother and a 
schizophrenic sister, a destiny that he did not in the slightest 
choose. Up to this point in his life he had tried to cover up this 
early background, to compensate for it, consciously to deny it- 
anything to avoid facing directly this aspect of his infancy. But 
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this only contributed to resentment, a longing and yearning that 
he could not understand, a Quixote-like tilting at windmills. 
So long as he continued this, he would remain bound to his 
mother, his very resentment furnishing the motive for this bind- 
ing. He would also be doubly sensitive to Nicole's affairs with 
other men; he would always be trapped by the question, Why 
does this woman, who should give me security and recompense 
for the past, continually cut my heart in two? But as he began to 
confront his destiny as a given, unchangeable series of events 
which, no matter how painful, needs to be acknowledged and 
accepted, he became able to experience the relief of one who was 
a slave and is now free. 
The freedom of each of us is in proportion to the degree with 
which we confront and live in relation to our destiny. 
Unfortunately, the term destiny has been so used and misused 
by Hollywood films that the word has almost solely the conno- 
tation of inescapable catastrophe, secret doom, irrevocable ruin- 
all of which gives a curiously erotic flavor to the films, as though 
the secret urge to be carried off for sexual purposes by Zeus cam- 
ouflaged as a bull were present in the subconscious of all of us, 
male as well as female. 
True, the définitions of destiny do include "irrevocable fate," 
but they also include much more. The verb form of the word, 
destine, is defined as "to ordain, to devote, to consecrate." Destiny 
is a cognate of the term destination, which implies moving toward 
a goal. We discern two trends in these different meanings: one 
the element of direction, and the other the sense of plan or design. 
These are ail aspects of the human condition; our billiard balls 
have been left far behind. 
1 define destiny as the pattern of limits and talents that consti- 
tutes the "givens" in life. These may be on a grand scale, like 
death, or on a minor scale like the gasoline shortage. As we shall 
see below, it is in the confronting of these limits that our creativ- 
ity emerges. Our destiny cannot be canceled out; we cannot erase 
it or substitute anything else for it. But we can choose how we 
shall respond, how we shall live out our talents which confront 
us. Destiny is a term that describes our condition prior to sociolog- 
ical and moral judgments. One's destiny is archetypal and onto- 
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logical; the term refers to one's original experience at each 
moment. It is the design of the universe speaking through the design of . each one of us. ' . Destiny confronts us on different levels. There is our destiny ' " 
on the cosmic level, like birth and death. We may postpone death 
slightly by giving up smoking, for example, or we may invite it 
by suicide; but all the while death stands there irrevocably wait- 
ing. Dylan Thomas's poem on the death of his father is an impas- 
1 
sioned and arresting creative work. But it did not cancel out the 
fact that his father had to die. 
Also on this cosmic level are earthquakes and volcanoes, cur- 
iously called "acts of God" in insurance policies. We can choose 
to flee from the vicinity of earthquakes or volcanoes, or we can 
take our chances, remaining in the path of the eruptions. But we 
cannot escape the fact that volcanoes and other such eruptions of 
the universe do occur without the slightest concern for us. When 
we admit these so-called destructive aspects of destiny, we also 
see that the positive side of the pattern includes the "pleasure in 
the pathless woods" and "the rapture by the lonely shore." 
There is a second group of "givens," genetic. Our destiny is 
expressed in our physical characteristics, like the color of our eyes 
and skin, the race we happened to be born into, whether we are 
male or female, and so on. "Anatomy is destiny" is the famous 
statement by Freud. One's talents-such as special gifts for 
music, art, or mathematics-are part of this bundle. One feels 
possessed by them. There is no denying talents without penalty, 
and one name for the attempt at denial is neurosis. 
Third, there is the cultural aspect of destiny. At birth we are 
"thrown," to borrow Heidegger's term, into a family we did not 
pick, into a culture about which we knew nothing, and into a 
particular historical period about which we had no say. We 
may, and sometimes need to, fight our family, but there is no 
successful way of disowning this fount from which we sprang. 
"Freedom's great emotional potency," writes Bronislaw Mali- 
nowski, "is due to the fact that human life and indeed the pursuit 
of happiness depend upon the nature and the efficiency of those 
means which culture gives man in his struggle with the environ- 
ment, with other human beings, and with Destiny herself." 
A fourth group of givens is circumstantial. The stock market 
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rises and falls; a war is declared; Pearl Harbor is attacked. Once 
these ltappen, they cannot be reversed nor avoided nor ignored 
nor done over again. 
One can think of the different forms of destiny on a spectrum 
with various gradations. On the left-hand extreme position 1 
would put what the philosophers call necessity and the poets call 
fate, like earthquakes or volcanoes. These are scarcely at all sus- 
ceptible to human change. Determinism 1 would place near this 
end also. In the middle I would place the unconscious function of 
the human mind, since this is partly determined and partly influ- 
enced by human activity. The cultural aspects of destiny 1 would 
place nearer the right end of the spectrum, since, though we have 
no voice in choosing our society or historical period, we have a 
good deal of freedom in how we use them. On the extreme right 
hand 1 would put talent, for though it is given in one sense, we 
have considerable freedom with respect to how we use it. 
There are also varying ways of relating to one's destiny. One 
is to cooperate with it. The aspects of destiny that Marcus Aurelius, 
the Roman Stoic, had in mind best fit this cooperation: "The des- 
tiny assigned to every man is suited to him, and suits him to 
himself." Another way is be aware of and to acknowledge one's des- 
tiny. Most of us do this, at least superficially, with physical size, 
anatomy, and death. A third way is more active-namely, engag- 
ing one's destiny. A fourth way is the outright confronting and 
challenging of one's destiny. Philip's conversations with his dead 
mother are examples of this. A fifth and the most active response 
is encountering and rebelling against destiny. Dylan Thomas's 
"Rage, rage against the dying of the light" is an example of this. 
These ways are not mutually exclusive, to be sure, and we all use 
all of them at different times. 
The role of talent as a form of destiny is shown in a letter 
Beethoven wrote when he was twenty-eight and becoming so 
deaf that others "heard the shepherd singing and 1 heard noth- 
ing" : 
Oh, if 1 were rid of this affliction 1 could embrace the world! I feel that 
my youth is just beginning and have I not always been ill ? ... Grant me 
but half freedom from my affliction and then-as a complete, ripe man 
1 shall return to you and renew the old feelings of friendship. You must 
see me as happy as it is possible to be here below-not unhappy. No! 1 
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cannot endure it. 1 will take Fate by the throat; it shall not wholly over- 
come me. Oh, it is so beautiful to live-to live a thousand times! 1 feel 
that 1 am not made for a quiet life. 
We can, of course, spend our lives trying to falsify or flee from 
our destiny. F. Scott Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby is the story of 
a young man who tried to falsify his past. Gatsby changed his - 
name, disowned his parents, cultivated a British accent, and 
spent the crucial years after the world war trying to win back ' 
Daisy, the rich girl with whom he had fallen in love when he was 
in military training. In Fitzgerald's words, 
The truth was that Jay Gatsby of West Egg, Long Island, sprang from 
his platonic conception of himself.... So he invented just the sort of 
Jay Gatsby that a seventeen-year-old boy would be likely to invent, and 
to this conception he was faithful to the end. 
' 
At the tragic ending, the fabulous dance orchestras were silenced, ' ' the last person had left the once-crowded parties, Gatsby's big 
house was empty, Daisy had gone back to her rich husband. And 
Gatsby's body floats dead in his own swimming pool. Fitzgerald 
sums up the tragedy and relates it to us all: 
Gatsby had corne a long way to this blue lawn, and his dream must have 
seemed so close that he could hardly fail to grasp it. He did not know 
that it was already behind him, somewhere back in that vast obscurity 
beyond the city, where the dark fields of the republic rolled on under the 
night. 
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgiastic future that year by 
year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that's no matter-tomor- 
, row we will run faster, stretch out our arms farther.... And one fine 
morning- 
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into ' 
the past. 
. With beautiful insight, Fitzgerald sees the human compulsion ' to repeat behavior: "tomorrow we will run faster." Is this not our 
universal hubris? "No man of woman born / Coward or brave, ' 
can shun his destiny," Homer proclaimed centuries ago. We 
human beings beat on like "boats against the current," while we 
are all the time "borne back ceaselessly into the past." Fitzgerald . ' . rightly observed that each of us to some extent falsifies, denies, or 
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dodges his destiny-to commit the errors is all too human. He 
himself was especially of this type, as imaginative writers often 
are, and his special difficulty with his own destiny, which 
obviously included his early fame, led to his alcoholism and early 
death. So he knows whereof he speaks. 
Looking at destiny from within the person, Ortega y Gasset 
calls the destiny of each of us our "vital design." This puts the 
accent on destiny as destination, or the significant direction or 
conflict of directions each one of us senses within himself. "Our 
will is free to realize or not to realize this vital design which we 
ultimately are, but we cannot ... change it, abbreviate it, or 
substitute anything for it." The environment we live in, the out- 
side world we face, and our own character as it had developed up 
until that moment simply make this task easier or harder. "Life," 
continues Ortega, "means the inexorable necessity of realizing the 
design for an existence which each one of us is.... The sense of 
life ... is nothing other than each one's acceptance of his inex- 
orable circumstance and, on accepting it, converting it into his 
own creation." 
Destiny in this sense is that design of our lives that we spend 
our years trying to find, seeking and groping, trying this job and 
that one, loving this woman or man and that one, stumbling into 
this therapist's office or that one,, sometimes with success and 
sometimes with failure. The tendency, present especially in 
America, to believe that we can change everything at any time 
we wish, that nothing in character or existence is fixed or given 
(in Los Angeles not even death) and that now with psychotherapy 
or the cults we can remake our lives and personalities over the 
weekend is not only a misperception of life, but is also a desecra- 
tion of it. 
Psychoanalysis and its offspring provide varied ways of trying 
to discover this vital design of each of us. Gurus?r other per- 
sons who claim to have some transterrestial connections-are so 
prized in our day because they presume to tell us what our vital 
design is. 
To the extent that we are able to live out our destiny, we 
experience a sense of gratification and achievement, a conviction 
that we are becoming what we were meant to become. It is an 
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experience of authenticity, a feeling of being in accord with the 
universe, a conviction of genuine freedom. William James would . have understood what we are talking about: 
The huge world that girdles us about puts all sorts of questions to us, 
and tests us in all sorts of ways. Some of the tests we meet by actions 
= that are easy, and some of the questions we answer in articulately for- 
mulated words. But the deepest question that is ever asked admits of no 
reply but the dumb tuming of the will and tightening of our heartstrings 
as we say, "Yes, 1 will even have it so!" 
" 
When the vital design is covered up and silenced, however, 
the sensitive person has the experience of acting like a prig-he 
feels unreal, ungenuine, inauthentic. "This design," Ortega ' 
states, "is not an idea or plan thought up by the person involved, 
and freely chosen. The design is anterior to all the ideas one's 
intellect forms, and to all the decisions of one's will. Life is essen- 
tially a drama, because it is a desperate struggle-with things and 
even with our own character-to succeed in being in fact that wbicb 
we are in design. 
" 
Often our pressure to deny our destiny comes from such 
things as our insecurity, our dread of ostracism, our fear and anx- 
iety, and our lack of courage to risk ourselves. These, in turn, 
come largely from the pressure to conform: it is safer to be like 
everybody else. The vital design, the authentic pattern to which 
we are called can then be left far behind. 
But the tendency to deny our destiny may also come from a 
conflict between possibilities-between, say, being a scientist or 
a poet, as in Goethe's life. There is the conflict in classical trag- 
edy, for example, between Orestes' love and pity for his mother 
and his need to avenge his father, the love-hate dilemma that 
arises from a fundamental human conflict between desire and des- 
tiny. 
' 
There is a tendency among us to separate that which has an 
evil connotation in destiny, which we generally cali fate, from 
that which is constructive, which we cal] destiny. Martin Buber, 
who has said important things about destiny, also seems to make 
that mistake when he writes in 1 and Thou of the need to avoid the 
"fate-will" and to choose instead the "destiny-will." He distin- 
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guishes "between fated self will and destined free-will." But this 
emasculates destiny and makes it insipid. It is crucial to remem- 
ber that the concept of destiny is prior to the moral criteria of 
good and evil, as we stated earlier. "So let there be no confound- 
ing the ought to be of morality, which inhabits man's intellectual 
region, with the vital imperative, the has to be of personal voca- 
tion, situated in the most profound and primary region of our 
being." 
We need to accept the negativefate element together with the 
positive destiny elements if we are to experience the power of 
destiny. Hitler developed his great power over the German peo- 
ple by his use of destiny, demonic as this power was. When he 
spoke of the destiny of the German people, he was using the term 
correctly no matter how destructive his campaigns tumed out to 
be. "The devil can quote scripture" has a meaning far beyond 
what we normally assume. 
Destiny and freedom form a paradox, a dialectical relation- 
ship. By this 1 mean that they are opposites that need each 
other-like day and night, summer and winter, God and the 
devil. Out of the encountering of the forces of destiny come our 
possibilities, our opportunities. In the engaging of destiny our 
freedom is born, just as with the coming of the light the day 
overcomes the night. Destiny, as we have said, is not to be 
thought of as a ball and chain that afflict human beings. It is true 
that 
There's a divinity that shapes our ends, 
. Rough-hew them how we will. 
But it is likewise true, as Shakespeare also points out, 
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars 
But in ourselves, that we are underlings. 
These statements sound like a clear contradiction. But they 
are paradoxes instead. Freedom is by no means the absence of 
destiny. If there were no destiny to confront-no death, no ill- 
ness, no fatigue, no limitations of any sort and no talents to pose 
against these limitations-we would never develop any freedom. 
_ The meaning of the dialectical relation between freedom and 
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destiny is that, even though they are opposites, they are still 
. bound together. They imply each other. If destiny changes, free- 
dom must change, and vice versa. As Hegel put it, first comes a 
thesis; this then gives rise to its antithesis; and this, in tum, leads 
, to a syntbesis. Destiny is the thesis; this gives rise to freedom, 
which is its antithesis; and this, in turn, leads to a synthesis. Each 
not only makes the other possible; each stimulates activity in the 
other pole, gives power and energy to the other. Thus we can 
truly speak of destiny being born out of freedom and freedom 
being born out of destiny. 
For freedom is honed in the struggle with destiny. The free- 
dom that develops in our confronting our destiny produces the 
richness, the endless variety, the capacity to endure, the ecstasy, 
the imagination, and other capacities that characterize the world 
and ourselves as conscious creatures, free but destined, moving 
in it. In this sense destiny is personal : "Each of us suffers his own 
destiny," as Virgil puts it. It is out of the dialectical relation of 
destiny and freedom that creativity and civilization are born. Karl 
Jaspers agrees: "Thus freedom and necessity [destiny] meet and 
fuse not only in my present and future choices but in the very 
individuality of my existence. Each and every decision establishes 
a new foundation for the formation of my real historical self: 1 
am bound by the decisive character of my choices; in virtue of 
these choices I have become what 1 wanted myself to be." 
Hence, there are all the paradoxical statements about free- 
dom. "We are 'doomed' to be free by the very fact of being born," 
states Hannah Arendt. She is here in agreement with Saint 
Augustine, who said the same thing. Or, as Sartre puts it, "We 
are condemned to freedom." Or Ortega: "Man is the being con- 
demned to translate necessity into freedom." 
3. Destiny and Responsibility .. . 
Are we responsible for our destiny? If we dare to answer that 
by saying "Partly so," we then face another question just as 
difficult. That is: If destiny is a given, a vital design that gives us 
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talents and limits and that we cannot revoke, how can responsi- 
bility have any meaning? 
The ancient Greeks faced this problem, together with the 
moral implications of destiny, when the ethical consciousness of 
the Greek civilization was being formed. During this period, 
around 1000 B.c., Homer relates the following fascinating inci- 
dent from the Trojan War. 
The combined Greek forces were encamped around the walls 
of Troy. Agamemnon, the general in chief of the Greek armies, 
had stolen Achilles' mistress from the Achilles' tent. When 
Achilles returned and discovered this, his rage knew no bounds. 
He was not only a man of fiery temper, but also the best fighter 
in the Greek army, There hung in the balance the portentous 
question: Would the whole Greek expedition be destroyed by the 
enmity between these two men? 
As these two heroes confront each other, Agamemnon says: 
Not I ... was the cause of this act, but Zeus and the furies who walk in 
darkness: they it was who ... put wild até [madness] in my understand- 
ing, on that day when I arbitrarily took Achilles' prize from him. So 
what could 1 do? Deity will always have its way. 
In other words destiny-Zeus and his "wild até"-will brook no 
denial. Is Agamemnon saying "I was brainwashed; not 1 but my 
unconscious did it"? It may seem so, but he is not. He is prepar- 
ing the way to assume his own responsibility. He then goes on: 
But since I was blinded by até, and Zeus took away my understanding, 
1 am willing to make my peace and give abundant compensation. 
Ah! Since destiny did these things to me, 1 will give compen- 
sation. 
Cooling down, Achilles answers: 
Let the son of Atreus [Agamemnon] go his way.... For Zeus the coun- 
selor took away his understanding. 
The Greeks are saying here that a person is responsible even 
though the gods work inwardly, even though they take away 
one's understanding. That is, one is destined, but one is respon- 
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sible for what this destiny makes one do. Although Agamemnon 
is driven by destiny, which works through powers in his uncon- 
scious mind, he is nevertheless responsible. And responsibility is 
inseparable from freedom. Freedom and responsibility on one 
; side, and até and destiny on the other-these operate simultane- 
ously in this dialectical and intimately human paradox. 
Julian Jaynes reminds us of another incident from Homer and 
the Trojan War. Hector finds himself confronting Achilles in the 
heat of battle. Hector does not want to fight Achilles at that 
moment, so he backs away. His withdrawing is not determined 
by cowardice; i.e., he is not forced by Achilles' sword to back up. 
Instead, the goddess put her shield around Hector in the form of 
a cloud under which he could back out of the battle without any 
loss of self-esteem. 
The furies who walk in darkness and the goddess surrounding 
Hector with a cloud are superb synonyms for destiny. Indeed, 
the gods and goddesses were personifications of destiny; they set 
the ultimate limits on human actions and opened up possibilities 
for human beings. Anyone who opposed them outright was 
brought to ruin by such means as a boit of lightning-what we 
modems call an "act of God," carryover of this ancient belief- 
from the hand of Zeus. 
This sense of responsibility is partly the impingement of cul- 
ture upon us. We have to have responsibility if we are to live with 
any harmony in community. Culture can help us mitigate or 
meliorate destiny: through culture we learn to build houses to 
keep out the snow and the winter cold. Through culture we 
barter our services for food so that we do not starve. But culture 
cannot overturn destiny, cannot erase it. We can collectively 
cover our eyes to the results of our actions, blind ourselves to the 
full import of our cruelty and our responsibility for that cruelty, 
as we did in the Vietnam war. But this requires a numbing of our 
sensitivity and will sooner or later take its toil in neurotic symp- 
toms. 
For Homer the acknowledging of destiny was by no means a 
wallowing in guilt, but an acceptance of personal responsibility. 
Homer has the gods proclaim in the Odyssey: 
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O alas, how now do men accuse the gods! For they say evils come from 
us [the gods]. But they themselves, by reason of their sins, have suffer- 
ings beyond those destined for them. 
In these Homeric tales the early Greeks were learning-an 
arduous task in civilization requiring hundreds and hundreds of 
years-that freedom and destiny require each other, that they are 
in dialectical relation with each other. Agamemnon knows that 
he must assume his responsibility by compensating Achilles for 
what he believes the gods-i.e., destiny-made him do. 
The Greeks found, furthermore, that their belief in destiny, 
expressed in the gods and goddesses, energized and strengthened 
them individually. The typical Greek citizens, as anyone who reads 
Herodotus or Thucydides knows, were amazingly self-reliant 
and autonomous. We look at their activities and realize that it is 
not true that belief in destiny tends to make one passive and inert. 
The opposite is true-namely, that belief in unlimited freedom, 
as the flower children demonstrated, tends to paralyze one. For 
unlimited freedom is like a river with no banks; the water is not 
controlled in its flow and hence spills out in every direction and 
is lost in the sands. 
Hence the seeming paradox that the deterministic move- 
ments, like Calvinism with its predestination, and Marxism with 
its economic determinism of history, have such great power. One 
would think that since people are the result of their predestination 
or their economic status, not much change is possible. But the 
Marxists and Calvinists work energetically to change people and 
often with great success. In other words, their belief in their par- 
ticular form of destiny gives them power. 
Once in a while a person, after going through innumerable 
smaller decisions, arrives at a point where his freedom and des- 
tiny seem united. This was true of Martin Luther, who, when he 
nailed his ninety-nine theses on the door of the cathedral at Wit- 
tenberg, said, "Here 1 stand, 1 can do no other." Such acts are 
the fruition of years of minor decisions culminating in this cru- 
cial decision in which one's freedom and destiny merge. 
By encountering destiny directly, the Greeks had their own 
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ways also of mitigating it. The clever man, like Ulysses, could 
know which gods to set against other gods in his sacrifices. The 
Greeks could guarantee an auspicious wind with which to sail 
from Aulis to Troy by sacrificing Iphigenia, daughter of Aga- 
memnon. This cruel act, incidentally, clinched Agamemnon's 
destiny-he would later be murdered by his wife for his part in 
the bloody heritage of Mycenae. 
In Aeschyus' drama, when Agamemnon came back from 
Troy, he marched in as the proud conqueror, one who could 
scarcely restrain his boasting that he had accomplished the laying 
low of Troy. The chorus hastens to warn him not to commit 
bubris, the sin of overweening pride, which makes the gods jeal- 
ous and incites their revenge. It is parallel to our modern, weaker 
' form of the same wisdom "Pride goeth before a fall." But Aga- 
memnon, with his bluster, does commit hubris, and this leads 
directly to his death. 
Hubris is the refusal to accept one's destiny. It is the person's belief 
that he performed great acts ail by himself. It is the tendency to 
usurp the power of the gods. It is also the denial of how much 
one is always dependent upon one's fellow man and woman and 
one's society. Destiny itself is the source of our talents and aids 
the victors in these great projects like the Trojan War, and when 
we lose sight of this-as we do when we commit hubris-evil 
consequences ensue. 
Does not the possibility or the power to do something about the 
situation at hand confer on one some responsibility to do it? 1 
choose to answer yes. Responsibility is no longer simply tied to 
past causes-i.e., what one did. It must be geared also to present 
freedom-i.e., what 1 can do. The freedom to act confers on me 
the responsibility to act. In this sense freedom and responsibility 
are united. Responsibility is more than a moral teaching, more 
than another rule of the ethical life. It is part of the underlying 
ontological structure of life. This means, obviously, that there is 
a host of things that we are responsible for that we will never be 
able to discharge. But it is better to carry unfulfilled responsibil- 
ity than to act on some pretense of "pure" conscience. 
Such is the interdependence of people in the collective nature 
of the human community that we need to assume responsibility 
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for a multitude of things. Obviously, I am not saying that we 
develop neurotic consciences-there may be many reasons for not 
doing the given thing. For example, my friend brings up his child 
wrongly, and 1 had better not act on my hunch that 1 know how 
and he doesn't. But the freedom inherent in a friendship does 
confer on me the responsibility to be open to talk with him about 
it and to share whatever insights I have. Thus, 1 am not suggest- 
ing we be busybodies. I am suggesting we be sensitive, compas- 
sionate, and aware of the complex interdependence of our human 
community. 
" : VI . 
' Destiny and Death . 
' 
Forget your personal tragedy. We are all bitched from the start and 
you especially have to hurt like hell before you can write seriously. But 
when you get the damned hurt use it-don't cheat with it. Be as 
. faithful to it as a scientist. 
- ERNEST HEMINGWAY, writing to F. Scott Fitzgerald 
.. It is only in the face of death tbat man's self is born. .. 
- SAINT AUGUSTINE 
Our awareness of death is the most vivid and compelling 
example of destiny. 1 say awareness of death rather than simply 
death, for everything in nature dies in its own time. But human 
beings know that they die. They have a word for death, they 
anticipate it, they experience their death in imagination. This 
experience of imagining one's own death is seen in such diverse 
events as seeing a dead bird in the road, or crossing a trafficked 
street, or buckling a seat belt, or having an orgasm. 
A genius in physics as weil as in moral insight, Blaise Pascal 
tells us this most beautifully: 
Man is only a reed, the feeblest reed in nature, but he is a thinking reed. 
There is no need for the entire uni verse to arm itself in order to annihilate 
him: a vapour, a drop of water, suffices to kill him. But were the universe 
to crush him, man would yet be more noble than that which slays him; 
because he knows that he dies, and the advantage that the universe has 
over him; of this the universe knows nothing. Thus ail our dignity lies in 
thought. By thought we must raise ourselves, not by space and time, 
. 
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which we cannot fill. Let us strive, then, to think well-therein lies the 
principle of morality. 
This awareness of death is the source of zest for life and of 
our impulse to create not only works of art, but civilizations as 
well,. Not only is human anxiety universally associated with ulti- 
mate death, but awareness of death also brings benefits. One of 
these is the freedom to speak the truth: the more aware we are of 
death, the more vividly we experience the fact that it is not only 
beneath our dignity to tell a lie but useless as well. Rome will 
not burn a second time, so why fiddle during this burning? We 
can then say with Omar, "The bird of Time has but a little way 
to flutter-and the Bird is on the Wing." 
The men of wisdom throughout history have understood the 
value for life in our awareness of death. "To philosophize," said 
Cicero, "is to prepare for death." And Seneca stated, "No man 
enjoys the true taste of life but he who is willing and ready to quit 
it." ,, 
A young man who was studying to be a psychotherapist and 
who was at this time my patient told me how intensely anxious 
he had been for several days prior to reporting on a case before a 
group of older practicing therapists, where he anticipated being 
attacked. Driving to the meeting, the thought suddenly occurred 
to him, "We'lI ail be dead some day-why not forget this neurotic 
anxiety and do the best I can?" Strange to say, this gave him a 
sudden, temporary relief from his anxiety. Another client told 
me about his having gone to a therapist several years earlier also 
with the problem of being so anxious he felt he could not stand it 
when his work required him to travel around the country. The 
other therapist had remarked, "You can always put a revolver in 
your suitcase and shoot yourself." This also gave the man a con- 
siderable relief from his anxiety. 
Both of these persons experienced, with this reference to 
death, a relief from the feeling of being trapped. The anxiety lost 
its power when they realized that, if they had to, they could get 
out of the victim's role. We see what Nietzsche meant when he 
said, "The possibility of suicide has saved many lives." 
' 
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1. The Poignance of the Transient 
' 
To admit genuinely one's mortality is to be released, to 
achieve a sense of freedom. The immortal gods on Mount Olym- 
pus were not free in any real sense. They were bored, empty, and 
uninteresting creatures-except when they got involved with 
mortals. Zeus and his cohorts could liven things up only by va- 
grant trips to earth to have a love affair with a human being. Those 
figures in Greek mythology whose careers are genuinely inter- 
esting are the demigods who do things for mortals, like Prome- 
theus, or the gods or goddesses when they concern themselves in 
human affairs like the Trojan War or like Athena when she pre- 
sided at the trial of Orestes. In other words, mortality must be 
brought in to liven up immortality. The drama Amphitryon 38, writ- 
ten by a contemporary Frenchman, illustrates this point. Zeus 
goes down to seduce the beautiful wife of a soldier away at war, 
and he later tells Mercury about making love to a mortal: . ;: : . 
She will use little expressions and that widens the abyss between us. She 
will say, "When 1 was a child"-or "When 1 am otd"-or "Never in all 
my life"-This stabs me, Mercury.... We miss something, Mercury- 
the poignance of the transient-the intimation of mortality-that sweet sad- 
ness of grasping at something you cannot hold. 
' 
Homer, in the same vein, tells us how Odysseus refused ' 
immortality when he was tempted by the beautiful goddess 
', Kalypso, who says to him: ........ 
" "Son of Laertes and seed of Zeus, resourceful Odysseus, are you still all ' 
so eager to go on back to your own house and the land of your fathers? 
1 wish you well, however you do it, but if you only knew in your own 
heart how many hardships you were fated to undergo before getting back 
. , to your country, you would stay here with me and be the lord of this 
"' . household and be an immortal, for all your longing once more to look on 
that wife for whom you are pining ail your days here. And yet I think 
that I can claim that 1 am not her inferior either in build or stature, since ' 
..., it is not likely that mortal women can challenge the goddesses for build 
and beauty." 
" 
Then resourceful Odysseus spoke in turn and answered her: "God- 
dess and queen, do not be angry with me. 1 myself know that ail you say 
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is true and that circumspect Penelope can never match the impression 
you make for beauty and stature. She is mortal after all, and you are 
immortal and ageless. But even so, what I want and all my days 1 pine 
for is to go back to my house and see my day of homecoming. And if 
some god batters me far out on the wine-blue water, 1 will endure it, 
keeping a stubborn spirit inside me, for already 1 have suffered much 
and done much hard work on the waves and in the fighting. So let this 
adventure follow." 
So he spoke, and the sun went down and the darkness came over. 
These two, withdrawn in the inner recess of the hollowed cavern, 
enjoyed themselves in love and stayed all night by each other. 
At dawn Odysseus arises, cuts down trees to build his ship, 
and sails away three days later. As Kalypso had foretold and 
Odysseus had feared, his journey home was long and filled with 
hardships. He nevertheless had chosen Penelope, home, and 
mortality rather than the pleasant life of immortality with 
Kalypso. 
This is what Abraham Maslow meant when he wrote, while 
recuperating from his heart attack: "Death and its ever present 
possibility makes love, passionate love, more possible. 1 wonder 
if we could love passionately, if ecstasy would be possible at ail, 
if we knew we'd never die." This is not simply an expression of 
"I almost lost this ... 1 almost died," but is a sensing of the rich 
depth that comes from awareness of destiny and the new possi- 
bilities, the new freedom of aesthetic sensibility, that then opens 
up. 
No one knows what lies beyond this pale. But if there is any- 
thing other than extinction, we can be sure that the best prepa- 
ration for it, in this brief interval when the bird of time is still on 
the wing, is to live out our lives and our creativity and as fully as 
we can, experiencing and contributing what we can. 
If, however, we defend ourselves against the dread of dying 
by the belief that death is simple and easy, life becomes insipid 
and empty and the concept of freedom has no meaning. 
Like most of the people who have read and heard Kübler- 
Ross, I have been impressed by her stories of her self-sacrifice in 
dealing with dying patients. 1 don't wish to detract from that or 
from her right to believe what she thinks is correct. But this 
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should not prevent us from looking clearly at the implications of 
. the conclusions she draws. Kübler-Ross states that death is like 
the opening of the chrysalis of the caterpillar and the emergence 
of the butterfly. This, I propose, is a form of denial; it takes away 
the person's impetus to make the most of this life. Kübler-Ross . also quotes some of her patients as saying, "I cannot wait to die 
. and see my friends." If death is so nice, then we would hurry 
. toward it, with no poetry, no attention to building civilization for 
our children, no painting to pass on to posterity, no Ninth Sym- 
phony of Beethoven. And freedom would not even be a relevant 
concept. 
This leads to the real hopelessness, for it robs human beings 
of the poignancy of living. In vain, then, we listen for the song of 
the Ulysses: 
... I will drink ' 
' Life to the lees ... 
... Life piled on life . 
' 
Were ail too little ... 
' 
Tennyson then describes the confronting of destiny and the 
living out of one's possibilities ... 
... Come, my friends. 
'T is not too late to seek a newer world. . 
We are ... " ' .. 
. One equal temper of heroic hearts, 
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will . ,. 
_ To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield. 
' 
. ' But immediately we run up against the omnipresent denial of 
death in our culture, the fact that our society is sick in its pre- 
. tenses in song and ritual that we never really die. When Hubert 
Humphrey, wizened and thin from cancer, made his last appear- 
ance before Congress, the senators, in their speeches, spoke opti- ' ' 
mistically: "Get well soon, Hubert. We need you back here." ' ' Who were they kidding? Not Humphrey, who courageously ` 
knew his death was only several months away. Not the millions 
watching on television, who could see clearly he was dying. ' Themselves? How much in contrast is Senator Richard Neuber- 
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ger's statement, which he wrote shortly before his own death 
from cancer, that there had come 
a new appreciation of things 1 once took for granted-eating lunch with 
a friend, scratching Muffet's ears and listening for his purrs, the com- 
pany of my wife, reading a book or magazine in the quiet cone of my bed 
lamp at night.... For the first time 1 am savoring life. 1 realize, finally, 
that 1 am not immortal. 
But what a tragedy that one waits until one is dying before 
savoring life! 
The denial of death is the more amazing because it is clearly 
exhibited by many of the famous psychoanalysts themselves. 
Erich Fromm, in his book The Heart of Man, states, "The good 
man never thinks of death." In this book he sets "biophiliacs," the 
lovers of life, against "necrophiliacs," the lovers of death. In the 
latter, which Fromm obviously hates, were gathered the destruc- 
tive persons of history-Hitler, Napoleon, and so forth. "Good is 
all that serves life; evil is all that serves death." The problem is , 
that one then represses all thoughts of death, and this leads 
directly to the denial of death and of evil. In those thoughts there , 
is no understanding of Goethe's statement in Faust: 
LoRD: Man's active nature, flagging, seeks too soon the level; 
Unqualified repose he learns to crave; 
Wbence, willingly, the comrade him I gave, 
Who works, excites, and must create, as Devil. 
And when Mephistopheles reveals himself to Faust: 
FAUST: Who art tbou, then? 
MEPHISTOPHELES: Part of that Power, not understood, 
Which always wills the Bad, and always works 
tbe Good. 
In his denial of death, Fromm was but following the lead 
of most Freudians and of Freud himself. The originator of psy- 
choanalysis set the fashion in arguing that anxiety about death is 
generally castration anxiety, because no one has ever actually 
experienced literal death, and, therefore, death cannot be in the 
unconscious. But as Yalom pointedly asks, Who has ever experi- 
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' 
' enced literal castration? Freud deals with death only in his the- 
. ory of Thanatos and in some essays inspired by World War I. 
. But the theory of Thanatos-whatever its mythic values, which 
1 think are great-never became part of the main body of psy- 
choanalytic thought and is widely rejected by orthodox Freudi- 
ans. With the exception of Otto Rank and Melanie Klein, both of 
whom broke off from the master and founded their own schools, 
this blindness about death seems more or less universal in ortho- 
dox psychoanalytic circles. 
It is indeed a puzzle as to why Freud and his orthodox follow- 
ers have so blocked off death and left the area for the existential 
therapists to bring back into its own. I suggest that the reason is ' 
the illusion of the invincibility of psychoanalysis. For to confront 
and acknowledge death-our own death and the death of 
others-is the central statement of human vincibility. The aware- 
, ness of death is the emergence of destiny, now in the sense of 
necessity, in its extreme and ultimate form. To admit this aspect 
of destiny, this confession of finitude, would be to admit that 
. 
psychoanalysis-and Freud and Fromm and all the rest of us 
mortals as well-would have to give up the craving for invincibil- 
ity. This is to accept our finiteness and our mortality. It is to join 
the club of the human, the club of the finite, the vincible, the 
vulnerable; the club of the poignant mortals. 
The awareness of death is required by the yes-no character- 
istic of human consciousness. Consciousness is never static: it 
" knows one thing because that is opposite to something else. It 
experiences things dialectically, like an electric current with pos- 
itive and negative poles. Or, as Gregory Bateson often said, we 
become aware of something by virtue of its contrast with its back- 
: ground. If the fly were perfectly still, the frog would never see it. ' 
But the fly moves once, and the frog takes aim; the fly moves 
again and the frog gobbles it up. Again, we hear the echo of the 
ancient wisdom of Heraclitus: "People do not realize that what 
is opposed to something is also identical with it." 
" 
:, ' 
Life is the opposite of death, and thoughts of death are nec- 
essary if we are to think significantly of life. Who has not thought 
at some moment of great joy "I hope 1 never die!" Or on seeing ' some breathtakingly beautiful view of the Alps "This makes me 
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feel like eternity-l'm beyond life and death." Or on toiling at 
some challenging task "May heaven help me to live long enough 
to finish my work." Or at some moment of discouragement 
"Death would be better than this!" Or at a time of great fatigue, 
"He giveth his beloved rest." We need not talk about thoughts of 
suicide at ali. For ali the above illustrations are of the poignancy 
of life, and they a)) contain references to death. The most intense 
experiences of life bring with them the most intense experiences 
of death. 
2. Witchcraft and the Projection of Destiny 
When persons cannot or will not acknowledge and confront 
aspects of their destiny-such as a sudden illness, an inexplicable 
death, the birth of a malformed baby-the destiny becomes 
repressed. It is then often projected on figures outside them- 
selves, such as gods, sorcerers, demons, and witches. I do not use 
the word project pejoratively. Projection is a common and normal 
function of the human mind, and we all do it continuously in less 
portentous ways then those cited here. Many talented people 
experience their visions in art or music as coming at least partially 
from outside themselves. As an artist paints a landscape, it is 
impossible to tell how much comes from the landscape that he 
presumably sees and how much is projected from his own sense 
of form. Indeed, his genuine art depends on what he projects 
rather than on what exists objectively "out there." The line 
between inner and outer reality is impossible to draw sharply, 
as the physics as the brain studies of Karl Pribram make clear. 
But here we will be talking mainly about the destructive aspects of 
the projection of destiny as it shows itself in witchcraft. 
Witchcraft has been a sad and serious problem in Europe and 
the West since the twelfth century, particularly in the Catholic 
and Protestant churches. In the thirteenth century the Inquisition 
petitioned Pope Alexander IV (1254-61) for permission to add 
witchcraft to the ecclesiastical functions to be judged by the 
Inquisition. The pope refused, but he left the door open by stating 
his belief that all witches were the servants of Satan. By the enè 
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of the fifteenth century, witchcraft was assimilated with heresy, 
and those found guilty by the Inquisition of practicing witchcraft 
were burned at the stake. 
If a person did not believe in witchcraft, his very disbelief put 
him in danger of being accused of heresy. If you believed that "no 
compact does or can exist between the Devil and a human being" 
or "that there is no sexual intercourse between the Devil and 
human beings" or that neither "devils nor witches can raise tem- 
pests, rain-storms, hail-storms and the like," you were already 
_ suspect of being in league with Satan. Even the leaders of the 
Protestant Reformation believed in witches. Luther wrote, "Paul 
reckoneth witchcraft among the works of the flesh, which ... is 
not lust or lechery, but a kind of idolatry. For witchcraft 
covenanteth with the devil." John Calvin also was a believer in 
such sorcery and frequently quoted a passage from the New 
Testament: "Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be 
. able to stand against the wiles of the Devil. For we wrestle not 
against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, 
against the ruiers of the darkness of the world." 
Witchcraft not only denied the ethical standards of the day, 
but also the aesthetic ones. The customary repulsive aspects of 
the witch's sabbath are present in extant documents: "The corp- ' 
ses of newly-born children were eaten by them; they had been ' ' stolen from their nurses during the night; all manner of revolting 
liquids were drunk and there was no savour in any of the food." 
It is easy to understand that the aspects of destiny that we 
have called "cosmic," like the eruption of volcanoes or earth- 
_ quakes, associated as these phenomena are with emotions of ' ' awe and terror, should be seen as the workings of some super- 
. natural power. But the commonplace things of life were also sus- . 
ceptible, in any imaginative or hysterical person, to being called 
the work of witches. Thus, "continued sterility of many years 
. was caused by witches through the malice of the Devil." 
" 
. Male impotence, to cite an example among the many things 
projected, was widely cited as being caused by witchcraft. A ' 
couple, let us say, had been preparing for weeks to be married, . and in the evening, after the strain and stress of the marriage ' 
ceremony, the groom finds himself impotent. Out of his bewil- 
derment, anger, and feelings of inferiority, he could weil have 
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fantasies that some enchantment caused this embarrassing 
phenomenon. Pierre Bayle wrote in the early eighteenth century: 
"Several men are unable to consummate their marriage, and 
believe that this impotence is the effect of a spell. From then on, 
the nevrlyweds regard each other with an evil eye, and their dis- 
cord at times descends into the most horrible enmity; the sight of 
one makes the other shiver." It is said, he adds, that witches say 
certain words during the nuptial benediction, which is called 
"knotting the braid." "That is why there are some good mothers 
who consent to anticipating the wedding night in order to foil the 
witch." 
Thomas Aquinas takes up this question under the rubric 
"Whether the effects of sorcery are an impediment to mat- 
rimony." While he concludes that witches cannot impede the 
consummation of a marriage, the stronger spirits of evil, like 
demons and the devil, can do so. "The catholic faith ... insists 
that demons do indeed exist and that they may impede 
intercourse by their works." 
The data in the witch trials are often sexual, and, indeed, 
sound like the precursor to today's pornography. 
Anne Marie de Georgel declares that one morning when she was 
washing clothes near Pech-David above the town, she saw a man of huge 
stature coming towards her across the water. He was dark-skinned and 
his eyes burned like living coals; he was dressed in the hides of beasts. 
This monster asked her if she would give herself to him and she said yes. 
Then he blew into her mouth and from the Saturday following she was 
borne to the [witch's] Sabbath, simply because it was his will. There she 
found a huge he-goat and after greeting him she submitted to his plea- 
sure. The he-goat in return taught her all kinds of secret spells; he 
explained poisonous plants to her and she learned from him words for 
incantations and how to cast spells during the night of the vigil of St. 
John's day, Christmas Eve, and the first Friday in every month. He 
advised her to make sacrilegious communion if she could, offending God 
and honouring the Devil. And she carried out these impious suggestions. 
Anne Marie de Georgel then admitted that she had not ceased to do 
evil, practising all manner of filthiness during the years which passed 
from the time of her initiation to that of her imprisonment. 
Sometimes these victims make theological statements of con- 
siderable sagacity. This Anne Marie went on to say that "the 
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struggle between God and the Devil had gone on since eternity 
and would have no end. Sometimes one is victorious, sometimes 
the other, and at this time the situation was such that Satan was 
sure to triumph." How ironical that her being burned at the stake 
was itself a demonstration of the "triumph of Satan"! 
Why are witches predominantly female? Whereas some of the 
pronouncements from the Inquisition use the phrase "witches of 
both sexes," there is no doubt that witches are chiefly women. 
(The term for a male witch, warlock, is unfamiliar and rarely 
used.) The Malleus Maltficarum (1486) written by two leaders of ' the Inquisition in Germany, H. Institoris and Jacob Sprenger, 
often called an "encyclopedia" of witchcraft, has one section enti- 
tled "Why is it that Women are chiefly addicted to Evil Supersti- 
tions ?" The authors write (with seemingly perverse delight) "con- 
cerning the witches who copulate with devils," and they seek 
the methods by which such abominations are consummated. On the part 
of the devil: first, of what element the body is made that he assumes; 
secondly, whether the act is always accompanied by the injection of 
semen received from another ... whether he commits this act more fre- 
quently at one time and place ... [and] whether the act is invisible to any 
. who may be standing by. 
These authors speak often of the "fragility" of females and 
state, concerning women, that "when they are governed by a 
good spirit, they are most excellent in virtue; but when they are 
governed by an evil spirit, they indulge [in] the worst possible 
vices." Indeed, "the word woman is used to mean the `lust of the 
' ' flesh.' " But women also have brought beatitude to men, and have 
, "saved nations, lands and cities," as did Esther, Judith, and 
Deborah. Referring to the fact that original sin is blamed on Eve, 
Institoris and Sprenger remark that "we find a change of name, as 
from Eva to Ave [as in 'Ave Maria'] ... and the whole sin of Eve 
is taken away by the benediction of Mary." 
This condescending diatribe against women makes one wince, 
but it also casts light on the dynamics of the repression and pro- 
jection of destiny. It seems obvious that this "lust of the flesh" is 
... largely a projection of the men's own unacknowledged sexuality. ' 
The femme fatale phenomenon throws light on the helplessness a 
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man may feel under the attraction of a beautiful woman, espe- 
cially if she is unavailable to him. Many men resent such attrac- 
tion, as though these waves of passion take the control of their 
own lives away from them. Throughout history, paintings of the 
courtesan, the prostitute, the beautiful but possibly insensitive 
woman bear witness to the power of the femme fatale. 
Sex is a vivid part of our destiny in that we had no say about 
whether we were born male or female. Sex seems to take over our 
bodies willy-nilly. Our biological development brings with it new 
and, to the pubescent, strange and powerful desires and fantasies. 
Growing boys and men often experience sex as an intrusion and 
the powerful yearnings as something beyond their control. The 
conflicts males have about their sexuality can be accentuated by 
monastic life, as illustrated by Saint Anthony's sexual tempta- 
tions in the desert and by Origen's self-castration. 
All bf this generates hostility toward the women on the man's 
part. But "good" men repress this hostility-perhaps under a 
Victorianlike code of putting women on a pedestal-even though 
this hostility is shown in semirecognizable form in men's groups, 
men's humor, and so on. Male anger arises from the situation in 
which the woman seems to hold power over his own glands, some 
secret influence over his internal organs that may be shown in his 
involuntary erections. This at first surprises him, then bewitches 
(the word is àpt) him, and finally enrages him. It is easy to 
imagine these uncontrollable and tantalizing surgings of emotion as 
evidence that one has been bewitched. So strong can the repres- 
sion be that one never pauses to consider that the source may be 
one's own destiny in one's reference to sexuality. 
What better way to handle this bewildering attraction, this 
succumbing to the charms of the femme fatale, than by ascribing 
the secret influence to a witch? Sometimes the witches are young 
girls whose only crime is their beauty, and sometimes the witches 
are old and wizened and senile. But the man can easily remind 
himself that the old witches had this magic power in their youth, 
and they still remember the secret of it even though they don't 
tell. The "bewitched" man, attracted in ways he can do nothing 
' 
about, passes on to another his suspicion that so and so has 
witchly powers. Others become suspicious, and soon so and so 
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"becomes" a witch. Her denial only adds to the conviction. The 
erstwhile attracted man can tell himself he acted righteously and 
helped rid the world of the harmful one. Thus, his hostility and 
his erotic passion are relieved a thousandfold as the woman is 
bumed at the stake. 
Ali along there were protests against the cruel and inhuman 
treatment in the attack on so-called witchcraft, but the protesters 
objected at the risk of being accused themselves. One Jesuit and 
poet, Frederick Spee, assigned to the task of confessor to witches 
condemned to death in Würzburg, was appalled by the method of 
the trials and in 1631 published an anonymous attack on the per- 
secutions. 
In 1584 Reginald Scot subtitled his book on witchcraft proving 
. tbat the Compacts and Contracts of Witcbes with Devils and all Infernal 
Spirits... are but Erroneous Novelties and Imaginary Conceptions, and ' 
laying bare Tbe Unchristian Practices and Inbumane Dealings of ... 
Witcb-tryers upon Aged, Melancholly and Superstitious people in extort- 
ing Confessions by Terrors and Tortures. 
Toward the end of the period a number of people argued that 
the fears of witchcraft were themselves the result of superstition 
. and the human imagination gone wild. Pierre Bayle, in 1703, in a 
public letter, asserts that one hears among the common people 
that "an illness has been given to such and such persons by a 
. witch." But he argues that these "are an effect of the dominion 
that the imagination exercises over the other faculties of the body 
and the soul." The diseases mentioned are "maintained by the 
anxieties of the mind and by the panic-stricken terrors of the 
soul." He tells of a nun who sincerely felt herself possessed and 
adds, "see what the imagination is capable of, once unhinged by 
too contemplative a life." Bayle reminds the person to whom he is 
writing that "you did not put too much stock in what 1 wrote to 
you about the bitterness that accompanies the devout life. You 
have persisted in telling me that mystics seem to you to be the 
happiest men in the wortd. It was thus necessary to convince you 
_ by means of a great example that they do not always enjoy those 
. ineffable sweetnesses that you have read in their writings." We 
note here Bayle's insight that the evil projected on witches was 
the result of mental difficulties on the part of the mystics and 
Destiny and Death 115 S
others who repressed their own evil tendencies and pretended to 
experience perpetual sweetness and peace. 
Bayle points out that witchcraft is the effect of an intense but 
twisted imagination. "Remove this cause," he states like a modern 
psychotherapist, albeit in overly simplistic terms, "give a full 
confidence to the ill person, and he will have a tranquil mind, and 
that will be his cure." 
In the sixteenth century Montaigne tells of talking at length to 
"a prisoner ... a real witch in ugliness and deformity, long very 
famous in that profession," and gives his conclusion: "It seemed 
to me a matter rather of madness than of crime." 
In the seventeenth century Hobbes also became convinced 
that the belief in witchcraft was a delusion based on self- 
persuasion. Even the Grand Inquisitor of Spain came to see the 
self-delusion in the persecution of witches, and the fact that the 
presentation of witches itself led, by its suggestive self-fulfilling 
effects, to the appearance of the symptoms of witchcraft. There 
was, finally, the touching recantation of the twelve jurors of 
Salem (where a score of convicted witches had been put to death), _ 
who solemnly stated: "We justly fear we were sadly deluded and 
mistaken, ... [and] do therefore humbly beg forgiveness." 
" 
Witchcraft and the persecution of witches were ultimately 
overcome by Cartesian rationalism, the philosophical belief that 
the body and the mind were separate and did not influence each 
other. In our day this rationalism takes the form of the factual, 
"scientific" explanation of the adversities that befall us. 
1 propose, however, that this solution is not enough. What are 
we to do with the destructive projections (which have been and 
can be shifted to Jews and blacks as well as witches) that are not 
cured by the "clear and simple" ideas of the rationalist? Parents 
may want to know the facts concerning the crippling of their child 
in an auto accident, but this does not assuage their grief. Sadness 
and grief, joy and exultation are emotional responses, while sci- 
entific explanations are rational phenomena. Thus the acknowl- 
edging and confronting of death, serious illness, the fact that one 
was born into a certain race and culture at a certain historical 
period (to cite some random aspects of destiny) are essentially 
feeling, emotional phenomena. Logical data are on a different 
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plane. A healthy society must make room in poetry, art, and 
music for the expression of those emotional and mythic activities. 
This is why our forbears, like Bayle and Hobbes, spoke so 
often of the role of imagination in the projections on witches. It 
also may throw light on why women were regarded as being 
"more disposed to superstition," since women in Western culture 
by and large react more emotionally than do men.* In witchcraft 
. women were being punished for being more poetic, more emo- 
tionally sensitive, more intuitive than men (all things that could 
be regarded as "fragile"). 
. This is also why our argument here does not fall under Cal- 
.. vin's stricture when he attacks the "trifling philosophy about the 
holy angels which teaches that they are nothing but good inspira- 
tions or impulses which God arouses in men's minds, [and] those 
men ... who babble of devils as nothing else than evil emotions ' ' 
or perturbations which come upon us from our flesh." But the 
acknowledgment of fate and other aspects of one's destiny is by 
no means a "trifling" matter. On it depends our freedom as 
human beings and our very existence. ' 
We note that it is the conventionally "good" people-the 
faithful Catholics and Protestants, the ethical bourgeois citizens, 
the monks and nuns-who seem to have been most ready to ' ascribe witchcraft to other persons living on the fringes of their 
.. communities. These "good" people are most apt to repress the 
. ' evil tendencies within themselves and to pretend that fate does ' 
not exist, and, therefore, they are most likely to project their 
* Light is thrown on this by contemporary research into the dif?'ering functions of 
the nght and left hémisphères of the brain, begun by Dr. R. W. Sperry at the ' California Institute of Technology and now generally accepted in scientific quar- ' ters. Thèse studies demonstrate that the left hemisphere, broadly speaking, chan- 
nels logical, rational aspects of our experience, and the right hemisphere channels ' 
mainly the emotional, poetic, artistic ones. In our culture, women are reputed to 
develop the right-brain functions, and men depend more on the left brain. Thus, . it can be asked whether women, in our culture, are more addicted to what 
_ Institoris and Sprenger called "evil superstitions." We here state that this was sim- 
ply a question of women being emotional, poetic, and imaginative. 
This can be said only in a general sense, and should not be made into a rule. 
There are many exceptions, one of which we shall see presently in the per- 
sonalities of Macbeth and Lady Macbeth. 
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unacceptable urges on to other persons. Thus, goodness without 
the humility that John Bunyan expressed on seeing a condemned 
man being taken to the gallows, "There but for the grace of God 
go I," can itself lead to evil. Whenever I hear the customary plat- 
itudes "I love everyone" or "I have no enemies" or "Illness does 
not exist since God is spirit," 1 sigh and find myself wondering: 
Which aspect of destiny is the person repressing? Where will 
the projected energy rear its destructive head? 
' 
A classic portrayal of the projection of destiny is found in 
Shakespeare's Macbeth. In the fashion typical of the times, 
Shakespeare uses the three witches, called by him "the Weird 
Sisters," as the screen on which Macbeth's drive for power and 
ambition are projected. In this tragedy it is crucial that Shakes- 
peare present Macbeth in the beginning as a good man, univer- 
sally admired and respected by his peers. This sets the stage for 
Macbeth's profound and tragic conflict between this, the "pub- 
lic," side of his personality and his repressed power drives. A 
character sketch of Macbeth is given to us by Lady Macbeth near 
the beginning of the play: 
... thy nature; 
It is too full o' th' milk of human kindness 
To catch the nearest way. Thou wouldst be great, 
Art not without ambition, but without 
The illness should attend it. What thou wouldst highly, 
That wouldst thou holily; wouldst not play false, 
And yet wouldst wrongly win.... 
Macbeth is presented in the hour of his greatest success as 
leader of the army on the day of victory. This is the moment 
when we are ail open to the greatest temptations of power and 
ambition and the time when Macbeth is most open to his own 
sense of destiny. As one Shakespearean scholar states: "Experi- 
ence has taught that to good men the day of greatest achievement 
- proves too often the day of fate; that few natures can withstand 
the evil promptings to greater glory which come in the day of " success." 
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Macbeth also possesses a poetic nature and an active and por- 
tentous imagination, which reminds us of the role of imagination 
in the witchcraft of the times. He is always communicating asides 
to the audience, telling us his inner thoughts: he sees ghosts and 
apparitions and hallucinates the dagger hanging in the air before 
him. Lady Macbeth rightly states, "Your face, my thane, is as a 
book where men/May read strange matters." During the drama 
he vacillates between his power drive and his human compassion, 
as illustrated in his cry after murdering Duncan the king, "Wake 
Duncan with thy knocking! 1 wouldst thou couldst!" 
" 
. The play opens on a stormy day with the witches dancing 
around their fire as they chant on the heath: "Fair is foul, and foui 
is fair." Thus, as was the practice of witches, they deny the stan- 
dard of ethics in their first line. They likewise destroy the stan- 
dard of aesthetics: the brew around which they dance is made up 
of such things as "Finger of birth-strangled babe" and "grease 
that's sweatn'd/From the murderer's gibbet." 
" 
Macbeth's first words as he comes on the stage with Banquo 
. echos what the witches have just said, "So foul and fair a day 1 
have not seen." He is wholly unconscious of any relation with 
these supernatural agents of evil. The audience knows that this 
'. signifies some link between Macbeth and the witches, some 
unconscious relationship with the Weird Sisters. 
The witches then predict that Macbeth will be Thane of ' Cawdor and king and that Banquo's children will be kings to 
come. Banquo brushes off the witches' message, saying it is 
nothing: "The earth hath bubbles, as the water has,/And these are 
of them." He asks Macbeth whether they have "eaten on the 
insane root/That takes the reason prisoner." But Macbeth, with 
his poetic nature and already drawn into a relationship with 
occult powers, cannot brush the witches' prediction aside, espe- 
cially since they are the screen on which he projects his uncon- 
' ' scious urgings. The witches, indeed, are constituted by Macbeth's 
own unconscious. 
One might ask: Why does Banquo see the witches at all if they 
are projections of Macbeth's suppressed evil hopes and fears? 
Shakespeare was writing a drama, not a psychoanalytic paper, 
and took whatever poetic license he needed. But it is a fact that 
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when we project our own evil, we can make it sound rational 
enough to get our friends to "see" it even though they do not take 
it as seriously as we do. Macbeth cannot rid his imagination of 
these prophecies from the witches. When other lords arrive to 
inform him that he has indeed been rewarded for the victory by 
being appointed Thane of Cawdor, Banquo cries, "What, can the 
devil speak true?" But Macbeth ponders the dilemma in an aside, 
This supernatural soliciting 
Cannot be ill, cannot be good. If ill, 
Why hath it given me earnest of success, 
Commencing in a truth? 1 am Thane of Cawdor. 
If good, why do I yield to that suggestion 
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair 
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs, 
Against the use of nature? ... 
He is so caught up and overwhelmed by these thoughts that he 
can only add another paradox: "nothing is/But what is not." 
Thus, he again agrees with the witches' denial of the base of ethi- 
cal standards. But his vacillation goes on: "If chance will have me 
King, why, chance may crown me/Without my stir." 
" 
We see in this the drama of the damnation of a great soul, the 
struggle of a once good man with his destiny. Lady Macbeth 
plays the part of a human representative of fate, a situation similar 
to Macbeth's own projection on the witches. Her portrait is 
drawn by Shakespeare as the opposite of Macbeth's: she is not 
poetic but practical, cold, calculating, even ruthless. She cries in 
speaking of nursing her baby, "I would, while it was smiling in 
my face,/Have pluck'd my nipple from his boneless gums/And 
dash'd his brains out, had I so sworn as you/Have done." As the 
representative of fate, she uses every kind of persuasion from 
scorn to cajoling to force Macbeth "to screw his courage to the 
sticking point," until finally her husband, in a salute to her steel- 
like will, adjures her to "bring forth men-children only!" 
" 
Murder follows murder as this fate is lived out-the assassi- 
nation of Banquo and the killing of Macduff's wife and children. 
Macbeth is vacillating and remorseful all the while, until at the 
end he becomes desperate. The "milk of human kindness" is now 
' 
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' lost in his deeper and deeper inner conflict, depression, and ulti- 
mate destruction. 
Like the rest of us, Macbeth cannot take responsibility for his 
. own fate. He goes back three times to the witches for reassurance. 
Hecate, queen of the witches, states to her minions, "Thither 
he/Will come to know his destiny." And she instructs her witches 
on how they will delude Macbeth further: 
. ' 
... raise such artificial sprites 
As by the strength of their illusion 
Shall draw him on to his confusion. 
' ' 
. He shall spurn fate, scorn death, and bear 
His hopes 'bove wisdom, grace, and fear. 
And you all know, security 
Is mortals' chiefest enemy. 
Macbeth's life has become empty, as in the "tomorrow, and 
tomorrow" speech, but more than that: "There's nothing serious 
in mortality;/AII is but toys." 
True to Hecate's prediction, Macbeth does come back again 
"to know his destiny" and is bolstered by the witches' statement 
. that he will not die "till Birnam wood do come to Dunsinane," 
and no one "born of woman" will be able to kill him. Both of these 
turn out to be illusions. And in the last scene Macduff marches on 
stage with Macbeth's head. 
It is not by accident that this drama, which is so psychoanaly- 
tic, is also the one where Shakespeare makes his most speci6c 
references to mental healing. After Lady Macbeth, herself at last 
the prey of overwhelming guilt, walks in her sleep, trying to wipe 
out the blood on her hand, and Macbeth and the doctor he has ' called watch her, Macbeth pleads with the physician, 
Canst thou not minister to a mind diseas'd, , , 
.. ' _ . Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow, 
' 
' 
Raze out the written troubles of the brain ... 
When the doctor answers, "Therein the patient/Must minister to 
. himself," Macbeth expostulates, "Throw physic to the dogs; l'Il 
none of it." Relevant also is the doctor's earlier remark: "More 
needs she the divine than the physician." 
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The destiny of Macbeth, we assume, is a combination of the 
design of his own nature in conflict with the external situation in 
which he finds himself. This conflict confronts us all, and to the 
extent that we can embrace it, we avoid the need to repress it and 
then to project it upon somebody or something outside ourselves. 
Dramatic tragedies have such a powerful impact on us because 
we observe on the stage a good person who, like Macbeth, may be 
universally admired and respected by his peers but who suc- 
cumbs to the conflicts that were always present in himself and 
who then slowly disintegrates before our eyes. Good people, as 
we have said, have a capacity for evil that balances their goodness. 
The saints throughout history have declared-and there is no rea- 
son to doubt their judgment-that they were also great sinners. 
This does not necessarily mean that they did specific evil 
things-which may or may not be the case. It does mean that, 
ethically speaking, goodness and evil are to be understood as one's 
sensitivity to the effect of one's actions and thoughts on oneself 
and on one's community. Holy men are saints precisely because 
of their highly developed sensitivity to goodness and evil. 
1 borrow from Carl Jung the concept that, in the unconscious 
mind, a person's goodness is in direct proportion to his poten- 
tialities for evil. The unconscious thus compensates for and bal- 
ances consciousness. As one becomes sensitive to one's greater 
good, one also has the potentiality for greater evil. It is the latter 
that the witches represent. The higher we are able to go, the 
lower we can sink. 
The necessary thing is to be able to acknowledge and confront , 
one's evil fate. A tragedy is a situation, like Macbeth's, in which 
the person cannot admit and confront the aspects of his destiny 
nor even rebel against his destiny, for it is already blocked off 
from awareness. When Macbeth cries "Stars, hide your fires;/Let 
not light see my black and deep desires," he is describing the 
fissure that leads to projections of the repressed elements on 
witches or other unfortunate, albeit supernatural, agents. 
' 
Societies also go through the process of repression and projec- 
tion that produces witches and witchcraft. Sometimes it takes the 
form of scapegoating, as when it was used against the Jews and 
the blacks in our own time. Every nation in wartime shouts out to 
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its people the atrocities committed by the enemy and projects its 
own repressed aggression on the enemy. Thus freed of their own 
guilt at killing and given tangible "devils" to fight, the people can 
' 
unite on the side of "God," "democracy," and "freedom." Like 
the "good people" of the Middle Ages, we are the righteous ones, , 
struggling against the representatives of Satan. 
" 
We can see this in our own country, when we are told that we 
cannot talk with the Russians because they do not believe in God 
and an afterlife. Whether the statement is sincere or is made by 
officials simply as a way of enlisting the support of the religious 
masses, the dynamics are the same. It is the dynamics of witch- 
craft all over again. Witchcraft led to torture and burning ât the 
stake in past centuries, and such behavior can lead us and our 
world into unimaginable tragedy-atomic warfare. Coming to 
terms with our own destiny is essential if we are to have compas- 
sion and empathy for others who are different from us, but with 
whom we must co-exist in a world with possibilities of unpre- 
cedented cruelty. 
3. Destiny and the Poets : _ 
Engaging destiny is seen most brilliantly in poets, partly 
because of their genius with words, but mainly because they 
live in and write with the awareness of deeper dimensions of con- 
sciousness than the rest of us. Whether or not we call these 
depths subconscious, unconscious, or collective unconscious, they 
still are arrived at only by an intensity of feeling and vision, an 
ecstasy or a rage that cuts through superficial existence and 
reveals the profound forms of life. We should expect poets to 
have a great deal to communicate about destiny and about their 
own struggles to confront it. And we are not disappointed. 
The poet's way is the opposite to the opaque, placid life. In 
authentic poetry we find a confrontation which does not involve 
repression nor covering up nor sacrifice of passion in order to 
avoid despair, nor any of the other ways most of us use to avoid 
direct acknowledgment of our destiny. The art of the poet teases 
out our awareness of our fate; the energy that goes into the mak- 
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ing of the poem adds to our passion; and by means of the music 
poets combine with words, the poem takes on a power to express 
the dignity of our state as human beings. 
Matthew Arnold begins his sonnet entitled "Shakespeare" 
with the line "Others abide our question. Thou art free." The : 
reasons Shakespeare is free are revealed in the remainder of the 
sonnet: 
All pains the immortal spirit must endure, 
All weakness which impairs, ail griefs which bow, 
Find their sole speech in that victorious brow. 
Shakespeare thus expresses for all of us the passions and griefs 
experienced in engaging our own destinies. The joy and ecstasy 
of Shakespeare are noted by Matthew Arnold in his reference to 
"that victorious brow." From this level freedom takes off. Ail pos- 
sibilities then open up-"Thou art free," as Arnold puts it. 
John Milton contended, in his approaching blindness, against 
a bitter fate without becoming bitter. We find in his poetry not 
self-pity, but a courageous statement of his life's circumstance: 
When 1 consider how my light is spent 
Ere half my days in this dark world and wide, 
And that one talent which is death to hide . 
Lodged with me useless.... 
Blindness is a cruel fate for anyone, and especially for a poet in 
which it covers over this "talent which is death to hide." 
" 
In another sonnet to a friend, Milton is more explicit about 
"this three years' day these eyes": 
Bereft of light, their seeing have forgot; 
Nor to their idol orbs doth sight appear 
Of sun or moon or star through-out the year, 
Or man or woman. 
For many people this loss of the precious capacity of seeing would 
eat their souls. But Milton had available what we do not generally 
have in our culture-namely, a religious faith that could help him 
to accept such a harsh destiny. He speaks of the "mild yoke" that 
he is assigned to bear: 
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Against heavens hand or will, Yet 1 argue not 
Nor bate a lot of heart or hope, but still bear up - 
And steer right onward.... _.j 
This thought might lead me through the worlds vain mask 
Content, though blind, had 1 no better guide. 
The above lines may sound like resignation, but they are not 
a giving-up. Resignation usually drains away one's power and 
productivity. But this is the Milton who was passionate in his 
defense of freedom, who wrote the "Areopagitica," who cried 
"Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely 
according to conscience, above ail other liberties." This is the 
Milton who in Italy went to see and to support Galileo, at that 
time a victim of the Inquisition, the Milton who devoted his 
energy to producing passionate pamphlets in the service of 
Cromwell and the Reformation. When their cause was successful, 
Milton wrote Cromwell a collegial caution about the preservation 
of this freedom: 
y Help us to save free conscience from the paw 
Of hireling wolves whose gospel is their maw. 
This is the Milton who refused to recant when the Common- 
wealth later failed; he risked the scaffold but somehow escaped it. 
Such passionate devotion to the cause one believes in speaks 
not of resignation, passivity, docility, or loss of energy. Milton's 
poetry is an example of how tragic experience can be formed by 
art into a thing of beauty. This outer power in politics as well as 
the inner power of poetry indicate that Milton had kept very 
much alive his dialectical relation to his own destiny and thus his 
experience of authentic freedom. 
If Milton had lived in the twentieth century, the same senti- 
ments might have required different expression. Our form of 
expression might well have been the "rage" Stanley Kunitz holds 
is the source of the intensity necessary for all poetry. 
John Keats had an even more difficult destiny to confront- 
his own death from tuberculosis, which occurred when he was 
twenty-five. About his anticipation of this he wrote: 
_ When I have fears that I may cease to be -' 
_ Before my pen has gleaned my teeming brain.... 
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It is fascinating that both Milton and Keats, in the second line of 
the sonnet of each, are chiefly concerned with the poetry in them 
that may be forever unwritten. Their chief expression of possi- 
bility, their freedom to create, may be taken from them. Keats 
counts out the different meaningful things he will have to give up 
in the event of his death, 
When 1 behold, upon the night's starred face, 
Huge cloudy symbols of a high romance, ' And think that 1 may never live to trace 
Their shadows, with the magic hand of chance; 
And when 1 feel, fair creature of an hour, 
That 1 shall never look upon thee more, 
' 
Never have relish in the faery power 
' 
Of unreflecting love;-then on the shore 
Of the wide world 1 stand alone, and think 
Till love and famé to nothingness do sink. 
Let us consider a poet who is not concerned with a physical des- 
tiny like blindness or tuberculosis, but considers instead destiny 
in the form of the complete finitude of human beings-Omar 
Khayyâm. He is generally considered the poet of fatalism. But he 
can be more fruitfully seen as one who looks without flinching at 
the brevity of life: 
Into this Universe, and Wby not knowing 
Nor Wbence, like Water willy-nilly flowing; 
And out of it, as Wind along the Waste, 
1 know not Wbitber, willy-nilly blowing. 
The Rubdiydt is often cited as a poem of cynicism. But 1 wish to 
present Khayyam as the poet who is unafraid of the glaring light 
and does not flinch as he looks directly at human destiny: 
Up from Earth's Centre through the Seventh Gate 
1 rose, and on the Throne of Saturn sate; 
And many knots unravel'd by the Road; 
But not the Master-knot of Human Fate. 
The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ, 
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit 
Shall lure it back to cancel half a line, 
Nor ali your Tears wash out a Word of it. 
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He attacks the false wishes and illusions that we all tend to 
. carry-the hope that somehow we shall escape, through our spe- 
.. cial piety or our self-pity, the common fate of mankind. We sim- 
ply do not know the ultimate answers. But despite this fate and 
the injustice that it implies, we must seize what freedom we can 
and push on. The mystery wili remain a mystery, Omar states; ' ' 
or, as we would put it here, our destiny cannot be unraveled by 
reason or by wit. 
Though often seen as the poet of hedonism, advocating whiling 
away one's life "under the bough" with poetry, wine, and sex, 
Omar can more truthfully be read as the poet who pits fortitude 
against fatalism. He confronts fate without becoming fatalistic. ' .. This is the same Omar who, as a boy eight centuries ago, studied 
Sufism and science and as an adult became known as Persia's out- 
standing astronomer, who wrote an authoritative text on algebra, 
who revised the astronomical tables, who persuaded the sultan to 
: reform the calendar, and who in other ways worked diligently in ' .. the sultan's government. Hardly a hedonistic loafer! 
The embracing of one's fate so directly and so clearly-as well 
as so blithely and courageously-reduces the negative effect of " 
the piddling worries about destiny, and sets one free inwardly for 
actualizing one's freedom outwardly. Like Omar, those persons 
who often seem the most capable of accepting the inevitable are 
also the most productive and the most capable of pleasure and ' 
loY. 
We see in these poets that the acceptance of human destiny is 
the way to put one's feet on solid ground. We then are not the 
ready prey of hobgoblins-we are no longer fighting battles 
against figments of our imagination; no boogeyman is lurking in 
the closet. We are freed from the hundred and one imaginary 
bonds; we are loosed from the need to beg others to take care of 
us. Having confronted the worst, we are released to open up to 
the possibilities of life. 
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4. The Uses of Destiny 
Euripides has bequeathed to us some excellent advice: 
Events will take their course, it is no good 
Our being angry at them; he is happiest 
Who wisely turns them to the best account. 
How can we "wisely turn them to the best account"? What 
powers do we have to guide and influence the direction of our 
destiny? How does one both shape one's destiny and live as an 
expression of it? Whittier expressed it directly, "This day we 
fashion Destiny /Our web of fate we spin." 
" 
Ludwig van Beethoven was one of these from whom we may 
learn. 
What one individual has done another can aspire to; the destiny that one 
man has challenged and finally mastered another has it in his power to 
confront courageously also. In its externals Beethoven's destiny was his 
own; seen from within it is the destiny of man made manifest in one 
individual.... 
He does not fulfill our destiny for us, but he shows us how we in our 
turn may fulfill it. 
Destiny sets limits for us physically, psychologically, cultur- 
ally, and equips us with certain talents. But we do not simply 
ask: How do we act within those limits or how do we develop 
those talents? We ask the more crucial question: Does the con- 
fronting of these limits itself yield us constructive values? 
Can one, in other words, tum misfortune into fortune and 
keep fortune fortunate, turn handicaps into assets and keep assets 
from becoming handicaps? Is something taught us by the very 
process of confronting hardship that yields greater benefits than 
we gave up in our hardship and greater gifts than we lost? There 
come to mind hosts of examples of persons who have been bur- 
dened with a cruel destiny and have turned it to a constructive 
use. Epictetus says it powerfully: 
1 must die. I must be imprisoned. I must suffer exile. But must I die 
groaning? Must 1 whine as well? Can anyone hinder me from going into 
exile with a smile? The master threatens to chain me: what say you? 
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Chain me? My leg you will chain-yes, but not my will-no, not even 
Zeus can conquer that. 
Spinoza relates freedom to our capacity to be active rather 
than passive. In this sense let us inquire: What possibilities does 
our capacity to be active give us in molding our destiny? Which 
trends in our destiny do we choose to identify with, and which 
others do we avoid? Do we cringe before our destiny, feeling 
sorry for ourselves, crying out: If only we could have been such 
and such? If so we shall go down like cowards or, more likely, 
robots-mechanical human beings whom the universe erases. Or 
do we confront destiny directly, using it as a stimulus to call forth 
our best efforts, our greatest sensitivity, our sharpest creative 
vision? If so, we then are men and women for whom the future 
cries. 
We can see the vicissitudes of finding and losing, searching 
for but fleeing from, our personal destiny in noting how other 
historical figures have dealt with their destiny. Carl Jung tells of 
his own experience: 
From the beginning 1 had a sense of destiny, as though my life was 
assigned to me by fate and had to be fulfilled. This gave me an inner 
security.... Often I had the feeling that in all decisive matters 1 was no 
longer among men, but was alone with God. 
1 have offended many people, for as soon as I saw that they did not 
understand me, that was the end of the matter so far as I was concerned. 
1 had to move on. I had no patience with people-aside from my 
patients. 1 had to obey an inner law which was imposed on me and left 
me no freedom of choice. 
Ortega tries to understand Goethe's destiny: 
Goethe is the man in whom for the first time there dawned the con- 
sciousness that human life is man's struggle with his intimate and indi- 
vidual destiny, that is that human life is made up of the problem itsélf, 
that its substance consists not in something that already is ... but in 
something which has to make itself, which, therefore, is not a thing but 
an absolute and problematical task. 
Thus the task is not only to answer "Who am I?" but it goes 
beyond the problem of identity. For what is this "I," this sense 
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of self, except me-in-relation-to-the-universe? It is more fruitful 
to ask: To what am 1 called in this world? What is my vocation? 
Goethe himself wrote: "However much a man searches 
heaven and earth, the present and the future, for his higher des- 
tiny, he remains the victim of a perennial vacillation, of an exter- 
na] influence which perpetually troubles him." We may take this 
as a personal confession from Goethe as well as a statement about 
all of us. The heroes and heroines in Goethe's works go through 
life seeking their own destiny, often with the passion of Faust. 
Meister "goes wandering through the universe without ever find- 
ing his own life.... What befalls Werther, Faust and Meister is 
... they want to be and they do not know how-that is, they do 
not know wbo to be." " 
At forty we find Goethe wandering through Italy asking him- 
self, "Am 1 poet, artist, or scientist?" The pondering led him to . 
some conclusion, for he then writes from Rome, "For the first 
time 1 have found myself and am happily in harmony with 
myself." Is he in harmony because he has accepted his confused 
callings, accepted the fact that he is called to a number of tasks at 
once? When Goethe got back to Weimar, he went into politics, 
which Ortega thinks separated him from his world and from him- 
self. "He looked so hard for his destiny, his destiny was so little 
apparent to him, because in looking for it he had already made up 
his mind to flee from it." To be continually preoccupied with 
one's destiny is also a way of escaping living it out. A sense of 
abandon is necessary, a sense of throwing oneself into one's call- 
ing. 
Also; it is relevant that Goethe, according to Ortega, spent 
most of his days depressed, a psychological state that can be a 
symptom of a lack of harmony between oneself and one's way of 
life, a state opposite to the way Goethe described himself in 
Rome. In depression one feels on the rack, one struggles against 
meaninglessness, against the burden of it not being worthwhile 
to get up in the morning. Goethe's Faust, at the onset of the 
drama, greets every morning with "bitter weeping." Using the 
term vocation as a calling (the word is cognate of "vocal"), a voice 
from the universe proclaiming "this is where you belong," Ortega 
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then asks, "Was the man Goethe in the service of his vocation, or ' 
was he, rather, a perpetual deserter from his inner destiny?" 
It is the genuiuses, the persons of abundant talents, who have 
the greatest difficulty in seeking and living out their destiny 
because their gifts continually present them with so many differ- 
. ent possibilities. Hence geniuses are more often depressed and 
anxious than the rest of us, and more often joyful and ecstatic. ' 
Life, especially for creative people, is generally anything but sim- 
ple and harmonious. It is especially hard, admits Ortega, for 
those with a multiplicity of gifts, which "troubles and disorients 
the vocation, or at least the man who is its axis." It may well be, 
1 would add, the destiny of persons like Goethe not to rest in an 
unambiguous vocation. 
The example par excellence of one who struggled to discover 
and live out his destiny is found in William James, to my mind 
the greatest psychologist and most original philosopher America 
ever produced. He embraced many different professions. He first 
- ' studied art and planned to be an artist; then he shifted back to his 
childhood interest in science, from which he moved to biology 
and medicine. "I originally studied medicine in order to be a 
physiologist," he tells us, "but 1 drifted into psychology and 
philosophy from â sort of fatality." Those two words, "drifted" 
and "fatalism," reveal the paradox he experienced in acknowl- 
edging destiny. The psychology and philosophy into which his 
_ restless quests drove him were, interestingly enough, subjects in 
. which he had had no academic training. These shifts were by no 
means dilettantish, but an expression of the earnest seeker who " lives perpetually on the razor's edge. 
' 
At sixteen we find William James writing passionately to a 
friend that what gives a person's life importance is its use, citing 
as an example a poet writing a poem. We find our path of greatest 
' use, he wrote, by following our own individual inclinations, and 
if James had his way, he would simply "take a microscope and go ' into the field and become a scientist." He was prevented from 
doing this by his weak eyesight. This conffict of destinies shows 
us that the point where one's individual inclinations collide head- 
on with the necessities of life is where we see revealed the deeper 
density of ourselves. 
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James tells us also how he struggled with bad health, poor 
eyesight amounting at times to blindness, disabilities of his back, 
and his profound and recurrent psychological depression. But 
James managed to surmount his depression by his belief in free- 
dom. The focus of his depression had been a conflict around the 
question of whether his actions were caused by prior influences 
such as childhood conditioning, or did he have some margin of 
personal freedom of action? He could not prove the latter, and 
none of his friends could send him proof. No one can prove in 
positivistic terms the qualities of life such as courage, love, beauty, 
or freedom. Thus began the important work of James on will and 
belief, illustrated by the title of one of his collections of essays, 
The Will to Believe. "The first act of freedom is to choose it," he 
wrote. Anyone who has done psychotherapy knows that this 
would give the person a point outside the depression from which 
to view it and would provide some rising above the malady. 
James is here demonstrating the relation of belief to destiny. 
Does belief-or faith, as some may put it-change the "track" of 
destiny? There are many wise persons in the history of the West- 
ern world who would answer "yes" to that. They would hold, 
with Kant, that the state of mind of the beholder influences what 
he perceives in life, that our minds not only conform to reality 
but reality also conforms to our minds. Thus, our state of mind 
influences the reality we experience around us. Karl Pribram's 
recent experiments on the neurology of the brain and its relation 
to the world would support this, as would Gregory Bateson's 
concept that "values are constituted in part by our beliefs." James 
was apparently stumbling-forced as he was by his own severe 
depression-upon the same truth. 
Out of his problems and his perpetually difficult destiny Wil- 
liam James developed a remarkable sense of personal freedom. 
He was amazingly flexible and broad-minded: he was the living 
example of freedom from cant and constriction. He not only 
wrote the classical volume on academic psychology, but books on 
religion, will, mysticism, and education as well. He insisted ever- 
lastingly that in human life there are options, however much des- 
tiny may limit these options. 

Two 
Mistaken Paths to Freedom 

VII 
The New Narcissism 
' 
Willy, dear. I can't cry. Why did you do it? 1 search and search and I 
search, and 1 can't understand it, Willy. 1 made the last payment on 
the house today. Today, dear. And there'JJ be nobody bome. [A sob 
rises in her throat] We're free and clear. [Sobbing, more fully, 
released] We're free. [Biff comes slowly toward her] We're free 
... We're fne ... 
- ARTHUR MILLER, Death of a Salesman 
If we are to understand contemporary narcissism and its rela- 
tion to freedom, we must look at the cultural crisis out of which 
the narcissism was born. The 1960s were marked by pronounced 
rejections, especially on the part of young people: the rebellions 
against education as a factory, the strident protests of draft-age 
persons against the automatic assumption that they could be sent 
off to be maimed in the swamps of Vietnam; the fairy-tale "love" 
of the flower children; the hippies, who camped together believ- 
ing they needed nothing more than themselves; the vast number 
of young people who severed all ties to their parents and took to 
the road. 
All of these movements in the 1960s can be seen as endeavors 
to gain freedom. Free from the assembly line of education, free 
from wars regarded as psychotic, free to make love with no hin- 
drance by the mores of the past or vague dreads of the future, 
free from the limits of space for those who donned knapsacks and 
set out hitchhiking to live "on the road." The faith was that every- 
one could be born anew in a secular sense. They were all Jay 
Gatsbys, not representing but rebelling against the Horatio Alger 
myth. 
l35 
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1 do not wish to burlesque the decade of the 1960s. Among 
the good things it did produce were highly valuable gains in race 
: relations, the erasing of some of the barriers between adolescence 
and adulthood, and the new sharing of responsibility on college 
boards by students as well as faculty. 
But the general feeling with which the decade of the 1960s left 
us was one of disappointment and disillusionment. Something 
important had been missing. Was it not that this freedom from 
past structure brought with it the assumption that ail structure 
could be thrown to the winds? One's own purity of heart would 
suffice for everything. One's faith would move the mountains 
even of legislative passivity. The belief was, in Peter Marin's 
words, that "the individual will is ail powerful and totally deter- 
mines one's fate." There was no sense of responsibility to society, 
no acceptance of the inevitable, no sense of a human destiny that 
could not be denied. The American tradition, where, according 
to Tocqueville, people believe that their whole destiny is in their 
own hands, was acted out to the extreme in these movements of 
the 1960s. 
Why Americans should believe this is also described by Toc- 
queville : 
Born often under another sky, placed in the middle of an always moving 
scene, himself driven by the irresistible torrent which draws all about 
him, the American has no time to tie himself to anything, he grows 
accustomed only to change, and ends by regarding it as the natural state 
of man. He feels the need of it, more, he loves it; for the instability, in- 
stead of meaning disaster to him, seems to give birth only to miracles all 
about him. 
y 1. The Threat of Loss of Self 
No one can exist long on disillusionment. There soon was 
visible a different kind of concern among the equivalent groups. 
The young people of the 1970s turned inward. They asked, logi- 
cally enough: Is it because of something lacking in ourselves that 
these movements failed? Since we cannot change the outside 
world as we wished, can we change the inner world? 
The New Narcissism 1 3 7 
Since the extrovert efforts proved more or less bankrupt, they 
now were replaced by introvert concerns. One felt the question 
in the 1970s-and we therapists heard it time and again: Can we 
find ourselves by means of some therapy for the inner person or 
with some new religion? Can we find our guidance in the East? 
Can we learn a new kind of yoga or meditation? Many of those 
who had been leaders in the activist movement went directly into 
the introvert movements. Of the Chicago Seven, Rennie Davis 
became one of the devotees of a teenage guru who dominated the 
news for a while and now is, like so many of them, heard of no 
more. Jerry Rubin turned to writing introspective, confession- 
type books, availing himself of that avenue which beckons to all 
who feel empty-i.e., writing about sex. 
It needs to be said, in defense of the new narcissism, that the 
threat of losing oneself was real-losing oneself to behaviorism, 
which was indefatigably preached in those years with the dogma 
that the self did not exist, that all behavior was simply a conglom- 
eration of conditioning, and that freedom was an illusion. The 
extent of the general culture's acceptance of these ideas, partly to 
escape the pervasive fears of atomic warfare and internal chaos, 
was shown in the wide sale of Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dig- 
nity. Or losing oneself to a technologized culture that was becom- 
ing more computerized by the minute, losing oneself by 
becoming a mechanical robot of our society. A significant minor- 
ity retreated-some of them would say "advanced"-to another 
fort, the fort of oneself, in the hope that behind that stockade 
they could form the final line in defense not only of freedom but 
of their existence as human beings. The new narcissism is seen in 
Nicole's statement concerning sex: "I have a right to do what 1 
wish with my own body." 
The songs said it: "I Gotta Be Me," "I Do It My Way," and, 
"My Heart Belongs to Me," the last sung convincingly by Bar- 
bra Streisand. Hence, also the great tidal wave of self-awareness 
books for shoring up the individual's self-esteem: l'm OK-You're 
OK, 1 Just Met Someone I Liked and It's Me, Being Your Own Best 
Friend. Even Alan Watts entitled his autobiography In My Own 
Way. One book, written by the same person who produced Win- 
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ning by Intimidation, was entitled How I Found Freedom in an Unfree 
World and includes such monstrous examples of the ultimate in 
narcissism as "free men in any country have found ways of living 
their lives freely and happily without feeling a responsibility to 
be involved." Also, "Of what importance is society if you must 
give up your happiness for it?" Where did this man learn to speak 
if not in society? Who protected him as an infant if not the society 
of his mother? Did he never attend society's schools or the million 
and one things for which people join in society? That this "me" 
age is still alive is shown in a full-page advertisement that recently 
appeared in the New York Times for a book entitled The Sky's the 
Limit, which promises "absolute happiness" and to "make you a 
winner 100% of the time!" 
Along with these came the mushrooming of self-help groups 
and the endeavor to raise consciousness to the point where it 
would suffice not only to direct ourselves, but to insure that our 
sense of freedom will not be threatened by the vast mechanical 
pressures all about us. It is not surprising, then, that many 
believed "If 1 am me, 1 will be free." This is the "new narcis- 
sism," as Peter Marin called it, or the "me" decade. 
It is significant that in psychotherapy, too, narcissism has 
become the dominant problem. It is recognized, from Freud on, 
that the completely narcissistic person is the most difficult to help 
in psychotherapy because the therapist can achieve no relation- 
ship. The client seems unable to break through his own self- 
enclosing fog. 
Christopher Lasch points out that now our whole society par- 
takes of the culture of narcissism. He describes the narcissistic 
person: 
Liberated from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the reality 
of his own existence. Superficially relaxed and tolerant, he finds little use 
for dogmas of racial and ethnic purity but at the same time forfeits the 
security of group loyalties.... His sexual attitudes are permissive rather 
than puritanical, even though his emancipation from ancient taboos 
brings him no sexual peace. Fiercely competitive in his demand for 
approval and acclaim, he distrusts competition because he associates it 
unconsciously with an unbridled urge to destroy.... He extols coop- 
eration and teamwork while harboring deeply antisocial impulses. He 
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praises respect for rules and regulations in the secret belief that they do 
not apply to himself. Acquisitive in the sense that his cravings have no 
limits, he does not accumulate goods and provisions against the future, 
in the manner of the acquisitive individualist of nineteenth-century polit- 
ical economy, but demands immediate gratification and lives in a state of 
restless, perpetually unsatisfied desire. 
Christopher Lasch's book, in my judgment, is a relevant dis- 
section of our culture, and his comments are often piercing. But 
1 wish to comment on its assumptions and statements about psy- 
choanalysis and clinical activity, which is my field. What he fails 
to see is that psychoanalysis is a symptom of the whole develop- 
ment of modern culture, not simply an endeavor to correct its 
problems. Furtbermore, he limits himself to one aspect-ortho- 
dox Freudianism-and depends chiefly on two analysts, Otto 
Kernberg and Heinz Kohut, who have written on modern narcis- 
sism. In the index of his book there are not even mentioned the 
host of other important figures: Erikson, Jung, Rank, Adler, Sul- 
livan, all of whom wrote importantly on narcissism. The great 
loss in his failure to know more about these tributaries to Freud 
is, first, that one cannot even understand Freud without under- 
standing why these persons developed their deviations from 
Freud. One of these deviants, Erich Fromm, Lasch takes to task 
for being "sermonic." But Harry Stack Sullivan was not given to 
moralizing and contributed most, in my judgment, to what Lasch 
is talking about-the problems of character neurosis. 
By not looking at these persons who differ with Freud, Lasch 
repeats a great deal of what was said decades ago. Lasch talks 
about death. But the existential analysts, for example, have been 
discussing the fear of death ever since the 1940s, and working 
directly with it in therapy. (See Yalom's writings and my own.) 
Lasch talks of modern patients not having "symptoms" but being 
generally purposeless, aimless, empty, and complaining of bore- 
dom and a lack of commitment. This is exactly what I discussed 
in Man's Search for Himself in the 1950s. Lasch speaks of "character 
problems" as being the chief ones now facing analysts. Wilhelm 
Reich made this point in his book Character Analysis in the late 
1920s, and Sullivan has done most of the significant contempo- 
rary work on this question. As a matter of fact, the narcissism 
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Lasch discusses as though it were a relatively new development 
has been the central concern of existential therapists-and, in dif- 
ferent terms, in Sullivan-for over two decades. Thus, Lasch's 
book seems to me to be valuable as a social critique, but par- 
ochial as a psychoanalytic and clinical discourse. 
2. "If I Am Me, Will I Be Free?" 
" ' 
In a series of verses written over the past five years, a young- 
ish acquaintance of mine demonstrates the estrangement from 
community that is part of the new narcissism. She sets out to find 
"How to set myself / Totally free." A few pages later we come to 
a verse which states, 
1 have no special 
' 
Circle of friends 
Who think the way 1 do, 
. No rights, no wrongs, no desired ends. 
This reveals a world with no structure of human relations and no 
moral structure-"no rights, no wrongs," no purposes. It is a cel- 
ebration of isolation and emptiness. No wonder she is driven 
inside herself, taking refuge in an essentially narcissistic relation 
with herself: 
' The purest form of love 
The warmest kind of love ... -" 
The most exciting love . 
Is knowing that these feelings :.. : : é. 
. Are not mine for another , = 
. - But mine for me. 
' 
= , ' 
But this solipsism, a powerful illustration of the "me" decade, 
leads her to anxiety, which at this point is a sign of residual 
health. 
1 am just beginning to see 
' = 
how scary it is . ' < " 
] . To live first for myself. 
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Afterward, in the series of verses, there comes a growing degree 
of resentment and anger when she senses that in her alienation 
and isolation she has somehow missed the boat. The series ends 
with a strong attack on the discipline of oneself, 
Self-discipline is self mutiny. 
These verses are like the cry of Willy Loman's wife at his 
funeral: "We're free and clear ... We're free ... We're free 
... We're free." But there was no genuine freedom at all since 
the family had been broken up by the fact that Willy had com- 
mitted suicide. 
The main problem in the "if 1 am me" syndrome, and the 
reason it so quickly goes bankrupt in the search for personal free- 
dom, is that it omits other people; it fails to enrich our humanity. 
It does not confront destiny as embodied in the community. It 
reminds us of the famous statement of Fritz Perls: 
1 do my thing and you do your thing. 
1 am not in this world to live up to your expectations, 
And you are not in this world to live up to mine. 
You are you and 1 am 1; 
If by chance we find each other, it's beautiful. . 
If not, it can't be helped. 
This yields the courage-or arrogance, if one wishes to call it 
that?f one against the world. True, it may be a necessary phase 
of individuation at certain times in one's history-and I think the 
past decade has been such a time. But it is a cop-out as a perma- 
nent way of life. Tubbs, in "Beyond Perls," is certainly right 
when he states, "The 1 detached from a Thou disintegrates." 
"Narcissism is self-hate disguised as self-love," says Clint 
Weyand. "It is probably the cruelest and most insidious form of 
self-deception, because it destroys the healing power of loving 
relationships. We must now transcend the seduction of the mir- 
ror, and replace the ego's image with a moral and political vision 
which restores our morale and enriches our humanity." 
The "I am me" always sooner or later comes to grief because 
it tries to escape confronting the destiny that limits every expres- 
sion of freedom. The writer of the verses quoted above and all 
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other devotees of Fritz Perls's dictum could benefit by taking to 
heart a simple statement made by Angelus Silesius in the seven- 
teenth century: 
Nothing keeps you 
bound 
except your Me- 
until you break 
' 
its chains, its handcuffs, 
and are free. 
In our birth, the cutting of the umbilical cord is a first step on 
the long and tortuous path, fraught with endless difficulties and 
emblazoned with many joys, becoming autonomous. Obviously, 
we never fully reach our goals. But we shall never even start on 
the right track until we become aware that individuation occurs 
in our confronting, accepting, or engaging in various ways our 
destiny as social creatures. 
If there are no limits in a human relationship, no place in the 
other where one cannot go, there is then no gratifying relation- 
ship from which one can learn. The concept of the unconscious 
used to provide this, but now, when everyone wears his dreams 
on his sleeve, it no longer does. Complete self-transparency, not 
withstanding its value as an ideal aim, is impossible and even 
undesirable. To keep the secret self-that sanctum sanctorum- 
is as important as the transparency. 
The new narcissism brought with it a distrust of reality, as 
though we could never be sure anything was real, and we grasped 
desperately at what was inside ourselves in the hope of finding an 
anchor. The positive side of this uncertainty about reality is 
shown in the Zen story of the person asking: Am 1 a man looking 
at a butterfly, or am I a butterfly dreaming 1 am a man? The 
negative side is shown by a remark of Susan Sontag's: "Reality 
has come to seem more and more like what we are shown by 
cameras." There comes to mind the scene from Apocalypse Now, 
where the marine at night is desperately shooting at random not 
knowing where the enemies' shells are coming from, not knowing 
where his commander is or even wbo he is or whether he even has 
a commander. It is a Kafkaésque story that we are playing out, 
except that it is not played out now on a calm scene: it is played 
Tbe New Narcissism 143 
with atom bombs and the possibility of annihilated cities and the 
dreaded prospect of darkness at noon. 
It is the uncertainty about the reality of oneself that threatens 
us. The self becomes increasingly insignificant in our world of 
technology. The emphasis on living now, with no ability to get 
solace or renewal from the past or future, the inability to commit 
oneself because one is not sure there is a self, the pervasive sense 
of purposelessness and vague despondency always threatening to 
become severe depression-these are all symptoms crying out 
that something has radically gone wrong with the self in relation 
to its world. The new narcissism and the "me" decade are symp- 
toms of what has gone wrong with the reality of oneself. We seem 
to have to question every relationship, and the answers continue 
to be ambivalent. 
Confronted mostly by young people in the 1960s, this unreal- 
ity of the self has led to a fear of psychosis on a scale broader than 
ever before. For their elders all these compulsive-obsessional 
symptoms-the rigidity, the hollowness, the lack of affect-were 
protections against psychosis. But the young had taken LSD, and 
the psychoticlike shock to one's consciousness that this produces 
makes it clear that a similar shock was possible for the whole of 
society. More and more the question is being asked whether soci- 
ety as a whole is psychotic, and the pause after the question is a 
sign that the answer could be yes as well as no. 
The widespread passion to be "me" with the assumption that 
then 1 will be free turns into becoming a candidate for a mental 
hospital, as seen in Ibsen's fantastic prophecy in 1887. The direc- 
tor of the insane asylum that Peer Gynt visits in Egypt states, in 
contrast to Peer's expectation that these inmates are there because 
they cannot be themselves, 
Here we are ourselves with a vengeance; 
Ourselves and nothing whatever but ourselves. 
We go full steam through life under the pressure of self. 
Each one shuts himself up in the cask of self; 
Sinks to the bottom by self-fermentation, 
Seals himself in with-the bung of self, 
And seasons in the well of self, 
No one here weeps for the woes of others. 
No one here listens to anyone else's ideas. 
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There can be no sense of the self without a sense of the des- 
tiny of that self. How we respond to the facts of illness, disaster, 
good fortune, success, renewed life, death ad infinitum is crucial; 
and the pattern of such response is the self relating to destiny. 
For the sense of self consists, when all is said and done, in the 
relationship between the person's freedom and his or her destiny. 
So we must conclude that the lack of sense of reality of the 
self is due to the fact that we have omitted destiny. We secretly 
tend to believe the advertisements that tell us that we are "unlim- 
ited," "the sky's the limit," "we'll be 100-percent winners," "we 
make our own destiny," and so on and on. And it is this that robs 
us of the sense of reality-and of adventure also-in our encoun- 
tering the vicissitudes of human existence. It is certain that the 
"if 1 am me, 1 will be free" is a mistaken path, for it lacks the 
sense of destiny that gives freedom to reality. Instead of freedom, 
this path leads to isolation and estrangement. 
3. The Myth of Narcissus and Revenge 
' . 
Most of us remember the myth of Narcissus as the story of a 
beautiful youth who fell in love with his own image in a pool and 
pined away because he never could possess it. But the actual 
myth is a great deal richer. 
.. It begins with Tiresias, the aged prophet, predicting to the 
river nymph who was Narcissus' mother that her son would live 
to a ripe old age "provided he never knows himself." This catches 
us up short. What is the meaning of not knowing oneself? True, 
the dynamics of narcissism always have as their fulcrum the prob- 
lem of self-knowledge. But could Tiresias be saying that Narcis- 
sus will live long if he avoids the absorption of self-love, the very 
thing we later call narcissism? Or can he be referring to the literal 
translation of "know thyself," from the Greek "know that you are 
only a man," accept your human limits, which Narcissus 
obviously refused to do? 
The second character in the myth, also forgotten by most of 
us, is Echo, a lovely mountain nymph who falls hopelessly in love 
with Narcissus and follows him over hill and dale as he hunts for 
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stags. Intending to call his hunting companions, Narcissus cries, 
"Let us come together here!" Echo responds in the same words 
and rushes out to embrace Narcissus. But he shakes her off 
roughly and runs away crying out, "I will die before you ever lie 
with me!" 
Echo then pines away, leaving behind only her melodious 
voice. Disdaining her supine resignation, the gods condemn her 
.to wander forever in the mountain glens and valleys, where we 
hear her voice today. But in her need for revenge, she calls upon 
the gods to punish Narcissus by making him also the victim of 
unrequited love. It is only then that he falls in love with his own 
reflection. 
At first he tried to embrace and kiss the beautiful boy who confronted 
him, but presently he recognized himself, and lay gazing enraptured into 
the pool, hour after hour. How could he endure both to possess and yet 
not to possess? Grief was destroying him, yet he rejoiced in his torments; 
knowing at least that his other self would remain true to him, whatever 
happened. 
Echo, although she had not forgiven Narcissus, grieved with him; 
she sympathetically echoed 'Alas! Alas!' as he plunged a dagger in his 
breast, and also the final 'Ah, youth, beloved in vain, farewell!" as he 
expired. 
Narcissus' tragic flaw, in the eyes of the gods, is that he could 
never love anyone else, never love in the sense of giving himself 
in union with another person. There is no fertility in Narcissus' 
"love," and none in narcissism-no genuine coupling, no cross- 
fertilization, no interpersonal relationship. This threatens to be a 
tragic flaw in our present-day "I am me" effort to escape the par- 
adox : we cannot love without committing ourselves to another 
person. In grasping for freedom from entanglement with other 
persons, we come to grief over our failure of compassion and 
commitment-indeed, the failure to love authentically. 
But there is another important insight in this story that will 
help us understand present-day neo-narcissism and that, to my 
knowledge, has not yet been mentioned in the literature. It is that 
narcissism has its origin in revenge and retaliation. Echo's plea, 
answered by Aphrodite, is a gesture of revenge. 
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And this is also true in our contemporary neo-narcissism: . there is in it a strong motive of anger and revenge. This is shown 
in the above series of verses. "I have ... no rights, no wrongs" 
can be translated into ine cry "The culture has let us down." 
What we learned as children turns out to be phony; our parents 
seemed unable by dint of their confusion to show us any alterna- 
tive moral guideposts or teach us wisdom; and what we were 
taught often turns out to be undesirable anyway and promotes 
counterrebellion. 
It is out of revenge upon those in the culture who "betrayed" ' 
her that the writer of the verses withdraws into herself and com- 
forts herself with a lonely self-love: "The purest form of 
love / The warmest ... / The most exciting love / Is ... / ... ' not mine for another / But mine for me." " 
In our society we have called this self-love. The phrase "self- 
love" came into general currency after Erich Fromm's essay "Sel- 
fishness and Self Love." Fromm condemned the first and elevated 
the second. He did not see the important differences between 
self-love and love of another. There is a tragic flaw in this self- 
love, a seductive error that carries over into the masses of self- 
help books and spreads the havoc that arises from neo-narcissism. 
What is called love for others and "self-love" are two different 
. 
things,. Love for another person is the urge toward the uniting of 
two separate entities who invigorate each other, revivify each 
other, contribute their differences to each other, and combine ' their different genes in a new and unique being-toward which ' the sex urge is a powerful motivation. The essence, then, is the 
.° , combining of two different beings. Nature's obvious purpose in ' ' 
this, in contrast to incest, is the increase of possibilities. The 
insemination, the combination of two different sets of genes, 
. results in the creation of new forms and original patterns. All of 
this Narcissus could not or would not do. ' 
The well-worn dogma that you cannot love others if you hate 
yo,:rself is true. But the converse of that-that Çyou kve yourse§ 
you will automatically love others-is not true. Narcissus, in his rejec- 
tion of Echo, dramatically demonstrates this. Many persons use 
self-love as a substitute for the more difficult challenge of loving 
others. What is generally called self-love, then, ought really to be 
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termed self-caring, which includes self-esteem, self-respect, and 
self-affirmation. This would save us from the confusion of self- 
caring and love for others, as it is shown so vividly in the myth of 
Narcissus. 
To be free to love other persons requires self-affirmation and, 
paradoxically, the assertion of oneself. At the same time it 
requires tenderness, affirmation of the other, relaxing of compe- 
tition as much as possible, self abnegation at times in the interests 
of the loved one, and the age-old virtues of mercy and forgiveness 
toward each other. 
Destiny is the other person in the act of loving. The dialectical 
poles of self-caring and love for the other fructify and strengthen 
each other. Fortunately, this paradox can neither be escaped nor 
solved, but must be lived with. 
VIII 
Is Sex without Intimacy Freedom? . 
Cavanaugh ... bent toward Berliner. "Solly, aren't you jealous 






"No, man. l'm liberated." 
" 
"What the hell does that mean?" 1 said. 
Berliner said, as if it were obvious, "1 don't feel anything. 
" 
"Liberated means you don't feel anything?" 
" 
, 
"Yeah, l'm liberated. 
" 
- LEONARD MICHAELS, The Men'S Club 
At what moment do lovers come into the most complete possession of 
themselves, if not when they are lost in eacb other? 
- PIERRE TEILHARD E CHARDIN, The Phenomenon of Man 
At one of the student crusades for freedom in the 1960s at the 
University of California in Berkeley, handbills were passed out ' 
emblazoned with the proposal "Sleep with a stranger tonight." 
..' Similarly, on the fringes of the psychotherapeutic movement 
workshops are offered on the theme "Sex with the Stranger." The 
logic of these phrases is fairly clear. Is not an essential part of 
. 
being free the freedom to have sexual intercourse with whomever 
one wants and whenever one is so inclined? Does this not guar- 
antee spontaneity, self-affirmation, the cleansing out of the last 
vestiges of culturally inherited guilt, and the opportunity to fling 
caution to the winds with a vengeance? And is not the best guar- ' 
antee of this our being able to separate sex from intimacy by hav- 
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ing sex with the stranger? Or, as it may be put, "Sex does not 
involve intimacy." 
For the first time in history we have in our day the contracep- 
tive pill, and we are confused about what to do with it. The pill 
has made possible a new attitude toward sex. But what are the 
implications for interpersonal relationships? What is the effect on 
personal freedom of using sex-that most intimate of human 
physical relationships-in the service of nonintimacy? 
Sex without intimacy obviously happens about us all the 
time. One has only to mention prostitution to demonstrate that. 
Sex without intimacy does give some "freedom from," which we 
shall consider presently. But something new has been added in 
our day. This is the elevation of this form of sex, among sophis- 
ticates, into an ideal, a principle, a virtue. I believe that this mak- 
ing sex without intimacy the ideal, something to strive for, is an 
expression of narcissism, that it also is a rationalization for fear of 
intimacy and closeness in interpersonal relations, and that it 
arises from the alienation in our culture and adds to this aliena- 
tion. 
Intimacy is the sharing between two people not only of their 
bodies, but also of their hopes, fears, anxieties and aspirations. 
Intimacy is all the little gestures and expressions that endear us to 
each other. Intimacy is sensation blooming into emotion. As 1 
have said in Love and Will, sex consists of stimulus and response, 
but love is a state of being. That relation is intimate which is 
enriched by the sharing of one's being with the other, in which 
one longs to hear the other's fantasies, dreams, and experiences 
and reciprocates by sharing his own. 
But first let us look at the constructive side of sex without 
intimacy. It is seen in carnivals in Latin countries, in customs like 
Fasching in Germany, and in masked balls. There is a singular 
attraction in these mysteries, a stimulation in the fact that one 
does not know who one's partner is. Who among us has not 
thrilled-at least vicariously-at the new innocence assumed in 
such balls and carnivals, where responsibility for the moment is 
checked at the door? These customs are an intentional reversal of 
' 
the wisdom in the ancient languages of Greek and Hebrew, 
where the word "know" means also to have sexual intercourse. 
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This not knowing carries a kind of folk wisdom-that the fallible 
human being, as the Grand Inquisiter said, needs periodic flings 
and especially a last fling before the long privation of Lent. Hav- 
ing lived for three years in a country in which the carnival season 
was built into the yearly calendar, 1 can testify to the great relief 
. and pleasure in attending champagne parties that went on all 
night long and that ended only when the sun was rising. 
For most people the carnival season is a time to dream dreams 
that may never come into reality. A patient from Germany, a shy 
man among whose problems was a fear of intimacy, told how he 
had gone regularly to the masked balls in Berlin after the war, 
"always hoping to meet some mysterious 'great love.' But, of 
course, 1 never found anybody." 
l. Freedom from Barriers ..) = 
Sex without intimacy is sometimes helpful for adolescents, 
who are stumbling their way into the scary and confusing wilder- 
ness of sex and afraid of getting trapped. Yet another use is for 
divorcees in healing the wounds of separation, abandonment, and 
rejection. Sex without intimacy is said by some therapists to be a 
stage in getting emotionally free from the estranged spouse and 
launching oneself into the stream of life again. Other therapists 
add that a period of promiscuity can be a way of avoiding marry- 
ing on the rebound or getting too deeply involved with a partner 
before one has lived through the inevitable mourning period of 
the previous abandonment. 
Now we note that each of these is clearly a freedom from. ` Prostitution is allegedly freedom from tension; masked balls are 
freedom from the perpetual burden of too much consciousness; 
adolescent sex a freedom from bewilderment; divorcees' promis- 
cuity is a freedom from the pain of wounded self-esteem. If sex 
without intimacy cannot enhance freedom of being itself, at least 
it can prepare the ground for later enhancement. ".. 
But when sex without intimacy is made into one's overall way 
of life à la Playboy a very different thing occurs. This is a com- ' 
partmentalization of the self, an'amputation of important parts of 
Is Sex without Intimacy Freedom? 151 
one's being. In one's fascination with the mystery in masked balls . 
of sex without intimacy, one wakes up, in our twentieth-century 
"age of no mystery," to find oneself with the mechanical coiinter- 
part to the masks, the love machines, literally or in the form sim- 
ply of feelingless people. As Dorothy Parker once said: "It's so 
nice to be in love. l'm tired of doing it for my complexion." 
We recall that Nicole, in Chapter II, spent the weekend with 
a man who was almost a stranger and then summed it up to 
Philip, after restating that sex does not involve intimacy, "Sex 
bored me." Is not this confession of boredom also a confession of 
alienation, a cutting off of possibilities, and, therefore, of free- 
dom ? 
Many therapists are consulted by clients whose aim is to learn 
how to perform sex with sensation but without emotion. The 
strange thing is that these clients sometimes come for therapy 
on the advice of their lovers. A young woman in her first session 
stated that she was entirely happy with her lover and did not 
want to have sex outside the relationship, but her lover had per- 
suaded her that something was wrong if she could not go to bed 
with other men. And this is what she, at his urging, had come to 
learn to do. Merle Shain, in her book Some Men Are More Perfect 
Than Others, tells of a quarrel she had with her lover in which he 
expressed his irritation that she confined herself sexually to him. 
She found herself crying out, "If 1 want to be faithful to you, 
what bloody business is it of yours?" 
In such men we see the fear of intimacy, often stimulated by 
their general fear of women. They may be afraid that too much 
responsibility will be dumped on them by the woman, afraid of 
enchainment to the woman's emotions, afraid of being 
encroached upon by the woman's needs. 
Obviously, women have similar fears of men: fear that they'll 
be enveloped by the man, fear that they won't be able to express 
themselves, that they will lose their autonomy-fears made all 
the stronger by the cultural emphasis, at least until recently, on 
the woman's "role" as subordinate to men. 
These fears are understandable. Sex involves a degree of inti- 
macy-for the woman the momentous act of opening herself for 
the male to penetrate and invade her body. And for tens of thou- 
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÷: sands of years before the last few decades, this has meant the 
man's leaving his seed inside her with the possibility of her car- 
rying a fetus for nine months and then having another mouth to 
feed and child to take responsibility for. What arrogance makes 
us think we can change that cultural inheritance of tens of thou- 
sands of years' duration in a couple of decades? 
_ The merging of two bodies in sex is, physiologically, the most ' 
intimate of all the relationships to which the human being is heir. 
It is a uniting of the most sensitive parts of ourselves with an 
intimacy greater than is possible with any other parts of the body. 
Sex is the ultimate way we become part of each other; the throb 
of the other's heart and pulse are then felt as our own. 
It is not the fear of intimacy 1 am questioning-there is no 
wonder we yearn for freedom from intimacy in carnivals and 
occasional flings. But 1 am questioning the rationalization of this 
fear into a principle that ends up amputating the self. 
Another rationalization is the idea that, since sex is at times 
recreation, it is nothing but recreation; and one does not get inti- 
mate with one's partner in tennis or bridge. This ignores not only 
the meaning of sex, but the power of eros. No wonder true erot- 
icism in our society is being steadily replaced by pornography. 
The penetrating psychologist and master of words Dostoev- 
sky gives us a vignette of this use of sex. In The Brothers Karama- 
zov, the drunken buffoon of a father, coming home from a party ' one night, accepts the dare of his friends and has intercourse with 
' the idiot woman in the ditch. That copulation spawns the son 
who later kills his father. Dostoevsky's use of symbols has pow- 
erful meaning. This act of sex, which is "sex without intimacy" ' 
in the extreme, leads ultimately to one's own death. 
2. Sensation without Emotion 
' 
" 
Considering the above factors, it will not come as a surprise ' 
when I state that, on the basis of my psychotherapeutic experi- 
ences, the people who can best function in a system of sex with- 
out intimacy are those who have little capacity for feeling in the ' 
first place. It is the persons who are compulsive and mechanical in 
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their reactions, untrammeled by émotions, the persons who can- 
not experience intimacy anyway-in short the ones who operate 
like nonsentient motors-that can most easily carry on a pattern 
of sex without intimacy. One of the saddest things about our 
culture is that this nonloving, compulsive-obsessional type seems 
to be the "fruit" of the widespread mechanistic training in our 
schools and life, the type our culture cultivates. The danger is 
that these detached persons who are afraid of intimacy will move 
toward a robotlike existence, heralded by the drying up of their 
emotions not only on sexual levels, but on all levels, supported by 
the motto "Sex does not involve intimacy anyway." Little won- 
der, then, that in the story which cites what the women of diffe- 
rent nationalities say after sexual intercourse, the American 
woman is portrayed as saying "What is your name, darling?" 
1 have noticed that in detached relationships with women, 
some male patients, not uncommonly intellectuals, are sexually 
very competent. They not only exemplify sex without intimacy, 
but they also think and live without intimacy; and their yearn- 
ings, hopes, fears have been so strait-jacketed as to be almost , 
extinct. Then in therapy they begin to make progress. Suddenly 
they find themselves impotent. This troubles them greatly, and 
they often cannot understand why 1 regard it as a gain that they 
have become aware of some sensibilities within themselves and 
can no longer direct their sexual organs on command as one 
would a computor. They are beginning to distinguish the times 
when they really want to make love and the times they don't. 
This impotence is the beginning of a genuine experience of sex 
witb intimacy. Now their sexual life ideally can be built on a new 
foundation of relationship; now they can be lovers rather than 
sexual machines. 
Christopher Lasch rightly points out that the new "narcissist 
is permissive about sex," but this has given him "no sexual 
peace." What happens is that a premium is placed upon not feel- 
ing. Susan Stern, in describing how she gravitated toward the 
Weathermen, confesses an "inability to feel anything. I grew 
more frozen inside, more animated outside." 
" 
We recall that Nicole had adjured Philip to "hang loose" with 
other women. She had added that she would be hurt only if he 
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felt too much-i.e., developed some intimacy with the other 
woman along with the sex. This puts a premium on not feeling, 
and the ideal then becomes the mechanized person who has sen- 
sations but no emotions. This is our situation in the latter half of 
the twentieth century. As in a Kafka novel, everything is waiting 
for us, but we ourselves-the feeling persons with their own 
emotions-do not appear. With the frankness that characterizes 
modern artists, Andy Warhol in his autobiography epitomizes 
this modern attitude: "Brigitte Bardot was one of the first women 
to be really modern and treat men like love objects, buying them 
and discarding them. I like that." Many others treat men and 
women like love objects, but cover it up under such principles as 
sex without intimacy. 
The sex-without-intimacy trend in our culture goes hand in 
hand with the loss of the capacity to feel. This is a trend 1 saw 
developing in patients in therapy as early as the 1950s. Lasch now 
also sees this. Speaking of some new movements in our culture he 
says they arise "out of a pervasive dissatisfaction with the quality 
of personal relations." This teaches "people not to make too large 
an investment in love and friendship, to avoid excessive depen- 
dence on others, and to live for the moment-the very conditions 
that created the crisis of personal relations in the first place." 
Lasch also states: . 
' . 
Our society ... has made deep and lasting friendships, love affairs, and 
marriages increasingly difficult to achieve.... Some of the new thera- 
pies dignify this combat as "assertiveness" and "fighting fair in love and 
marriage." Others celebrate impermanent attachments under such for- 
mulas as "open marriage" and "open-ended commitments." Thus they 
intensify the disease they pretend to cure. 
3. The Lost Power of Eros 
Gay Talese's book Thy Neighbor's Wife appeals to the voy- 
eurism of large numbers of people because it is a record of what 
"real people do in real bedrooms." If it were just that, however, 
we could write it off as simply another example-perhaps the best 
written and most readable-of how eros is being eroded by por- 
Is Sex witbout Intimacy Freedom? 155 
nography in our day. The sexual descriptions in this book are 
interspersed with references to contemporary writers-say, at 
Sandstone-who are quoted and misquoted, cited and miscited. 
The painter Hieronymus Bosch, with his paintings of hell, and 
John Smith, the founder of Mormonism, are cited by Talese as 
leaders in new trends in sexuality in ways that would have 
horrified them. Talese talks continually of his people, whom he 
describes in every kind of group sex and wife and lover exchang- 
ing, as being "freed," "liberated," and maintains that this is the 
way to "liberation" from the "suffocating bonds of traditional 
marriage." One reviewer said that the theme of the book is that "a 
freer fuck means a freer world." Hence, it will be helpful to 
examine this book to inquire fur'ther into the relation between sex 
and freedom. 
The first seventeen pages of the book describe a young man 
who masturbates with a photograph of a sexy young woman 
propped up before him in bed. Indeed, an aura of masturbation 
hangs over the whole book: solitary sensation without emotion, 
sex without any real relationship to another person, sex without 
involvement. This is so whether Tplese is talking about massage 
parlors, where actual masturbation is practiced, or the sexual cir- 
cus of Sandstone, where people have sex in which the mood is 
masturbatory. The children, with whom some of the couples 
happen to be blessed, are mentioned only vaguely, and then as 
being shunted around among baby-sitters. 
Talese tells us about Bullaro, the second most important char- 
acter in the book, turning out in the end to have lost his wife, his 
children, and his job, and reports it as though he were comment- 
ing on the weather. Bullaro is "alone, jobless without a sense of 
hope." The "months that had seemed so exhilarating and liberat- 
ing now loomed as a preamble to destruction and chaos." But 
. what does this imply about the vaunted "liberation"? Freedom 
for destruction and chaos? 
On almost every page there is some reference to freedom from 
Puritan repression. But in the process of beating this dead horse 
again and again, the book reveals no awareness that the more 
urgent danger is that in freeing ourselves we lose our humanity 
as well. 
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One of the aims of Williamson, the chief character in this 
book and the founder of Sandstone, is freeing lovers and their 
partners from all sexual possessiveness. The ideal is to have sex 
with "thy neighbor's wife" or lover and he with yours without 
any spark of jealousy. It is surprising, then, to read that William- 
son, originally confident to the point of authoritarianism, had 
brooded in his bedroom "when a woman he had gotten attached 
. to left him, and [he] had barely spoken to anyone at Sandstone 
for nearly two months." 
" 
We are given a detailed account of Hugh Hefner's parlaying 
his original hunches into the vast financial empire ofPlayboy, with 
all its available bunnies, where freedom from possessiveness 
would assumedly be the sine qua non. Again, it is amazing to read 
the dreary catalogue of Hugh Hefner's pursuing Karen Christy 
around Chicago, during which pursuit the guards he brought 
along, with walky-talkies, searched the rooms of Karen's friend, 
"in her closets, under her bed. Hefner looked haggard and deso- 
late, his hair blown wild, his Pepsi bottle empty." Karen had 
expiained that she had to get away from "faithless Hefner," 
whom she "had overheard ... in the next room talking on the 
telephone with Barbi [Benton] in Los Angeles, reaffirming his 
love and even making arrangements to join her for a week-end. 
... Obviously Karen concluded, Hefner was deceiving her." 
" 
1 mention these uninspiring items in order to ask the question: 
Why is it so hard for people like these two men to see that if one 
really cares about some other person, there will be some attach- 
ment, some normal jealousy and one will be vulnerable to pain; 
and that the aim with jealousy is not to exorcise it entirely, but to 
realize it is a problem only when it reaches neurotic proportions? 
Tbe awareness of normal jealousy is the one corrective to the growth of 
tteurotic jealousy, the dreary picture of which we have seen in these 
. '" 
vignettes. 
Freud gives us some hints as to one of the causes of our pres- 
. ent preoccupation with sex: 
' 
In times in which there were no difficulties standing in the way of sexual 
satisfaction, such as perhaps during the decline of the ancient civiliza- 
tions, love became worthless and life empty, and strong reaction-forma- 
tions were required to restore indispensable affective values ... the 
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ascetic current in Christianity created psychical values for love which 
pagan antiquity was never able to confer on it. 
In the judgment of many of us, our great preoccupation in 
America with sex, like "the decline of the ancient civilizations," 
when "love became worthless and life empty," is related to the 
disintegration of our mores and culture. Roman society was the 
only other historical society that was as preoccupied with sex as 
we are-with sex not only in our bedrooms but in our advertis- 
ing, our literature, our movies, our TV, and heaven knows what 
else. It is said that when the Goths were outside the walls, the 
Romans masturbated in order to drown their anxiety. For sex is 
a very effective antidote against anxiety; the neurological path- 
way that carries the sexual stimulation cuts off that pathway 
which transmits anxiety. In our own concern with the innumer- 
able problems in our society that we cannot solve, it is under- 
standable that we tum to preoccupation with sex. But we should 
avoid making principles out of our own abnormal state. 
Joseph Adelson, reviewing two books in the New York Times, 
remarks that "the books are alike in that they reflect and act upon 
the moral vacuousness that has become so commonplace as to be 
nearly normative in recent writing about sex." Is not this moral 
vacuity one explanation for the fact that, while we never had 
more talk and workshops and public-school teaching on sexual 
practices and contraception, the rate of venereal disease, teenage 
pregnancies and abortions are rising dramatically? 
Sex and the intimacy that goes with it are so basic a part of 
human existence that one cannot separate them from one's values. 
To treat sex and values as totally divorced from each other is not 
only to block the development of one's freedom, but also to make 
the cultural problem of sex simply insoluble. Moral concern in 
sex hinges on the acceptance of one's responsibility for the other 
as well as for oneself. Other people do matter; and the celebration 
of this gives sexual intercourse its ecstasy, its meaning, and its 
capacity to shake us to our depths. 
Benjamin De Mott remarks that Talese escapes moral vacuity 
because he is a good reporter. But this does not solve our overall 
cultural problem. De Mott also believes that writing like that in 
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Talese's book will self-destruct. The statement we have heard 
above, "sex is boring," is perhaps the beginning of such a self 
destruct. 
Sex without intimacy, when made into the be-all and end-ail 
of sexuality, is an expression of narcissism. It is a refusal to love, 
a running from the beautiful Echo as Narcissus did in the myth. 
Sex as solitary stimuli, carried on in the absence of sharing, 
whether in masturbation or with a partner in sex without inti- 
macy, is an overpowering concern with one's own stimuli, a peer- 
ing endlessly at oneself, as Narcissus peered into the pool. 
As a way of life, sex without intimacy is motivated by resent- 
ment and vengeance, like Echo's in the myth. Narcissus self 
destructs by stabbing himself, but we self-destruct by a long, 
drawn-out amputation of vital parts of ourselves. Our contem- 
poraries seem not to be vengeful because some specific person 
won't love them now (as was the case with Echo), but they seem 
to carry a vengeance from infancy, an experience of not having 
been loved, that they have never corne to terms with. They have 
never accepted, as one must accept, their destiny, with all its 
cruel and its beneficent strains. Nor have they accepted the fate 
that no one ever gets enough love. This yearning for love makes 
us human. Having accepted that aspect of destiny, perhaps then 
we can join the human race. 
What the proponents of the ideal of sex without intimacy as 
the way to genuine freedom have grossly overlooked is that free- 
dom in sex is like freedom in every other realm of life: one is free 
only as one recognizes one's limits-i.e., one's destiny. The 
structure, the design, of the sexual function in life needs to be 
seen steadily and whole. In human relations responsibility comes 
out of ever-present loneliness and our inescapable need for others, . 
which is dramatically true in sexuality; and without this sense of 
responsibility there is no authentic freedom. Our freedom in sex 
then grows in proportion to the parallel growth of our sensitivity 
to the needs, desires, wishes of the other. These needs, desires, 
and wishes of the other are the givens. The fact that sexual stim- 
uli can blossom into authentic intimacy and into love is one of the 
mysteries of life which can give us a lasting solace and joy. 
, As in all aspects of confronting destiny, there is a risk. If you 
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have feelings, you are bound to be vulnerable and to hurt. And 
sometimes the pain and ache and even agony of miscarried love is 
almost more than we can bear. But accepting this risk is the price 
of freedom, and especially the freedom to love authentically. 
Who wishes to trade these for existence as a zombie? 

Three 
Characteristics of Freedom 

IX 
The Significance of the Pause 
I don't think I bandle the notes much differently from other pianists. 
But the pauses between the notes-ab, there is where tbe artistry lies! 
-ARTUR SACHNABFL's answer to reporters who inquired 
about the secret of his genius. 
The goal of fasting is inner unity. Tbis means hearing but not witb 
the ear; hearing, but not with the understanding; it is hearing witb 
the spirit, with your whole being. The hearing that is only in the ears 
is one thing. The hearing of the understanding is another. But the 
hearing of the spirit is not limited to any one faculty, to the ear, or to 
the mind. Hence, it demands the emptiness of ail the faculties. And 
when the faculties are empty, then the whole being listens. There is 
then a direct grasp of what is right before you that can never be heard 
with the ear or understood with the mind. Fasting of the heart empties 
tbe faculties, frees you from limitations and from preoccupations. 
- THOMAS MERTON, Tbe Living Bread 
In a previous chapter we defined freedom as the capacity to 
pause in the midst of stimuli from all directions, and in this pause 
to throw our weight toward this response rather than that one. 
The crucial term, and in some ways the most interesting, is that 
little word pause. It may seem strange that this word is the impor- 
tant one rather than terms like liberty, independence, spontaneity. 
And it seems especially strange that a word merely signifying a 
lack of something, an absence, a hiatus, a vacancy, should carry 
so much weight. In America especially, the word "pause" refers 
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to a gap, a space yet unfilled, a nothing-r, better yet, a "no 
thing." 
The pause is especially important for the freedom of being, 
what 1 have called essential freedom. For it is in the pause that 
we experience the context out of which freedom comes. In the 
pause we wonder, reflect, sense awe, and conceive of eternity. 
The pause is when we open ourselves for the moment to the con- 
cepts of both freedom and destiny. 
The word pause, like the word freedom, seems essentially to 
signify what something is not rather than what it is. We have seen 
that freedom is defined almost universally by what it is not-r, 
in a sentence definition, "Freedom is when you are anchored to 
nobody or nothing." Similarly, the pause is a time when no thing 
, is happening. Can the word pause give us an answer not only as to 
why freedom is a negative word, but is also loved as the most 
affirmative term in our language? It was, notes the anthropologist 
Dorothy Lee, "this conception of nothingness as sometbingness that 
enabled the philosophers of India to perceive the integrity of non- 
being, to name the free space and give us the zero." 
" 
One version of a famous question is "How many Zen Buddh- 
ists does it take to screw in a light bulb?" The answer is two: one 
to screw it in and one not to screw it in. And the latter is as 
important as the former, for emptiness is something in Eastern 
thought. 
It should not surprise us that this contribution to our thinking 
and experience comes mainly from the East, especially from 
India, China, and Japan. In our crisis of thought and religion in 
the West, the wisdom of the East emerges as a corrective. This 
wisdom recalls us to truths in our own mystic tradition that we 
had forgotten, such as contemplation, meditation, and especially 
the significance of the pause. 
Freedom is experienced in our world in an infinite number of 
pauses, which turn out not to be negative but to be the most 
affirmative condition possible. Tbe ultimate paradox is that negation 
becomes affirmation. Thus, freedom remains the most loved word, 
the word that thrills us most readily, the condition most desired 
because it calls forth continuous, unrealized possibilities. And it 
is so with the "pause." The "no thing" turns out to bespeak a 
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reality that is most clearly something. It is paradoxical that in our 
lives empty can be full, negative can be affirmative, the void can 
be where most happens. In the Tao Teh Ching, for example, Lao 
Tzu says, 
We put thirty spokes to make a wheel: 
But it is on the hole in the center that the use of the cart hinges. 
We make a vessel from a lump of clay; 
But it is the empty space within the vessel that makes it useful. 
We make doors and windows for a room; 
But it is the empty spaces that make the room livable. 
Thus, while existence has advantages, ` 
. 
It is the emptiness that makes it useful. 
1. The Language of Silence 
This conception of the pause gives us a whole new world. It is . 
in the pause that people learn to listen to silence. We can hear an 
infinite number of sounds that we normally never hear at all-the 
unending hum and buzz of insects in a quiet summer field, a 
breeze blowing lightly through the golden hay, a thrush singing 
in the low bushes beyond the meadow. And we suddenly realize 
that this is something-the world of "silence" is populated by a 
myriad of creatures and a myriad of sounds. 
Luther Standing Bear, describing his childhood as an Oglala 
Dakotan in the 1870s, wrote that children "were taught to sit still 
and enjoy [the silence]. They were taught to use their organs of 
smell, to look when apparently there was nothing to see, and to 
listen intently when all seemingly was quiet." And Modupe, 
writing of his so-so childhood in French Guinea, says, "We 
learned that silences as well as sounds are significant in the forest, 
and [we learned] how to listen to the silences.... Deeply felt 
silences might be said to be the core of our Kofon religion. Dur- 
ing these times, the nature within ourselves found unity with tbe nature 
of the earth. 
" 
In Japan, free time and space-what we call pauses-are per- 
ceived as ma, the valid interval or meaningful pause. Such percep- 
tion is basic to all experience and specifically to what constitutes 
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creativity and freedom. This perception persists in spite of the 
adoption of Western culture and science. Even in 1958, Misako 
". Miyamoto wrote of the Nô plays, "The audience watches the 
play and catches the feeling through not only the action and 
words but also the inte,-vais of the period of pauses.... There is a ' free creation in each person's mind ... ; and the audience relates 
to this situation with free thinking." Of silent intervals in speech, ' she says, "Especially [in] the pauses in a tone of voice, 1 can feel 
the person's unique personality and his joy, sorrow or other com- 
plicated feelirgs." On listening to a robin in early spring, "It sang 
with pauses, ... 1 could have time to think about the bird [in] 
the silent moment between one voice and others, ... The pauses 
produced the effect of the relation between the bird and me." 
" 
' 
Lest these examples seduce us into assuming that this valuing 
of the pause is chiefly in Oriental and esoteric cultures, let me ' 
point out that the phenomenon is just as clear, though not as 
.. frequent, in our own modern culture. John Cage, a composer 
. noted for his originality, gave a concert in New York which con- ' 
. sisted of his coming out on the stage, sitting down at the keyboard 
for a period of time, and not playing a note. His aim, as he 
explained to a less-than-pleased audience, was to give them an 
opportunity to listen to the silence. His recorded music shows 
" _ precisely this-many pauses are interspersed with heterogeneous 
.. notes. Cage sharpens our awareness, makes our senses keener, 
and renders us alive to ourselves and our surroundings. Listening 
. is our most neglected sense. 
The vury essence of jazz is in the space between notes, called 
the afterbeat. The leader of a band in which 1 once played used . 
, to sing out "um-BAH," the "Bah"-or the note--coming always 
... between the beats. This syncopation is a basis of jazz. Duke 
Ellington, for example, keeps the audience tantalized, on edge, 
. " expectant-we have to dance to work out the emotion building up 
within us. On an immediate level this expectancy has a similarity 
to the exquisite levels of feeling before orgasm. Hence, some 
" musicians, can simulatè the process of sexual intercourse in the 
tantalizing beat of their songs. In the ever-changing jazz group at 
Preservation Hall in New Orleans, this infinite variety, with each 
. ". person improvising, produces each time a piece of music never 
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before played and never to be played again. This is freedom par 
excellence. 
There seems to be no pause in technology. Or when there is, 
it is called a "depression" and is denied and feared. But pure sci- 
ence is a different matter. We find Einstein remarking that "the 
intervals between the events are more significant than the events 
themselves." " 
The significance of the pause is that the rigid chain of cause and affect 
is broken. The pause momentarily suspends the billiard-bali sys- 
tem of Pavlov. In the person's life response no longer blindly fol- 
lows stimulus. There intervenes between the two our human 
imaginings, reflections, considerations, ponderings. Pause is the 
prerequisite for wonder. When we don't pause, when we are per- 
petually hurrying from one appointment to another, from one 
"planned activity" to another, we sacrifice the richness of won- 
der. And we lose communication with our destiny. 
2. Time and the Pause .. 
The length of time of the pause is, in principle, irrelevant. 
When we look at what actually happens in people's experience, 
we note that some pauses can be infinitesimally small. When I am 
giving a lecture, for example, 1 select one word rather than 
another in a pause that lasts for only a millisecond. In this pause a 
number of possible terms flash before my mind's eye. If I want to 
say the noise was "loud," 1 may consider in this fraction of a 
second such words as "deafening," "startling," or "overwhelm- 
ing." Out of these 1 select one. All this happens so rapidly- 
strictly speaking, on the preconscious level-that 1 am aware of it 
only when 1 stop to think about it afterward. 
Note in this last sentence I say "stop to think." This habituai 
phrase is another proof of the importance of the pause. Hannah 
Arendt remarks in Thinking (volume 2 of The Life of tbe Mind) on 
the necessity of "stopping" to think-i.e., pausing as essential to 
the process of reflection. 
But something else, even more interesting, occurs in those 
small, multitudinous pauses as one speaks. This is the time when 
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1 "listen" to the audience, when the audience influences me, when 
I "hear" its reaction and ask silently, What connotations are they 
taking from my words? For any experienced lecturer the blank 
spaces that constitute the pauses between the words and sen- 
tences is the time of openness to the audience. At such times 1 
find myself noting: There someone seems puzzled; here someone 
listens by tipping his head to one side so as not to miss any word; 
there in the back row-what every speaker dreads to see-is 
someone nodding in sleep. Every experienced speaker that 1 
know is greatly helped by the cultivation of his awareness of facial 
expressions and other subtle aspects of unspoken communication 
from the audience. 
Walt Whitman once remarked that "the audience writes the 
poetry," and in an even clearer sense the audience gives the lec- 
ture. Hence, a lecture delivered from the same notes, say once to 
a social club and then again to graduate students at a large uni- 
versity, will often seem to be two entirely different speeches. 
The pause for milliseconds while one speaks is tbe locus of the 
speaker's freedom. The speaker may mold his speech this way or 
that, he may tell a joke to relax the audience, or-in a thrilling 
moment of which there cannot be too many in a lecturer's 
career-he may even be aware of a brand new idea coming to him 
from heaven knows where in the audience. 
Cassandra, we are told in Aeschylus' drama, foretold the 
doom of Mycenae. A prophetess, she was sensitive to communi- 
cations on many different levels of which the average person is 
unaware. This sensitivity caused her much pain, and she would 
gladly have given up her role if she could have. She was 
"doomed," or destined to listen on these different levels; she 
could not escape hearing the messages coming in her pauses. 
Quite apart from the roles of prophetess or mystic-which we see 
also in Tiresias and Jeremiah and Isaiah-it would seem that mul- 
titudes of us have such capacities, but we train ourselves (a pro- 
cess abetted by much contemporary education) to suppress this 
sensitivity to the pauses. And we may do this in the hope of 
avoiding the pain. The difference between the charlatan and the 
genuine prophet may well be the sense of pain the latter experi- 
ences in his or her prophecies. .. 
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The pauses may be longer, for instance, when one is answer- 
ing questions after a lecture. In response to a question, 1 may 
silently hem and haw for a moment while different possible 
answers flash through my mind. At that time I do not usually 
think of Kierkegaard's proclamation "Freedom is possibility," but 
that is what 1 am living out in those moments of pause. The thrill- 
ing thing is that at such a time a new answer that I have never 
thought of may suddenly emerge. It is often said that intellec- 
tually creative people-like John Dewey, for example-are a 
strain to listen to and are not good public speakers, because the 
time they pause to consider different possibilities requires a 
capacity to wait that most people find tedious. 
One's freedom may involve still larger pauses. "Let me sleep 
on it" is a not infrequent remark when one is making an important 
decision like buying a house. These are the situations in which a 
longer interval between stimuli is desired; there may be many 
different houses available, or one can decide not to buy any at all. 
The decision then requires complex consideration, pondering, 
setting up possibilities for choice, and playing "as ii' games with 
oneself to assess various factors like view and design and so on. 
My point is simply that freedom consists of these possibilities. 
The pauses are the exercise of one's freedom to choose among 
them. 
We recall that Jesus and Buddha, each following his own 
inner guidance, went off into his separate wilderness to engage in 
his quest. Both "paused" for forty days, if the records are to be 
believed. These were assumedly times for each of intense concen- 
tration, times of considering possibilities, of listening to whatever 
voices were available on deeper levels within themselves, voices 
from nature, voices from what we now term archetypal experi- 
ences, voices from what Jesus called God and Buddha called 
Atman and 1 would call Being. These assumedly were periods in 
which they experienced their visions and integrated themselves 
around their messages. 
But students tell me that they have professors who paùse per- 
manently. These teachers make a career our of pausing. The pause 
is then not a preparation for action but an excuse for never acting 
at all. It has been remarked that the academic profession is the 
' 
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. only one in which you can make your living by questioning 
things. How much it is still true in academia that persons substi- 
tute talking for decision or rationalize lack of commitment by cal- 
ling it "judicious pausing" 1 do not know. Nevertheless this is a 
tendency that confronts us all : to use pausing as a substitute for 
. committed action. In our action-oriented life in America this mis- 
use of pausing is a not infrequently found neurotic reaction. But 
this dilemma is not overcome by acting blindly, without con- 
sciousness and without reason. To be free obviously requires the 
courage to act when it is necessary to act if one's freedom is to be 
actualized at all. 
A person may ponder for months and years or all life long, 
. never finding satisfactory answers. This occurs particularly with ' 
the question of death. Hamlet sroke for many of us when he 
stated his concern with what might happen beyond death, 
_ When we have.shuffled off this mortal coil, . ;. ' 
[1t] must give us pause. 
' 
But our personal freedom can be actualized regardless of ' 
whether we find satisfactory answers or not, or even if there are 
no answers at all. We can exercise our freedom even against des- 
tiny. Indeed, in the long run to "know that he dies," as Pascal 
said, is the most essential and triumphant experience of freedom ' 
possible for a human being. 
3. Creativity and the Symbol 
' 
.. 
The relation between creativity and the pause is as close as it 
. ) 
" is startling. Not only does one get one's original ideas in the 
pause-Einstein got his while shaving; Poincaré got his while ' 
walking by the sea; others get theirs in dreams at night-but the 
capacity to pause is woven all through the creative production 
... itself. The pause is an active, nimble, often intense state, as when 
` 
. an Olympic diver pauses at the end of the diving board until that 
precise hundredth of a second when every muscle is tensed in " 
harmony. And at that instant he dives. The creative person 
stands in a state of openness, heightened sensitivity, incubating 
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the créative idea, with a sharpened readiness to grasp the creative 
impulse when it is born. The phrase "inviting the Muses," which 
is part of the occupation in the "pause," is an active yearning, an 
imploring, the authenticity of which is demonstrated by the 
hours of hard work the créative person puts in before and after the 
insight. 
While writing this chapter, I went to the nearby coast one 
Sunday hoping to do a sketch. Afterward, 1 wrote some notes 
about the experience: 
1 walk about on the shore in a mood of readiness, openness, asking 
myself, Where is the scene that grasps me? This red cliff with that water 
behind it or that boulder with the other rocks in front of the ocean? 1 
continue looking until I have the special feeling that a particular scene 
seizes me. I see it; and though 1 don't think of this consciously, 1 see it in 
a way that no one has ever seen it before. 1 think only: "This 1 like, this 
turns me on." " 
When 1 start painting: 
The colors flow into each other ... my muscles react ... 1 make this 
line going off in that direction, another great rock on the paper ... the 
colors form almost as though they had their own plan in mind ... the 
world is born anew in the painting. Not only did no one ever see this 
scene before as I do now [everyone sees every scene differently] but 1 
find a new picture coming to birth, new to me as well as others, in the 
flowing of the colors into each other, new in that the combination makes 
a different effect from what 1 had expected. 
We see how important are such terms as "readiness," "open- 
ness." In thèse active pauses, we see the work of destiny 
expressed in my feeling grasped, seized, and a "new picture" is 
born in the unpredictable flowing of the colors. 
Hence so much of creativity seems accidental. But the artist, whether he 
be scientific inventor or painter or writer or what not, is the one who can 
most often put himself in readiness for the "accident." True, the picture 
comes out differently from what one expects. But knowing he can never 
predict for certain how a picture will turn out, the artist can hold himself 
open for the "lucky accident." This means that "accident" is not the right 
term: rather, a myriad of different possibilities exist, and out of these one 
is born. 
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Our capacity to appreciate is already a kind of creativity which 
shows the activity in the pause. Our appreciative listening to 
Mozart of Bach, our concerned reading of Aeschylus, is our cre- 
ative contribution. The listening and the seeing are what is 
important; hence, Frederick Franck in his book on Zen painting 
entitled it, very rightly, The Zen of Seeing. Indeed, it takes lis- 
teners, actual or imaginary, for a musician to compose a sonata. 
The audience is necessary and partakes of the creative act by vir- 
tue of the fact that writing poetry or prose or music or dramas 
would not be possible without a real or imagined audience, 
whether an author writes for people of his own century (like most 
of us) or for later centuries (like Kierkegaard). 
The presence of the pause is very clear in Matisse's paintings 
in his use of space-which is a synonym for pause. Ben Shahn 
tells, in his description of creativity, of one day taking his daugh- 
ter out to his studio with him to make a mock-up book out of 
papier-mâché for a friend. His daughter watched him as he tried 
one color, rejected it, pondered another, put it aside, and so on 
for half an hour. When they came back into the house, the little 
girl asked her mother, "Why can't Daddy make up his mind?" 
Shahn goes on to explain that the artist is the one who has the 
courage to pause, to be suspended for a certain duration in 
. midair. And even though in our technological culture such 
doubts may appear on the surface to imply weakness, this paus- 
ing is really a sign of an inner richness of discriminatory powers. 
There is a phrase among artists, "negative space," which 
stands for space not noticed by the usual viewer. On a Rorschach 
record "negative space" is the white area surrounding the black or 
colored. Many people who take the Rorschach never notice or 
remark on the white space-it is simply "surroundings." Those 
who do, who see many white spaces may be adjudged "stubborn" 
on the test because they are preoccupied with the opposite to 
what most people point out. This is an interesting commentary 
on the conformist tendencies in our culture to see artists and 
musicians as a bit strange and to see the pause as an anomaly. 
1 want to make clear that the common misconception that the 
creative person is passive is just that-a misconception. The cre- 
ative person is receptive. 1 agree entirely with Archibald MacLeish 
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when he quotes a Chinese poet, "We poets struggle with Non- 
being to force it to yield Being. We knock upon silence for an 
answering music." MacLeish continues, "The 'Being' which the 
poem is to contain derives from 'Non-being,' not from the poet. 
And the 'music' which the poem is to own comes not from us 
who make the poem but from the silence; comes in answer to our 
knock. " 
The creative act has always been a paradox, and it probably 
will always be one. Practically everybody trying to explain it, 
especially the psychoanalysts who propose that creativity is 
"regression in the service of the ego," find they crash upon the 
rocks of their inability to distinguish between passivity and recep- 
tivity. The creative persons are the latter; they are certainly not 
the former. 
We do not know from what combination in the brain cells and 
synapses the creative ideas spring. But we do know that creativity 
requires freedom, and the pause is the way to give that creative 
combination the chance to work. Pausing is wondering, and won- 
der is first cousin to creativity. 
"Poetry for me," writes a poet friend, "is the space between 
the words. A poet is a poet when he or she can create that tension 
between words-a tension created by spaces-that lifts the reader 
outside the pièce of paper." Lifts the poet into an experience, 1 
would add, of intense or mild ecstasy-standing mentally outside 
oneself. These new experiences of splendor or wonder or just 
plain insight have their start in the poem, but they leap out into 
the reader's conception of his own private world. Creativity 
comes not only out of our moments or hours or weeks of effort; it 
requires-and this is essential-the moments or hours or weeks 
of pause between the effort. 
The pause is that situation in which symbols are formed. The 
intensity of handling all the stimuli that corne at us requires the 
symbol. How are we to assess these stimuli, how are we to judge 
them, to weight them-all of which must be done before one can 
throw one's strength toward this response rather than that one, to 
employ our simplest paradigm of freedom? 
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The term symbol comes from two Greek words, sym meaning 
"with" and bollein meaning "to throw." The symbol is, thus, that 
which throws or brings together these antimonies into one image, 
one form. The vitality of the situation is preserved for as long as 
the symbol continues to exist. 
We surely cannot handle all thèse stimuli by computor; we 
cannot add and subtract and in other mathematical ways try to 
fashion them into a decision. In a technological problem one can 
do this. But when one tries to turn human decisions-such as 
whom shall 1 marry-over to the machine and tries to abstract 
oneself out of the picture, one becomes more and more mechani- 
cal, less and less personal and human. Lo and behold, the warmth 
. has gone out of the situation, the vitality lost, the personal char- 
acteristics fled, and the person talking to you experiences you as 
less and less a person and more and more a machine. This is ' similar to talking with brain-injured patients in a mental hospital: 
they understand all the words you use, but cannot go behind the 
words to understand you as the person speaking. A human being 
in normal communication speaks in symbols, and if these are not 
grasped-and they are not by the brain-injured-the person is ' 
not understood. All vital words carry some residue of their origin 
as symbols. 
In a human problem, the pattern is all-important and personal 
likes and dislikes are crucial. The response, to which you throw ' 
your weight, will not be only a conclusion, but will also be a 
commitment with its own power. Many factors need to be taken 
into consideration, some of which are only partially conscious. In 
." such personal questions there is no decision which is "right," but 
. only approximately so. We have to keep the different factors all 
alive, like a juggler with a dozen balls in the air; we cannot avoid 
.. some factors without doing damage to the totality. What ideally 
happens is that thèse stimuli begin to fit into a pattern, a whole, 
a totality, a form that preserves the kernel and the value of each 
one. Tbis is tbe symbol. 
._ Take, for example, the apparently simply stimuli that arise 
around the concept of patriotism. There is the cal] of one's home- 
land ; the fact that our forefathers fought in 1776 to construct this 
nation; the feeling of comradeship with people who speak the 
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same language; and a million and one other facts and memories 
acting as stimuli. You hit upon a banner, and you call it a flag. 
The flag does not leave out any of the above meanings; it 
expresses the multitude of meanings in a compact, dynamic sym- 
bol. 
The elements that are forged and united into symbol in this 
pause which we have made the center of freedom corne from 
many sources. They are from past and present, individual and 
group, consciousness and unconsciousness, and they are both 
rational and irrational. All of these antimonies are brought 
, together in the pattern which is the symbol. The symbol keeps 
them alive and vital. 
4. Leisure and the Pause 
That form of the pause which we call leisure is also, curiously 
enough, both desired and feared. Unbounded leisure can turn 
people's lives into chaos, which those people can then blame on 
"excessive freedom." Persons who despair about such problems as 
delinquency, rruancy, alcoholism, drugs, often point to "too 
much leisure" as the villain of the piece. These people believe that . 
the devil indeed has work for idle hands. The word "leisure" can 
be read as "freedom" or "pausing." Dorothy Lee suggests: 
This is why American leisure has to be filled with named games, orga- 
nized recreation, labelled hobbies, planned activities. And this is why 
the have to is often paradoxically freeing. 
Observing the sharp dilemma people are thrown into by lei- 
sure time, we ask: What is this apparent fear of leisure? In Amer- 
ica we have traditionally associated freedom, especially in the 
form of leisure, with space. There was always some new, unex- 
plored space to go to. Land was free. Although this is not true in 
a literal sense nearly as much as it used to be, the concept is still 
very much a part of our American myths. The Native Americans 
were never considered as owning the space or the land. Freedom 
of the land was recognized as the fundamental freedom, from 
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which other freedom was derived. We expressed our freedom of 
the body by moving to a new space. So we remained extroverts, 
concerned with our muscles. Hence, the great outcry, and near 
panic, with the gasoline shortage. People interpreted it as 
having their freedom to travel, to move, taken away from them, 
thus enslaving them. 
In Europe, on the contrary, all space has been explored for a 
long time, and is now apportioned out and owned by somebody. 
So the Europeans' emphasis bas been on time. Europeans culti- 
vated the introvert side, turned inward, free in their imaginations 
and thought to travel all over the world. Freedom meant freedom 
of the mind in contrast to the bôdy. 
But in America this leaves us with a problem. We no longer 
can simply pack up and move to another house, typically farther 
west. When our freedom essentially means what we do with our 
leisure, freedom then turns out to be a vacuum. There is no being 
in it; it is a "no thing." This becomes clear in psychoanalysis. 
Horney bas written about the "Sunday neuroses," the anxiety 
that subtly eats away at businessmen on Sunday when nothing is - 
planned, nothing scheduled. These businessmen are. filled with 
.., anxiety and stoically endure the passage of time until Monday . 
morning when they can go back to work and again become occu- 
pied. (What a graphie phrase, "become occupied," implying that 
something outside ourselves takes over and occupies us!) 
Dorothy Lee raises the question, "Does this version of free- 
dom, with its dependence on the pre-planned and its main 
emphasis on the capacity of the self, engender creativity, origi- 
nality, spontaneity? My own opinion is that it does not; that 
indefiniteness and randomness, the recognition of the pauses are 
all essential to creativity." 1 enthusiastically agree. Randomness, 
, the recognition of the pauses, and the confronting of leisure 
rather than destroying it by excessive planning are essential if the ' 
person is to be open to his creative impulses. The pause is the ' 
essence of creativity, let alone of originality and spontaneity. One 
cannot avail oneself of the richness of preconsciousness or uncon- 
", . sciousness unless one can let oneself periodically relax, be 
relieved of tension. It is then that the person lets the silences 
speak. 
Frieda Fromm-Reichman, the psychiatrist about whose work, 
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I Never Promised You a Rose Garden, was written, used to talk to her 
classes about the value to the analyst when a patient missed an 
hour. "If the analyst is the creative type," she put it, "this empty 
hour is of the essence." " 
True. Unstructured freedom is difficult for most people to 
confront for long periods. But there are happy mediums, and the 
use of leisure falls in that category. The constructive limits to our 
freedom are given by what we are committed to and by the myths 
we live by. Then there can be meaning to leisure. We can use it 
for random thinking, reverie, or for simply wandering around a 
new city for a time. Yes, the time may be wasted. But who is to 
say that this "wasted" time may not bring us our most important 
ideas or new experiences, new visions, that are invaluable? The 
"letting be" and "letting happen" may turn out to be the most 
significant thing one can do. 
S. The Psyche and the Ego 
A friend responded to my question as to how he was with 
these words: "l've got a cold, 1 didn't sleep much last night, 
everything is going wrong. By rights 1 ought to feel terrible. But 
actually 1 am quite good." My friend went on: "The people who 
argue that the psyche and the ego are identical are wrong. My ego 
is in bad shape; my psyche is fine." 
" 
All through history human beings have wrestled with the fact 
that each of us experiences two aspects of selfhood which are 
never fully separated from each other. One of these aspects is the 
ego-self. This has the functions Freud rightly assigned to it: bele- 
agered monarch though it is, it keeps, as best it can, some har- 
mony in the different sections of its kingdom. It judges the 
demands of reality, balances preconscious ideas, and sifts out 
unacceptable unconscious impluses so that the person can live 
with some unity. The ego-self is related to the instincts and bod- 
ily well-being. A number (though not all) of the concerns about 
wounded prestige, suffering slights, 1 would assign to this ego- 
self. The ego-self's question is some form of "Do 1 get what 1 
want?" Hence, its association with the term egocentricity. 
The other aspect is the psyche-self, which seeks to "see life 
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steadily and see it whole." The psyche-self is concerned with the 
context of freedom. The "heightened consciousness" of which we 
speak from time to time is a function of the psyche-self. It is the 
aspect that scans the various possibilities of the self; it is the locus 
of what we call essential freedom. When Christopher Burney, 
during five years in solitary confinement in Germany in World 
War II, set himself to review everything he had been taught in 
school in order to keep from going psychotic, he was using not the 
ego-self, but the source of purpose that transcends the ego, which 
is the psyche-self. The ego-self is correlated with freedom of 
- doing, the psyche-self with freedom of being. 
When Kierkegaard points out again and again that "freedom 
depends on how the self relates itself to itself at every moment," 
he is speaking of the psyche-self in relation to the ego. The self 
relating to itself was the aspect of selfhood that Freud never 
understood. About his therapeutic practice we find Freud writ- 
ing, "analysis does not set out to make pathological reactions 
impossible, but to give the patient's ego freedom to choose one way 
or the other." This refers to freedom, but it omits the function 
. most concerned with this freedom-namely, the self relating to 
itself. 
There is a curious phenomenon in human selfhood that 1 have 
noticed in my clients and in myself that I call the "automatic 
pilot." The automatic pilot is the device on passenger planes to 
which the pilot can shift the directing of the plane when, on a 
long flight, he needs to rest. A client, for example, will be 
intensely anxious about a confrontation he must have with some 
other person or about a difficult phone call he must make. 
Finally, he gets his courage up and goes ahead to do these 
anxiety-laden acts. He is surprised to discover that they turn out 
much better than he had anticipated. There seems to be some 
unexpected aid, some power that he did not know he had. From " ' a Freudian point of view, it would be asserted that the help of 
which he was not aware comes from the client's preconscious; 
and in Jungianism, it would probably be interpreted as a voice 
from the unconscious. 1 call such aid a function of the psyche- 
self. The implication is that we, whether we are patients in 
therapy or not, can rightfully trust ourselves on those deeper 
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dimensions which 1 have called the psyche-self. In the welter of 
self distrust in which we generally find ourselves these days (cov- 
ered up as it is by neonarcisscism, techniques of "assertiveness," 
and advice to "stand up for yourself"), we can bank on more 
power, more capacity than most of us give ourselves credit for. 
This upsurging of strength and energy which we did not 
know we had is an example of the working of destiny through the 
psyche-self. But it is required at the same time that we confront 
our despair and our anxiety rather than suppressing them; other- 
wise the despair and anxiety will take over in the moment when 
we need their opposites. 
The automatic pilot is partially an influence from Eastern 
mysticism, particularly Zen Buddhism and its offshoots. It is the 
phenomena of "letting go" and "letting be." 
" 
The awareness of the duality of selfhood enables us to correct 
a radical misunderstanding of Zen Buddhism and other Oriental 
psychoreligions with regard to transcending the self. There is a 
passion among some groups in America to lose oneself, to escape 
from oneself, to get "free" of oneself. It is significant that this 
passion came along with, or followed closely, the age of narcis- 
sism and the preoccupation with self-sentiments. The "me" 
decade followed hard upon the Zen decade. These two phases 
sound contradictory-and they are on paper. But their proximity 
shows that they had in common the same longing to escape from 
oneself. Students in search of a drug would ask a friend, "Do you 
have any uppers?" or, if the answer was no, "Do you have any 
downers?" It didn't matter whether the result one got was elation 
or depression. At least one got free of oneself. 
The rushing after Zen and the narcissism was thus often to be 
found in the same person. There was no distinction between the 
constructive self-concern of a person and the self-concern of one 
who leaps after one gimmick one weekend and after another gim- 
mick the next weekend. This leaping often leads not only to tem- 
porary elation, but to eventual confusion and despair. 
The "loss of the self," 1 believe, is a misnomer. The misun- 
derstanding of the Zen Buddhist goal of freedom from the self 
actually leads to a more subtle kind of narcissism. One's own 
pushiness, one's demands, one's egocentricity may still be present; 
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only the person now rationalizes them in terms of "nonselfull- 
ness." We cannot help noting that the exemplars of Zen Bud- 
dhism and TM and other forms of psychoreligion are not without 
any self; the idea is absurd. They are relieved of one phase of the 
self-namely, what 1 have called the ego-self. But they seek to 
discover in the psyche-self a new clarity, a freshness, a sense of 
immediacy and of eternity. 
The self we transcend in Zen Buddhism and meditation is the 
_ ego-self. The ecstasy we experience is the freedom from the con- 
cerns of the ego-self, a process of dumping the "garbage" of the 
_ self, followed by the pre-eminent presence, however temporary, 
of the psyche-self. 
, 
6. Meditation and the Holy Void 
, Most of us are so preoccupied with the noise, the uproar, the ' 
cacophony of the modern world that we have no energy left for 
.:. constructive living. We long to pause, to absorb into our day-to- 
day existence, some calmness, some inner order in which we can 
call our soul our own, in which we take time to experience some 
beauty, to know and enjoy our friends, and to let whatever crea- 
tive impulses or visions we have be heard, listened to, have their 
moment. This pressing need coincides with the influx of Oriental 
influence, especially among the young people in this country, 
shown by the wide sale of books on Oriental religion, the endless 
listening to gurus, the renunciation of all worldly possessions to 
join an ashram. There can be no doubt of the depth and urgency . of the hunger for some psychoreligious center of life. 
Meditation is a way, available for most of us without a radical 
changing of our vocation, by which we can put meaningful con- 
tent into the pause. No matter what form or stripe this meditation 
may take-yoga of the physical or mental variety, Zen Bud- 
dhism, Tao, Transcendental Meditation, Christian Contempla- 
tion, Concentration-they all have in common the aim of 
providing channels to deeper levels of experience by means of the 
pause. 
When I, for one example, am overburdened with fatigue or 
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gloom or the distress of problems and the sleeplessness that goes 
with these things, 1 may pause temporarily to withdraw myself 
from the ego-self. 1 cannot do this by the head-on force of think- 
ing. But it can be done, sometimes with the help of a mantra, or 
through relaxation, or pausing and "letting be." 1 seek to move 
into the psyche-self, in which 1 see things sub specie aeternitatis, in 
which 1 no longer feel the pains described above-the ego-self 
.that feels them is temporarily transcended. The fatigue, the dis- 
tress, the gloom all seem to vanish. The psyche-self, freed from 
the groveling kind of pain, freed from the narcissism, freed from 
ego-centered misery, can be a channel to awareness of infinite 
possibilities. This state is what the Zen Buddhists mean when 
they advise withdrawal and compassion. 
Meditation is, par excellence, a concentration of the void, the 
pause, the "no thing." It is a freeing of the self from the clutter of 
life, giving one a pleasantly dizzy and mildly ecstatic experience. 
This dizziness is an attractive state that one likes to come back to, 
at least in memory, in moments throughout the day. In this sense 
meditation is a relief and a freedom from our buying and selling, 
our technological culture. Meditation seems "magical" and cura- 
tive because it opens one's vision and being to a new world, a 
brightly colored world, conducive to calmness and peacefulness. 
In general it seems to be a less intense form of the world than the 
mystics describe, but in quality the same, a world which has 
within it sweetness, overflowing love, beauty now all about. 
This is the common denominator of the many diverse meth- 
ods of meditation. They seem to have in common (1) stopping the ' 
machinery, the noise, the pressure, the haste, the compulsive 
driveness, and (2) a higher level of consciousness, what was called 
"oceanic" by Freud and Einstein. One experiences being 
absorbed into the universe and the universe being temporarily 
absorbed into one's self. These aims are summed up in the words 
of the Taoist Chuang-tzu, as translated by the Trappist Thomas 
Merton, 
No drives, no compulsions 
No needs, no attractions: 
Then your affairs are under control. 
You are a free man. 
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There is always the danger that descriptions of such events 
will be too flowery, too separate from the reality of most people's 
experience. Let us keep in mind that meditation occurs in all gra- 
dations, from a chance insight on a crowded elevator to the con- 
scious cultivation of the sense of peace to the regular discipline of 
meditating for short periods several times a day. There are also 
dangers in becoming isolated from the world of social action by 
meditating too much, which, as 1 have pointed out in The Courage 
to Create, can be a detriment to one's own creativity. We never . 
wholly leave the ego-self behind, and we still live in the real 
world with its rationality and irrationality, and with our respon- 
sibility toward this world. But it is precisely in this ever-present 
world that meditation can give meaning to our pauses. 
. All forms of meditation seek to change the character of the 
.' self, a change that involves a new relationship with the void. 
Many people will be familiar with at least the beginning stages of 
the void by their practice of meditation. 
1 speak of the "holy" void because holy, coming from the root 
w£le, refers to the mystical experience of grasping the wholeness 
of the universe in one's meditation. "The feeling of the world as 
a bounded whole," writes Ludwig Wittgenstein, "is the mysti- 
cal." The holy void is the pause appearing in imaginary spatial 
form. This is one reason the mystics are so often shepherds since 
they look out continuously on the endless desert. One has this 
experience of the void in looking steadily out over the sea, an 
experience rightly termed "oceanic" since it gives one the feeling 
of infinity. Being in the desert or at the ocean where our vision 
can seemingly go on for ever can give us acute anxiety, since the 
eye has no boundaries with which to orient us; or it can give us a 
sense of profundity, of eternity, or of infinity, all of which are 
pleasurable. This is why floating in a stimulus-free tank, where 
we are insulated from every sound and every glimmer of light, 
can bring either intense anxiety or a transcendent, holy experience. 
In the void the experience of nothingness occurs, and in this 
one's spiritual inspirations are called forth and one's deepest 
thoughts are made manifest. Wittgenstein helps us here again, 
There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make 
tbemselves manifest. They are what is mystical. 
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In the experience of nothingness, we find ourselves cleansed of 
the chatter and the clatter of a "world which is too much with 
us," to borrow Wordsworth's words. Wordsworth goes on in that 
peom to say, 
Great God! 
. I'd rather be a Pagan, suckled in a creed outworn; 
. So might 1, standing on this pleasant lea, . Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn, 
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea; 
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd horn. 
It is not by accident that Wordsworth goes back to the Greek 
myths in searching for ways these things can be said, for mythic 
language is one of the ways such truths can be made manifest. 
In the holy void the nothingness that we experience gives our 
deeper thoughts room to make themselves manifest, and the oth- 
erwise silent inner voice can be heard. This is the equivalent of 
the listening to the silence we referred to earlier. One method of 
meditation, that of Aurobindo, consists of continuously clearing 
the mind of all content until God-or being, as 1 would prefer- 
can speak to us out of the void. The nothingness then becomes a 
something; a something that comes, the mystics would say, from 
the depths of our soul. 
The void is the dimension of eternity. "If we take eternity to 
mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal 
life belongs to those who live in the present," writes Wittgen- 
stein. Our human hope in these experiences of timelessness- 
such as when we see something breathtakingly beautiful or hear 
a piece of music that seems to raise us into eternity-is to hang 
on to the experience forever. Edna St. Vincent Millay shows this 
in the sonnet "On Hearing a Symphony of Beethoven": 
Sweet sounds, oh, beautiful music, do not cease! 
Reject me not into the world again. 
And again in "God's world": 
O world, 1 cannot hold thee close enough! 
... Lord, I do fear 
Thou'st made the world too beautiful this year; 
My soul is all but out of me,-let fall 
No burning leaf; prithee, let no bird call. 
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The void may seem to be contact with pure being, but 1 prefer 
a more modest judgment, that one gets glimpses of being, aware- 
ness that there is a beckoning path to pure being even though 
none of us gets very far on it. The concentration on the spaces 
between words, the intervals, the pauses in life-these yield the 
touch of ecstasy. But the moment formulation in words occurs, 
the "no thing" becomes a something. Obviously, one listens with 
care to any message that may be formulated in moments like 
these, and one need not worry too much about its origin. It may 
be interpreted as coming from one's deeper self, or from the var- 
. ious autosuggestions that occur, or from contact with the being of 
the universe. The last may be experienced as a glimpse of God- 
assuming that God is conceived as the ground of being and mean- 
ing in the universe. At this point 1 feel, as 1 often have in this 
section, the caution of Wittgenstein: "What we cannot speak 
about, we must pass over in silence." 
" 
x . 
The Dizziness of Freedom . 
I tell you one must barbor cbaos if one would give birtb to a dancing 
star. 
- FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Thus Spake Zarathustra 
Eternal anxiety is tbe lot of the free man. 
' 
' 
jAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS 
Anxiety is tbe dizziness of freedom. 
- SÔREN KIERKEGAARD 
Since personal freedom is a venture down paths we have 
never traversed before, we can never know ahead of time how the 
venture will turn out. We leap into the future. Where will we 
land? With freedom one experiences a dizziness, a feeling of gid- 
diness, a sense of vertigo and dread. The dizziness involves the 
whole body, not just one's mind; one can feel it in the stomach 
and limbs as well. We recall that dizziness can be both pleasur- 
able, as when one is being whirled around on a roller coaster, as 
well as painful, as it is in the first stages of panic. All of these 
feelings--dizziness, vertigo, giddiness, dread-are expressions of 
the anxiety that accompanies freedom like its shadow. 
Sometimes a patient in therapy will wryly smile and say, 
"When 1 am mad at you, 1 think 1 was better off when 1 was 
neurotic-then 1 could go along in only one groove." 1 say 
"wryly" because if he really believed this, he wouldn't be in ther- 
apy in the first place since the purpose of therapy is precisely to 
take one out of the rigid grooves, the narrow, compulsive trends, 
which are blocks to freedom. This gives the person a sense of 
release. But it is a freedom that brings anxiety. 
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Anxiety is potentially present whenever we are free; freedom 
is oriented toward anxiety and anxiety toward freedom. "Anxiety 
is the reality of freedom as a potentiality before this freedom has 
materialized," Kierkegaard put it. For freedom is possibility, and 
who is to forecast what the end result of any possibility may be? 
Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor saw this clearly: "Nothing has 
ever been more insupportable for a man and a human society than 
freedom. Man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find 
. someone quickly to whom he can hand over that gift of freedom 
with which the ill-fated creature is born." Freedom is a burden 
. because it brings anxiety in its wake; and the Grand Inquisitor 
- sought to shield people from the paralyzing aspects of anxiety by 
, robbing them of its positive aspects-chiefly, freedom. Requiring 
the surrender of their freedom, he removed the stimulus to invent 
new forms, new styles, new ideas-in short, new possibilities. 
Now, as he insisted, men and women are "vile, weak creatures," 
"slaves by nature," "base creatures." He is surely logical: if you 
take away freedom, you make people into the base, weak, vile 
slaves the Grand Inquisitor describes. 
It is helpful to keep in mind that anxiety, like dizziness, can ' 
be both constructive and destructive. The constructive aspect is 
stimulating and gives one energy and zest; anxiety is a teacher 
that, since we carry it inwardly, can never be avoided. Anxiety 
illuminates experiences that we would otherwise run away from. 
Alfred Adler used to say that civilization is the result of anxiety ' in that cavemen were forced to invent thinking in order to cope 
with the saber-toothed tiger and the bison and other animals, 
which were stronger in tooth and nail and would have extermi- 
nated the human race. 
The anxiety that comes with excessive freedom can also be 
destructive in that it can paralyze us, isolate us, send us into 
panic; and when repressed, it may lead to cardiac ailments and 
other psychosomatic illnesses. These two aspects of anxiety are 
parallel to what Hans Selye calls constructive and destructive 
stress. Every person must bear constructive stress if he lives with 
any sense of adventure; but destructive stress is the excessive ten- 
sion we see on the modern assembly lines which can tear the 
human being to pieces. This is why personal freedom is fascinat- 
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ing and the most prized of all human conditions. But because it is 
inseparable from anxiety, it is dangerous and understandably 
dreaded at the same time. 
l. Anxiety and the Pause 
. 
In the previous chapter we found the specter of anxiety forc- 
ing its way into the picture time and time again. The pause is the 
moment when a person is most vulnerable to anxiety. It is the 
tremulous moment when we balance possible decisions, when we 
look forward with wonder and awe or with dread or fear of fail- 
ure. The pause is the moment when we open ourselves, and the 
opening is our vulnerability to anxiety. 
When we spoke about "listening to the silence," we noted that 
many people flee from silence because of the anxiety the silence 
brings. They perpetually seek the company of some noise from 
TV or radio even to the extent of carrying blaring portable sets 
with them on the streets or in the erstwhile "peace" of the parks. 
John Lilly found in his experiments in which people floated in his 
stimulus-free tank that silence, with its complete freedom, brings 
to many people more anxiety than they can bear. Who knows 
what devil may emerge out of the complete silence? Where are 
our familiar boundaries? The members of John Cage's audience at 
his famous "concert of silence" were required to absorb their own 
anxiety. There was no music to do it for them. People shrink 
from the "quiet desperation" that confronts them in periods of 
complete silence, fearing they will lose all ways of orienting 
themselves. 
In our technological society, we are moving toward periods of 
greater and greater leisure-in earlier retirement, for example- 
and superficially we welcome this prospective leisure. But we 
find within ourselves a curious gnawing fear of something miss- 
ing. What will we do with all this unfilled free time, this 
unplanned, unscheduled empty space? Does it not hang before 
us-O paradox of paradoxes!-like a great threat, the threat of 
emptiness, rather than the great boon we were seeking? Will our 
capacities, lying fallow, evaporate? Will we lose our abilities? 
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Will we be blotted out in sleep for a half century like Rip Van 
Winkle? Will we lose our consciousness if there is nobody knock- 
ing at the door? Secretly, many of us interpret freedom as becom- 
ing nothing. And will we, in our now unhampered possibility, 
become simply "no thing"? 
This is a real and immediate source of anxiety, covered up 
and unadmitted though it generally is. Formless freedom, 
unstructured freedom without the limits of destiny, leaves human 
beings inert. At such times the "pause" takes over. People do not 
know what to do, and they cry out for someone or something to 
organize them. Hence, organized play and planned leisure-which 
are really contradictions in terms. Thrown on their own 
resources, people may find themselves bankrupt since they have 
long gotten into the habit of ignoring their pauses. 
Let us consider again the illustration in the last chapter of the 
speaker receiving promptings and directions from his audience. 
Suppose, in his millisecond pauses, no such prompting comes. In 
anxiety over this possibility, some speakers choose to write out 
their lectures word for word, and then they can fall back on the 
_ printed page regardless of the promptings or lack thereof from 
the audience. But in reading his speech the speaker has surren- 
dered his opportunity for freedom, for the discovery of new 
ideas, for the adventure of exploring new frontiers, for the heady 
thrill of uncertainty. Thus, one chooses security over freedom, as 
the Grand Inquisitor so passionately adjured. But such a choice 
exacts a serious price in self-consciousness, tension, and the loss 
of freedom. 
Sometimes the anxiety that accompanies freedom is inter- 
mixed and confused with excitement. Once, while waiting 
(which is a form of pausing) at an airport for a person whom 1 
knew only slightly and who was going to be my guest at my 
country farm for three days, 1 felt the excitement that always 
comes with the anticipation of meeting a new person. But this 
excitement merged back and forth into the anxiety that came as 1 
asked myself in fantasy: What will two people do cooped up in a 
little house for so long? Will the intimacy become boring or 
scary? So 1 jotted down the following notes: 
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When does excitement-i.e., the constructive side of anxiety, which 
keeps life from being boring, keeps us spontaneous, stimulated, and 
alive-lead into destructive anxiety, which shuts out spontaneity, para- 
lyzes, and blocks our freedom? Excitement, the risking of which is plea- 
surable, gives us the spirit of the chase, keeps us growing. This has a 
clear survival value. It remains excitement so long as 1 feel 1 can cope; 1 
can retain a sense of some autonomy. It becomes destructive when 1 
cannot do this. Thus as long as we can experience "I can" and "I will," 
'we remain open, we experience our freedom, we preserve the power to 
experience new possibilities. 
Does this anxiety always occur in the exercise of freedom? 
The answer to that depends on how one views life. If we follow 
Martin Heidegger and Paul Tillich, who conceive of life as a con- 
tinuous dialectical tension between being and nonbeing, each of 
us engaged in every breath in preserving our own being against 
the threat of nonbeing, then we must answer "Yes." In any case 
1 prefer to keep the question on the level of consciousness. This 
would mean stating that while there is always some accompani- 
ment of dizziness with freedom, we, as human beings, may not 
be aware of it since we have different points where we block it 
off, where we repress the dizziness temporarily or deny it alto- 
gether. 
2. Anxiety and Discovery 
We also recall that 1 described, in Chapter V, the anxiety 
which engulfed me like a tidal wave when 1 exercised my freedom 
in achieving the insight that determinism gives birth to freedom 
and vice versa. The anxiety came in the person of this figure 
whom 1 identified as my "enemy-friend," a kind of figurative 
devil. It is the anxiety that comes, in varying intensity, whenever 
one leaps into the field of new possibilities, whenever one moves 
into the area of new ideas or new compositions in music or a new 
style in art. It comes after such subconscious thoughts as "Ah, 
there is a new vision-nobody ever painted a scene like this 
before." Then there comes the feeling "Do 1 want to venture out 
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so far?" And 1 remind myself of all the dangers in venturing into 
that no man's land. In such situations the person finds himself 
adjuring himself to calm down, not to get too excited, when 
getting excited in the sense of becoming inspired is exactly what, 
on the deepest level, he wants. 
Freedom and anxiety are two sides of the coin-there is never 
one without the other. The anxiety is part and parcel of the 
excitement and enthusiasm that accompany the birth of a new 
vision or an idea that, in the particular form it comes to us, no 
one bas ever thought of before. This anxiety-or "dread," if we 
wish to use Lowrie's translation of angst-is a function of the free- 
dom of imagination we must exercise in order to get any idea of 
significance. The dread comes with the new possibility and the 
risk that this leap requires. 
We might, like the scientists who split the atom, break 
through into a new land, where the usual mooring places by 
which we have oriented ourselves no longer even exist. Hence, 
the sense of alienation and bewilderment-and even the experi- 
ence of intense human aloneness-that such a breakthrough 
brings in its train. I am told that when the scientists stood behind 
their glass barrier near Los Alamos and saw the first atomic explo- 
sion, the faces of a number of them turned white. One cried 
aloud, "My God, what have we done?" 
There is a rational explanation for this anxiety. We must keep 
in mind that the anxiety comes not from the possibility that the 
new idea or discovery might be wrong and useless (then it can 
simply be discarded), but from the possibility that it might be 
true, as it was, for example, with atomic fission or with Bee- 
thoven's new ideas about musical harmonies. Then one's col- 
leagues, the professors at one's university, will be jolted, will be 
required to change their viewpoints, and even, God willing, to 
rewrite their lecture notes. This causes upset, which was very 
great indeed with the splitting of the atom. Or if one is a Coper- 
nicus with the new theory that the earth moves around the sun, 
or a Karl Marx with a radically new approach to the economic 
life of humankind, the uproar that accompanies the shaking of the 
foundations will be that much more catastrophic. 
Although the examples above are of great men, we are illus- 
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trating something that we all experience, though to a lesser 
degree. Every human being experiences this anxiety when he or 
she exercises the freedom to move out into the no man's land of pos- 
sibility. We can escape the anxiety only by not venturing-that 
is, by surrendering our freedom. 1 am convinced that many peo- 
ple never become aware of their most creative ideas since their 
inspirations are blocked off by this anxiety before the ideas even 
reach the level of consciousness. 
A pressure toward conformism infuses every society. One 
function of any group or social system, as Hannah Arendt has 
pointed out, is to preserve homeostasis, to keep people in their 
usual positions. The danger of freedom to the group lies exactly 
at that point: that the nonconformist will upset the homeostasis, 
will use his or her freedom to destroy the tried and true ways. 
Socrates was condemned to drink hmlock because, so the good 
citizens of Athens believed, he taught false "daimones" to the 
youth of Athens. Jesus was crucified because he upset the 
accepted religion of his day. Joan of Arc heard voices and was 
burned at the stake. These extreme examples are of persons 
whose ideas later became the cornerstones of our civilization. But 
that fact only confirms my point. The persons whose insights are 
too disturbing, who bring too much of the anxiety that accom- 
panies freedom, are put to death by their own generation, which 
suffers the threat caused by the earthquake of the new ideas. But 
they are worshiped by subsequent generations, when their ideas 
are crystallized into the dogma of the new age and there is no 
chance of the dead figures rising from their silent graves to dis- 
turb the peace anew. 
The prototype of the person who produces something new is 
found in Prometheus, who created fire-or, as the myth presents 
it, stole it from the gods-and gave it to mankind as the beginning 
of human civilization. No one envies his punishment in being 
chained to a mountainside, where an eagle would eat away at his 
liver all day. At night, the liver would grow back, and the same 
grisly process would begin all over again the next day. This 
agony may be pictured as the severe form of the anxiety that 
accompanies his great act of defiance, which was one aspect of 
Prometheus' personal freedom. 
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The denying of the dizziness of freedom is shown in the 
phrase "pure spontaneity." For no one can seek that without suc- 
cumbing to the dreadful implications of freedom. Even John 
Lilly, in his experiencing "pure spontaneity" in his stimulus-free 
tank, describes the great dangers therein, and his own great anx- 
iety in his experience hovering on the edge of nonbeing, death. 
One may envy one's colleagues who claim to exist in pure spon- 
taneity and who seem to be on a perpetual "high." Yes, we may 
envy them, but we do not love them for that. We love them for 
their vulnerability-which means their accepting and owning the 
dizziness of their freedom, their destiny which always stalks their 
freedom. 
The legend of Icarus presents a picture of a young man refus- 
ing to accept the dizziness, or the anxiety, of freedom. Icarus that 
day must have felt a sense of great adventure-to be the first per- 
son who could sail "high" and taste the ecstasy, the sheer freedom 
from the bonds of the earth, with no limits at all. For this one 
afternoon he was completely subject, not limited even by the dis- 
tant reaches of the sky. He could order his universe as he wished, 
could live out his whim and desire born in his own imagination. 
Here, indeed, was "pure spontaneity." No longer part of the ' ' . world, no longer subject to the laws of earth or its destiny or the 
requirements of community. What exhilaration there must have ' 
been in the young man's breast! A great dream comes true, an 
experience of complete freedom, pure spontaneity at last. One 
. needs only the self-preoccupation, the refusal to consider com- 
promise. He is like the humanists of previous decades who - insisted that there was no evil they need bother to consider. Man- 
kind had done such great things in the past; why could we not 
overcome any and ail difficulties in the future? Icarus remained 
as spontaneous as a child and burst into the sea to drown not as a 
young man, but as a child. 
3. The Anxious Prophet 
. The authentic prophet experiences the anxiety that comes 
with his freedom to see into the future, to see beyond the usual 
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limits in which other people see. Thus, Tiresias cries out to 
Oedipus: .. 
"How terrible it is to know ... 
Where no good comes from knowing! 
' 
... my say, in any sort, 
1 will not say, lest I display my sorrow. 
.And again: 
1 will not bring remorse upon myself ' And upon you. Why do you search these matters? 
We recall also that the prophetess Cassandra, in ancient 
Mycenae, hated her role as a medium and hated to prophesy. One 
way to distinguish between the authentic prophet or saint from 
the fanatic or charlatan is this: the authentic prophet feels anxiety 
about his role and the charlatan does not. Like the prophets in 
the Old Testament, the authentic ones do not want to be proph- 
ets ; they do their best to decline the role. They would escape if 
they could because of the dizziness and dread such great freedom 
entails. Jonah even fled from Nineveh and had to be brought back 
by a whale to give his prophecies. 
The common ways of denying the anxiety of freedom 
include, in our society, alcohol and drugs. When Peer Gynt, in 
Ibsen's play, hears the passing people talking and laughing at him 
as he hides behind the bushes, he comforts himself: 
If only 1 had a dram of something strong, 
Or could go unnoticed. If only they didn't know me. 
' 
A drink would be best. Then the laughter doesn't bite. 
True, it does not bite so much when one has recourse to a dram 
of Scotch; this is the dominant way of escaping anxiety in our 
culture. Harry Stack Sullivan once remarked that liquor was a 
necessity in a technological civilization like ours to relax people 
after a compulsive-obsessional day in the office. Whatever truth 
there may be in that statement, probably made by Sullivan with 
tongue in cheek, it is obvious that alcohol drunk to avoid anxiety 
may ease the mind and dull the sensitivities. But the drinking to 
escape anxiety puts one on a treadmill: the next day, when the 
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anxiety increases, the drinking must increase also, and so on, 
until Alcoholics Anonymous has a new member. Overuse of alco- 
hoi erodes our freedom to imagine, to reflect, to discover some 
possibility that would have helped us cope with the anxiety in the 
first place. 
During a recent year there were 50 million prescriptions writ- 
ten in the United States for Valium-one for every five persons 
in the country. In'addition there are Librium, Equanil, Miltown, 
and a long list of similar drugs whose main purpose is to block off 
feelings of anxiety and consequent depression. These drugs 
obviously have their constructive uses, especially with people 
whose anxiety rises to paralyzing heights and who cannot then 
communicate fruitfully with others or a therapist. In this limited 
sense the tranquilizing drugs may temporarily promote freedom. 
They can relieve the anxiety long enough so that the person can 
then see some real possibilities in his life. 
But used as a crutch, the drugs, like alcohol, can be a way of 
blocking off freedom and possibility, a way of becoming an 
unfeeling robot, avoiding the sensitivity necessary to be open to 
possibilities. Personal freedom thus evaporates. One gives up the 
sharp play of imagination; one surrenders the inspiration that 
comes from the interplay of exhilaration and sadness, ecstasy and 
grief, "joy and woe" in Blake's terms. The human being then 
approximates the non-sentient computor which simply recites its 
pre-programmed responses. 
4. Dogmatism Is Fear of Freedom 
Since I will be attacking some so-called scientific forms of 
psychology in this section, 1 want to make it clear at the outset 
that I am by no means antiscientific. I ask the reader's permission 
to quote from a book published by the distinguished research 
professor of psychology at Yale University, Irvin Child: 
... Consider, for instance, two books by psychologists which have 
recently been best sellers with the American public: Rollo May's Love 
and Will and B. F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity. People who have 
Tbe Dizziness of Freedom 195 
studied psychology, 1 suspect, place Skinner's book very decidedly in 
the scientific tradition in psychology, and May's hardly at ail. 
Yet Skinner's book seems to me to be connected with the scientific 
tradition only in a personal sense, having been written by a psychologist 
who is a most distinguished leader of the experimental analysis of animal 
behavior. What Skinner's book has to say about human beings-and they 
are the subject of the book-seems to me to be in the philosophical or 
religious tradition rather than the scientific. It appears to me an expres- 
sion of the author's personal values and beliefs, stated with papal confi- 
dence and buttressed principally by wild extrapolations from rats and 
pigeons to man, making almost no contact whatever with the great body 
of psychological research on man, which might be drawn on to present 
a very different picture from that drawn by Skinner. 
May's book, on the other hand, grows out of his years of clinical 
experience with patients, and that of many other psychologists and psy- 
chiatrists. It draws on the interaction of hypothesis and observation, dis- 
plays humility about the author's wisdom, and looks toward future 
modification of knowledge. All this seems to me very much in keeping 
with the spirit of science, and with one reasonable opinion about what 
methods are at present most useful in scientific inquiry into human psy- 
chology. 
The prototype of the tendency in psychology to deny its own 
limits, became, in the last two décades, B. F. Skinner. 1 count 
Fred Skinner as a friend, but this does not hinder me from 
emphatically opposing his viewpoint in the debates we have had 
over the air and before college audiences. Skinner has made many 
constructive contributions to animal psychology and to educa- 
tionai theory which we all prize. But he has refused to admit the 
limits of psychology, which means, in my terms, destiny; and he 
has stretched his theory to include, among other disciplines, phi- 
losophy, sociology, criminology, and mental health. His work is 
an amazing example of hubris in psychology (we have defined 
hubris as the refusal to acknowledge destiny). Indeed, in Skin- 
ner's view it seems psychology has no limits at all. 
The popularity of his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity testifies 
to the vast number of people who are crying to be told that free- 
dom is an illusion and they need worry about it no longer. Skin- 
ner capitalizes with a vengeance on the widespread feelings of 
powerlessness and helplessness, which are the underlying anxiety 
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of our time; and he reassures people that personal responsibility 
is démodé and that they do not need to trouble their consciences- 
if they have any left-about it. We need to look once again into 
the phenomenon of that book to find several hitherto unexamined 
problems about personal freedom. 
Skinner argues that we must develop a technology of behav- 
ior, but that our belief in freedom and human dignity stands in 
the way. This new technology, he writes, 
will not solve our problems, however, until it replaces traditional pre- 
scientific views, and these are strongly entrenched. Freedom and dignity 
illustrate the difficulty. They are the possessions of the autonomous man 
of traditional theory, and they are essential to practices in which a person 
is held responsible for his conduct and given credit for his achievements. 
A scientific analysis shifts both the responsibility and rhe achievement to 
the environment. 
We would be the last to argue that the environment does not 
influence-to a considerable extent-the development of the per- 
son. Indeed, 1 would argue that the environment has an even 
more varied effect than Skinner argues: anyone in psychoanalysis 
knows that the environment is important even on unconscious 
levels and in dreams. Any viewpoint that leaves out the environ- 
ment-like the extreme forms of the human-potential movement, 
where it is argued that only the inner potentials are significant-is 
equally wrong. But there are other points related to responsibility 
and freedom in Skinner's system that concern us here. 
Again and again Skinner attacks the traditional belief that a 
man "can be held responsible for what he does." "A scientific 
analysis shifts the crédit as well as the blame to the environment." 
" 
, The "literature of freedom and dignity"-whatever that means- 
cannot "accept the fact that all control is exerted by the environ- 
ment and proceed to the design of better environments rather 
than of better men." " 
Now we would ail agrée that ideally ail citizens should 
strive-I would use Skinner's prohibited word and say it is their 
responsibility-to correct the flaws in the environment, say, of 
school children (on which Skinner has helped us greatly), the 
poverty-stricken, the lame, etc. Indeed, 1 believe-apparently 
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contrary to Skinner-that there are times we should "proceed to 
the design of better environments" by outright rebellion against 
the cruel and unfair laws in our society. 
But what, pray tell, is the environ ment composed of except 
other human beings like you and me? And how can an environ- 
ment be "responsible"? True, when a society is formed, there 
develops a group force which makes for conformism; to keep peo- 
ple in line is one of the functions of the group, as we have said. 
But if we surrender our individual responsibility, what leverage, 
what power, do we have against this force of the group? One gets 
the feeling, when reading Skinner, that the environment is some 
holy form made in heaven and superimposed by some god or 
demigod upon us mortals. Completely absent is the wisdom in 
Pogo's remark, "We have met the enemy and he is us." 
" 
Skinner heaps scorn on the mythic "autonomous man," who 
"possesses miraculous powers." 
" 
A scientific analysis of behavior dispossesses autonomous man and turns 
the control he has been said to exert over to the environment.... He is 
henceforth to be controlled by the world around him, and in large part 
by other men. 
Again, what kind of psychoengineering is this which "turns 
the control ... over to the environment," holds that the world 
around us does the controlling, and this consists "largely of other 
men"? This seems to me to lack the logic that we have a right to 
expect of "engineers of behavior," which Skinner aspires to be. It 
sounds like the following lines from Goethe: 
... for each, incompétent to rule 
His own internai self, is all too fain to sway 
His neighbor's will, even as his haughty mind inclines ... 
Skinner's statement also betrays the fundamental confusion of 
values in his system: toward whose values is the environment 
going to be changed? Who are the "other men" who will do the 
controlling? Perhaps Skinner himself? 
The problem is that either alternative-to blame the environ- 
ment for everything or to locate everything within oneself as the 
human-potential movement used to do-is wrong. Both deny 
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freedom. But human beings have a third possibility: they can choose 
when and whether they are to be acted upon or are to do the acting. W hen 
1 fly in a plane, 1 let myself be acted upon. I nap a little; 1 look 
out the window and daydream. The pilot entirely controls the 
success or failure of my flight. When 1 get off the plane, however, 
to make a speech at a college or university, 1 choose the opposite 
alternative. I seek to persuade the audience; I want to get my 
viewpoint across. 1 am now assumedly the controller. What is 
important is that when 1 morve between being controlled and con- 
troller, 1 am on a deeper level of freedom-the freedom of being. 
So far as we know, this choice between controlling or being con- 
trolled is not present for pigeons or rats, which comprise the basis 
of Skinner's studies. 
It would not matter if these ideas of Skinner's only slightly 
confused people about psychology and the state of being human. 
"One of the sadest things about psychology today is that so many 
of its better minds are forced to cope with the cant, error and 
falsehood generated by the discipline itself," writes Joseph Adel- 
son, professor of psychology at the University of Michigan. The 
problem is that so many people are on the edge of panic these 
days and yearn for some rationalization for dumping their respon- 
sibility someplace outside themselves. Such a simplistic gospel as 
Skinner's greatly appeals to them since it promises a way out and 
reinforces their desire to escape from a world that so baffles them. 
The gospel is especially seductive since Skinner is against sin: he 
opposes the things that ought to be opposed, such as aversive 
control and destructive punishment. Thus, people "dump" on their 
environment tbe very responsibility that would be needed if they are effec- 
tively to influence their environment. 
What about the high-school student who finds looming up 
° before him problems that he cannot possibly solve in the political 
and economic world, who is struggling with drugs and alcoholism 
and all the conflicts that occur in adolescence? Then he hears that 
he has no responsibility, that the environment will take over, that 
an impersonal science of engineering should take the blame and 
the credit. How is he going to experience himself and his life? 
One does not need to blame Skinner for the problems of juvenile 
delinquency like drugs, crime, violence. No single man can be 
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expected to answer for the exigencies of history, to state the 
obvious. But young people are scarcely going to take responsibil- 
ity for their actions or lives if they are continually told that they 
are powerless and all the influence is exercised by the environ- 
ment. Is it surprising, then, that they resign from life, become 
"the uncommitted," go to such films as A Clockwork Orange, mum- 
bling the while a paraphrase from Shakespeare: Oh brave new 
world that has such robots in it? 
When I was reading Skinner, I had a flash, unmistakable and 
demanding, of déjà vu. Then it struck me: the Grand Inquisitor! 
How alike the statements of these two men are. The Inquisitor 
says: "For now, for the first time, it has become possible to think 
of the happiness of man," and "we shall plan the happiness of 
universal man." Skinner likewise proposes his system for the sake 
of mankind. When Skinner talks about his "cultural technology," 
he also talks about the greater happiness of mankind as the goal 
of his engineering. The parallel is amazing. 
The Grand Inquisitor states: "Turn [these stones] into bread 
and mankind will run after thee like a flock, grateful and obedi- 
ent, though forever trembling, lest Thou withdraw thy hand and 
deny them Thy bread." Skinner does this with candy and other 
forms of reinforcement, but the same reward is immediately pres- 
ent. The Inquisitor states: "There is no crime, and therefore no 
sin." Skinner, as we have seen, argues that responsibility be 
shifted to the environment; people do not need incarceration, but 
rather treatment, rehabilitation. Both men emphasize obedience as 
a cardinal virtue. The Inquisitor states that "man seeks not so 
much God as the miraculous," and comes forth with his trium- 
virate, "miracle, mystery and authority." Skinner likewise pre- 
sents the miracle and authority of psychology and the concepts of 
science, arguing that these are rational and clear. He seems 
unaware that scientific concepts are the most miraculous and 
mysterious of all the concepts in our age. 
But the greatest similarity of Skinner and the Grand Inquisi- 
tor is that both regard freedom as the central enemy. The only 
difference is that Skinner goes further than the Inquisitor: he 
holds that freedom does not exist at all, whereas the Inquisitor 
grants the reality of freedom but regards it as dangerous for peo- 
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ple at large. The Inquisitor seems to be aware of his fear of free- 
dom ; hence, he bas Jesus, who he knows would preach freedom, 
locked up in jail. Skinner not only does not give any room to 
freedom, but he is dogmatic in his "papal" insistence that the 
individual's responsibility-and, hence, his freedom-is non- 
existent. This dogmatism of Skinner's is an expression of the fear 
of freedom, which the Inquisitor is aware of but Skinner is not. 
Skinner's ideas are the concerted endeavor to flee from freedom 
and to rationalize and justify that flight. 
At a recent conference on behaviorism and human ethics, one 
of the speakers, representing Skinnerian behaviorism, stated at 
the beginning of his presentation that he never read any philoso- 
'. phy and was not going to speak in that field. He then proclaimed 
that freedom is an illusion. However much our actions might 
seem to be freely chosen and performed, he could easily demon- 
strate that ail our behavior was the result of previous condition- 
ing. He went on to point out that behaviorism already had control 
of 80 percent of all the Psychology Departments in the country 
and would soon have control of all of them. The rest of us, he 
was good enough to advise, had better get on the behaviorist band 
wagon since what we had to teach was irrelevant anyway. Oth- 
erwise we would be buried and forgotten. 
Some of us immediately pointed out to him that the statement 
"Freedom is an illusion" is a philosophical statement, not a psy- 
chological one. It seemed to us frightening that he should brag 
about never reading any philosophy if he was going to talk phi- 
losophy. None of us denied determinism in its rightful place. 
But the real puzzle is: Why is it that behaviorism, almost 
alone among the many forms of psychology, is so dogmatic, so 
certain it has the whole truth? Especially since at the present 
time, five years after that conference, behaviorism is not the form 
of psychology to which most concern is given. Cognitive psy- 
chology has replaced it. We who are not behaviorists have almost 
universally smarted under such belittling as the above words. 
This strange dogmatism, as Child pointed out above, is charac- 
teristic of Skinner, and apparently explains why he subsumes 
under his psychology the many other disciplines of sociology, . 
philosophy, religion, and mental health. 
Tbe Dizziness of Freedom 201 
This dogmatism is now even recognized and admitted by 
some erstwhile Skinnerians as they look back on the past four or 
five decades. One behaviorist, Roger Ulrich, writes of that 
period, "there was nothing we could not do if we just put our 
behavior to it ... science and the scientist-priests could do any- 
thing and everything." He continues, "our leader [Skinner] let us 
know that we could go even further and control the whole 
.world." " 
All this obviously takes away the freedom of the individual. 
It is not by accident that Skinner and his cohorts argued so deter- 
minedly that freedom is an illusion since they had given up their 
own freedom in their very dogmatism. 
What accounts for such hubris in a discipline in which the 
members pride themselves on being scientific? Psychoanalyti- 
cally, dogmatism is interpreted as being a symptom of the fact 
that the person really doubts in his unconscious the truth he 
externally espouses so strongly. A person becomes more dog- 
matic-like Paul on the Damascus Road-the more he doubts his 
own "truth" and gets closer to the point of collapse. Thus, despite 
Skinner's insistence that what goes on between the ears is irrele- 
vant, the kind of psychology that has superseded behaviorism is 
cognitive psychology, the psychology of what occurs in the mind. 
But we wish to suggest a reason for the dogmatism of behavior- 
ism on a different level from the psychoanalytic one. We propose 
that this dogmatic behaviorism is itself a flight from destiny and 
an escape from the dizziness of anxiety in freedom. It cannot be 
by accident that behaviorism dominated the half century (from 
the 1920s to the 1970s) that has faced vast social problems such as 
nuclear fission, concentration camps, the aftermath of one world 
war and the agonizing endurance of the second, the period that 
includes the "age of anxiety," when inflation and unemployment 
occur simultaneously, when there is an energy crisis, and so on 
endlessly. This distraught age was offered a simple gospel, prom- 
ising escape from responsibility, from confusion, and especially 
from such difficult problems as freedom. Certainty was in the 
sadd le, even though it was a false certainty. In such behaviorism 
there is no sense of the freedom of uncertainty. 
This alone can explain why there was such a great segment of 
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our population who not only succumbed to the behaviorist view- 
point, but showed the telltale symptom at the same time- 
namely, its dogmatism. I believe that this flight from destiny 
includes a frank refusal to let oneself see any of the aspects of 
life-such as responsibility, limits in science, and so on-that 
require us to understand our destiny. 
A vicious circle gets started in dogmatism of any sort. The 
person's security is bolstered by the dogmatism, and the dogma- 
tism is, in turn, reinforced by the security. 
True, anxiety can be avoided by such dogmatism, but there 
are clear penalties. The person reinforces the stockade around him- 
self and his ideas; he blocks out the anxiety by cutting off his 
possibility and his maneuverability. The anxiety is escaped, but 
the person is a prisoner in his own stockade. This, by definition, 
is the loss of freedom. And the constant expansion that character- 
izes freedom is blocked. If we were to peel off the defensive cover 
of the dogmatist, we would almost always find a trembling person 
imprisoned within the walls he himself has created. 
Whether scientist or religious, the dogmatic person is one who 
fears secretly that he must crystallize his beliefs or they will evap- 
orate. He is afraid that any pause, as we used the term in the last 
chapter, would result in his losing his "truth" suddenly, and then 
he would be thrown into panic. He fears that his truth will dis- 
appear unless he puts a firm stockade around it. 
Yeats's remark that "some truths we embody and do not know, 
" 
which covers a great deal of experience, is totally ignored by our 
dogmatist. He knows everything, has an answer for everything; 
no question can make him ponder. Such persons are boring to 
others precisely because there is no freedom in what they are 
saying or standing for. In extreme forms and in clinical terms 
such a person becomes the compulsive-obsessional. 
All this has great bearing upon freedom. For freedom is 
release from dogma. Freedom is the capacity to increase our the- 
ories, to look about ourselves to find more possibilities. Freedom 
means that we can see many different forms of truth, some from 
the West and others from the East, some from technology and 
others from intuition. The very existence of theories and our 
dependence upon them are on the side of freedom. Then we 
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achieve the mark of the mature intelligence, as Alfred North 
Whitehead is reputed to have said, that is, we can hold in the 
mind two opposing thoughts without undermining either one of 
them. So the inescapable uncertainty of human life is accepted as 
our destiny from which we do not flee. 
The shadows cast upon the wall in Plato's myth of the cave 
are one degree removed from reality. But if we know they are 
shadows, we are saved from the shackles of dogmatism. And 
knowing we live in a cave can also turn our imaginations loose in 
new freedom. This confrontation with destiny releases us to 
experience a sea change in the realm of possibility. We can find 
new forms, new ways of relating to each other, new styles of life. 
XI 
. Freedom and Destiny in Illness and Health 
My very chains and grew friends, 
So much a long communion tends 
To make us wbat we are: -ven l 
Regain'd my freedom with a sigh. 
- GEORGE GORDON, LORD BYRON, "The Prisoner of Chillon" 
' 
But we bave understood nothing about illness so long as we have not 
recognized its odd resemblance to war and to love, its compromises, its 
feints, its exactions, that strange and unique amalgam produced by the 
mixture of a temperament and a malady. 
- MARGUERITE YOURCENAR, Memoirs of Hadrian 
Most people assume that their illnesses and diseases are almost 
wholly under the command of destiny. An ailment is accepted at 
best as "bad luck" and a disease as "irrevocable fate." Our very 
language expresses this attitude. We "fall" ill, as though the pro- 
cess were as fateful as gravity. We "catch" a germ as though it 
were an accident. We are the "victims" of cancer. We "get" sick 
(instead of "sicken"), and we go to the doctor to "get cured." And 
all we can do is be "patient" while the doctor treats us. All these 
words and phrases are in the passive voice. We assume that we 
are under the command of some fate and we can do nothing about 
it. The good patient is considered docile and cooperative, one 
who puts himself completely in the hands of the physician. Our 
conscious selves seem outside, standing there like slaves on the 
block while their fate is decided by forces greater than they. 
This attitude toward illness reminds us of the statement made 
by the Grand Inquisitor that "man is tormented by no greater 
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anxiety than to find someone quickly to whom he can hand over 
that gift of freedom with which the ill-fated creature is born." 
This attitude is unfortunately furthered by some misguided phy- 
sicians under the illusion that it makes their role easier. Even in 
psychotherapy this occurs. The following is an actual verbatim 
exchange of a doctor with a patient who had come to a clinic 
suffering from depression: 
PATIENT: What will 1 do about my problems? 
DOCTOR: Don't inquire into the source of your trouble. Leave tbis to 
us doctors. We will steer and pilot you through the crisis.... 
Whatever the pathological process ... we will cure you. 
1 believe this attitude works against health rather than for it. 
My belief is expressed on one hand by Professor Eli Ginzberg, 
"No improvement in the health care system will be efficacious 
unless the citizen assumes responsibility for his own well-being." 
Dr. René Dubos agrees: "Recovery depends upon the mobiliza- 
tion of the patient's own mechanisms of resistance to disease." 
Dubos emphasizes time and again the "vis medicatrix naturae," the 
healing power of nature. That is to say, far from robbing us of 
our total freedom, destiny expresses itself through nature with a 
constructive force which is available to us only when we assert 
our freedom in engaging it. 
1. Western Medicine and the Great Revolution 
Of the countless empirical studies which bear this out, 1 will 
cite an article from the Journal of the American Medical Association, 
which was reported in the daily press under the caption "Nice 
Patients Die Faster." This was a study of how two groups of 
women dealt with terminal breast cancer. "Feisty, combative 
women survived longer than trusting, complacent women" was 
the conclusion. The women who survived longest were, as a 
group, more anxious, depressed, hostile, and alienated about 
their illness than those who succumbed faster. The "feisty" 
women seemed to maintain a combative posture rather than being 
hopeless victims. "They were going down fighting!" wrote Dr. 
Derogatis, the pyschologist who made the study. "The women 
206 Freedom and Destiny 
who survived longer had mechanisms of externalizing their con- 
flicts, fears and angers about the disease. They were more 
demanding of physicians, less satisfied with treatment and were 
rated as less well adjusted. By contrast, the other women-who 
died sooner-felt less anxious and more positive towards their 
doctors, and rated themselves as more content on a self-evalua- 
tion. 1 believe they had divested themselves of the responsibility of 
fighting the disease." 
" 
Now breast cancer does indeed seem to be a blow of fate. Yet 
the women who could assert their freedom and take responsibility 
for the illness-and thus for fighting it-have a better chance of 
living. 1 do not wish my emphasis on responsibility to be con- 
fused with that of est. "You are the sole source of your own expe- 
rience, and thus totally responsibile for everything you 
experience" is the message of est training. Is the unborn baby the 
cause of its brain defect because of its mother's malnutrition? To 
hold that we are responsible for everything that happens to us is 
to show to what absurdities we go when we have no understand- 
ing of destiny. Our freedom-and, therefore, our sense of 
responsibility--exists only as we acknowledge and engage our 
destiny. 
Norman Cousins's book Anatomy of an Iliness excellently 
; describes his own encounter with a vital problem of health. Cous- 
ins was pronounced incurably ill of a rare disease of the collagen 
tissues which he had developed in Russia. Possessing a remark- 
ably strong will to live, he asked himself the question: "If negative 
emotions produce negative chemical changes in the body, 
wouldn't the positive emotions produce positive chemical 
changes? Is it possible that love, hope, faith, laughter, confi- 
dence, and the will to live have therapeutic value?" He tells us 
how, when the specialists pronounced him doomed, he sum- 
moned his own concern with the problem and his will to health. 
He moved out of the inhospitable hospital and into a hospitable 
hotel and began a new regimen, in consultation with his own 
physician. He went on a prqgram consisting of large quantities of 
vitamin C and equally large amounts of health-giving laughter. 
His story is the documentation of how one individual asserted his 
limited freedom and his responsibility for confronting his own 
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destiny, cruel and unfair as that destiny was. When asked by a 
friend whether he had not been terribly discouraged, Cousins 
answered that he was, "especially at the start when 1 expected my 
doctor to fix my body as though it were an automobile engine that 
needed mechanical repair, like cleaning out the carburetor, or 
reconnecting the fuel pump." 
" 
When he was a healthy man again, Cousins met one of the 
specialists who had stated that his disease was incurable, and told 
him that his cure began "when 1 decided that some experts don't 
really know enough to make a pronouncement of doom on a 
human being. And 1 said 1 hoped they would be careful about 
what they said to others; they might be believed and that could 
be the beginning of the end." 
" 
When one discusses the need for the individual to take respon- 
sibility for his own health, the tendency of listeners is to interpret 
the discussion as an attack on modem medicine. An address of 
mine, "Personal Freedom and Caring," before the convention of 
the American Occupational Therapy Association was reported in 
a newspaper under the caption "Caring Physicians Rob Patients 
of Their Freedom, Responsibility." This was, if anything, 
directly opposite to the meaning of my address. 1 was not attack- 
ing medicine as such. None of us can escape marveling at and val- 
uing the tremendous progress of modern medicine in the develop- 
ment of medical technology and the new drugs. Among my 
friends who are advocates of holistic medicine, my task is to cau- 
tion against viewing the medical profession as the enemy. "Talk 
of enemies does not sit well," Norman Cousins says, "in a move- 
ment in which spiritual factors are no less vital than practical 
ones." " 
It does no good, furthermore, to refuse on principle to take a 
prescribed drug because one wants to preserve one's "freedom," 
nor to refuse to go to a doctor when such is indicated. We cannot 
withdraw from the contemporary world, hermitlike, to contem- 
plate our own navels. Furthermore, such revoit smacks too much 
of the Luddites, eighteenth-century workers who, realizing the 
threat to their livelihood in the industrial revolution, armed them- 
selves with crowbars and pickaxes and attacked the machines. 
This rebellion does no good beyond the self-righteous feelings it 
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gives the rebels themselves. In a given illness 1 believe one's 
responsibility to oneself is to get the best medical advice available. 
But the very progress of modern medicine makes our empha- 
sis here all the more necessary, since this progress increases the 
mystification and authoritarianism that people have thrust upon 
the medical profession and the medical profession has assumed all 
too readily. When 1 lived in a large metropolis, 1 found myself, 
when 1 needed medical service, phoning my own physician to 
, find out which specialist 1 should go to. The "laying on of hands," 
" 
which has classically been central in the healing profession, has 
now become all too often the laying on of techniques. 
Since assuming the role of the priest, as doctors began to do 
as early as Paracelsus in the sixteenth century, the tendency has 
been for people to see in the physician the god who has power 
over life and death. But as long as physicians are made god on 
people's conscious level, they will also be made the devil on an 
unconscious level. The rash of malpractice suits in the last twenty 
years shows the disillusionment and rage that people feel as this 
belief in the "devil" begins to surface. 
When 1 told my present physician of my intent;on to work 
also with an acupuncturist on the problem of tachycardia, he well 
. remarked, "Western medicine is on the verge of a great revolu- 
tion." He did not mean in the sense of new discoveries in tech- 
niques. He meant, rather, a revolutionary change in the 
philosophical and ethical basis of medicine, a change in the cul- 
tural context in which doctors operate. This revolution is seen 
most dramatically in the incursion of Oriental insights into West- 
ern medical treatment. , 
2. Acupuncture and the Oriental Influence in Western 
Medicine 
Let us single out one aspect of that revolution, acupuncture, 
as represented by Dr. Harold Bailen, a doctor of Western car- 
diology who later became an acupuncturist. His shift to 
acupuncture occurred because of his growing conviction that the 
model of Western medicine was at best incomplète and at worst 
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simply wrong. The sickness itself is not the enemy. Rather the 
wrong way of life is. Western medicine, being disease-oriented, 
blocks off the symptoms with which patients come to the doctor, 
whereas Eastern medicine, with a tradition of thousands of years 
behind it, asks: What is the symptom trying to tell us? 
The symptom is the right-brain language-in its pain, ache, 
or other discomfort-saying that something is amiss. Dr. Bailen 
often remarks to patients, "Isn't it marvelous that your body is so 
bright that it can speak to you in that language?" In contrast to 
the left brain, from which language, logic, and rationality largely 
spring, the right-brain is the side that communicates in fantasies, 
dreams, intuition-and symptoms. The symptom is a red warn- 
ing light. Right-brain language cannot be attacked from a purely 
rational, left-brain point of view. Acupuncture enhances com- 
munication between the right and left brain, states Dr. Bailen. It 
synthesizes this information, something like an altered state of 
consciousness. 
The aim of acupuncture is to stimulate, through the use of the 
needles, the energy circuits of the body so that the body will be 
energized to cure itself. Thèse circuits, called meridians, are not 
synonymous with the neural pathways of the body. The most 
accepted theory thèse days is that acupuncture activâtes endor- 
phins, a morphinelike hormonal substance in the body. Dr. René 
Dubos, who is not an acupuncturist, describes this well: 
Acupuncture can trigger the release of pituitary endorphin which, some- 
how, gains access to the cells of the spinal cord and can thus exert an 
opiate-like effect on the perception of pain. It is not too far-fetched to 
assume that, as in the case of other hormones, mental attitudes can affect 
the secretion of endorphin and thereby the patient's perception of dis- 
ease. 
Dubos goes on to say that endorphin acts not only on the mech- 
anisms of pain itself, but also inhibits the emotional response to 
pain and, therefore, to suffering. Hence, the demonstrated anti- 
pain effect of acupuncture as used by a number of dentists in 
their work. 
Acupuncture requires that the person being treated not sim- 
ply be a "patient," but that his body and his consciousness- 
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meaning his whole self-be an integral part of the treatment. It is 
not simply done to a patient, but requires the patient's awareness . of his freedom and responsibility at every point. If the patient 
gets this message loudly and clearly, Dr. Bailen states, he is con- 
. fronted with a "choice point." This may take the form of a ques- 
tion to himself: "Oh, my God. Do I want to get rid of this?" 
Occasionally patients (generally arthritics) become better, get the 
insight, and then stop the treatment with the conclusion "It's eas- - ier for me to bear the pain than to make the change." They had 
. become so rigid, so bound by habit, and had gotten so much 
secondary gain, such as being taken care of, out of the ailment 
that they chose not to change their way of life. This is a con- 
scious, responsible choice. The person is no longer in his "victim" ' 
role. 
. This is very much like the goal of psychotherapy, in my judg- 
ment. The purpose of psychotherapy is not to "cure" the clients 
in the conventionai sense, but to help them become aware of what 
they are doing and to get them out of the victim role. Its purpose 
is to help the disturbed one get to the stage where he is free to 
choose his own way of life, as far as that is realistically possible, 
and to accept his situation in life, as far as that is unavoidable. 
To illustrate the "choice point," 1 will cite an experience of 
my own. The problem-or the symptom-with which 1 went to 
. Dr. Bailen for treatment was tachycardia, which 1 had had since 
1 was four years old. Though it had not handicapped me seriously 
as an adolescent, during the last years it had gotten severe enough 
to cause fainting and even more dangerous symptoms. 1 had been 
put on Inderal, one of the drugs which controls the beat of the 
heart. When I began I was on six Inderal (each one 10 mg.) a day. 
This, indeed, did control my heartbeat, but at the price of shut- 
ting off my brain. 1 felt like a zombie. 
The following are notes 1 made at the time of my acupunc- 
ture. 
This past Monday 1 felt very good after the acupuncture treatment, and 
my mood continued to be excellent on the morning of Tuesday. I was 
already down to one Inderal a day after several months of treatment. 1 
decided then to cut the Inderal out entirely. But by noon, when 1 was 
feeling high because of the possibility of curing the tachycardia entirely, 
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1 began to get a strange feeling of deep and pervasive loneliness. 1 placed 
back and forth in my office trying to figure out what this might be. There 
was no particular reason why 1 should be lonely. But 1 continued to feel 
as though 1 were in a foreign land where 1 could not speak the language, 
in a world in which 1 was lost and unable to communicate with anyone. 
1 had also the strange feeling that 1 had lost myself; 1 had only half an 
identity. 
In the middle of the aïternoon it occurred to me that this loneliness 
had come out of my fantasy that the tachycardia could be cured entirely 
and 1 would be free of it. Yes! an important part of how 1 had experi- 
enced my identity in the past would be gone. 1 lad grown accustomed 
to this image, this myth of myself, that 1 was this man with this partic- 
ular ailment, namely tachycardia. The ailment seemed to be my friend; 
it had stood by me faithfully when I was under too much stress and 
needed some withdrawal from the active world. Like the prisoner of 
Chillon 1 had become friends with my very chains. 
That night 1 dreamed that 1 was dying. My friends were gathered 
together and 1 was going around the circle saying good-bye to them. 1 
was crying in the dream and felt that I was saying good-bye to this 
world. 
The following night 1 dreamt that I was having a brain operation and 
part of my hair had been cut away in order for the surgeons to get to the 
part of my skull that was going to be cut out. The chief surgeon was a 
tall, thin man [Dr. Bailen is tall and thin]. 1 ran out of the operating 
room. 
When 1 woke up the next morning [Wednesday] my tachycardia had 
returned in full force; my heart was pounding at the rate of 150 a minute. 
The tachycardia continued to trouble me ail morning. 
1 was glad to get to Dr. Bailen's office that afternoon; for 1 knew that 
the dreams and behavior had been a very clear, if strident, cry that 1 was 
not yet ready to give up this ailment. The loneliness, and the first dream, 
were saying that to give up my symptom of tachycardia would be tan- 
tamount to dying, and also surrendering the identity by which 1 had 
known myself and survived since I was a child of four. The second 
dream makes an even more explicit cry about parting from the tachycar- 
dia : "Not yet!" it was shouting. Dr. Bailen laughingly agreed with my 
interpretation that 1 would need another month or so before making the 
drastic change completely. 
The hanging on to illnesses, or the difficulty in asserting one's 
freedom and responsibility toward illnesses, has been well known 
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through history and literature. Jean-Jacques Rousseau remarks 
about the tendency of human beings "to run to meet their chains 
thinking they secured their freedom." Even in the Declaration of 
Independence our forefathers recognized this truth: "All experi- 
ence hath shown that man-kind are more disposed to suffer, while 
evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the 
forms to which they are accustomed." 
" 
Thomas Mann shows in one of his stories how we make a way 
of life out of our own or others' sickness. In "Tobias Minder- 
nickel," he pictures the dog as overly independent, a loner and 
not very friendly toward its master. In an accident the dog breaks 
its two front legs. The man then puts it in bed beside him and 
nurses it through the illness. Finally, when the dog recovers and 
is able to run around as used to be its wont, the man no longer 
has the animal to care for nor the animal's friendliness and 
dependency upon him. He is beside himself. Unable to stand his 
present isolation, the man takes a hammer and breaks the dogs 
legs all over again. 
The moral of this story is applicable to the multitude of rela- 
tionships in our world in which marriages, friendships, depen- 
dencies of various sorts are kept together essentially by the need 
to be cared for on the part of one member and the need to take 
care of on the part of the other. On the healthy side this is the 
comradeship we experience in comforting each other as we 
embrace cold and lonely destinies we cannot change. On the 
unhealthy side, it is the self-limitations built into the world by 
persons who have suffered illness and are loathe to give up their 
dependency when the possibility of freedom does open up again. 
3. Tbe Balance between Illness and Health 
We need to understand the function of illness and health in a 
culture. The disease itself, as Harold Bailen puts it, is not the 
ultimate enemy. It may actually be a blessing in disguise in that it 
forces the person, as my tuberculosis did me, to take stock of his 
life and to reform his style of work and play. 1 wish to quote here 
, two paragraphs which 1 wrote in the Meaning of Anxiety: . 
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Having a disease is one way of resolving a conflict situation. Disease is a 
method of shrinking one's world so that, with lessened responsibilities 
and concerns, the person has a better chance of coping successfully. 
Health, on the contrary, is a freeing of the organism to realize its capac- 
ities. 
1 believe that people utilize disease in the same way older generations 
used the devil-as an object on which to project their hated experiences 
in order to avoid having to take responsibility for them. But beyond 
giving a temporary sense of freedom from guilt feeling, these delusions 
do not help. Health and disease are part and parcel of our continuous 
process throughout life of making ourselves adequate to our world and 
our world adequate to ourselves. 
Nor is pain the ultimate enemy. As Norman Cousins writes: 
"Americans are probably the most pain-conscious people on the 
face of the earth. For years we have had it drummed into us-in 
print, on radio, over television, in everyday conversation-that 
any hint of pain is to be banished as though it were the ultimate 
evil." He goes on a show how leprosy is such a dreaded disease 
because of the fact that the affected person has lost the sense of 
pain and has no signal to tell him how and when to take care of 
the infected parts. We consume in this country a fabulous num- 
ber of tranquilizers in the process of blocking out pain. 
The interplay of pain and pleasure, and the dependence of 
one on the other, was seen by Plato: 
How strange would appear to be this thing that men call pleasure! And 
how curiously it is related to what is thought to be its opposite, pain! The 
two will never be found together in a man, and yet if you seek the one and 
obtain it, you are almost bound always to get the other as well, just as 
though they were both attached to one and the same head.... Wherever 
. the one is found, the other follows up behind. So, in my case, since 1 had 
pain in my leg as a result of the fetters, pleasure seems to have come to 
follow it up. 
Pain is a sensitizer in life. In running away from pain we lose 
our vitality, our capacity genuinely to feel and even to love. 1 am 
not saying that pain is a good thing in itself. I am saying that pain 
and the relief from pain paradoxically go together. They are the 
bow and the string of Heraclitus. Without pain we would become 
a nation of zombies. Some critics believe we already have arrived 
at that state. 
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There is a common illusion that medical technology is wiping 
out one disease after another-such original lethal scourges as 
tuberculosis and infantile paralysis being among the recent exam- 
ples-that we need only to wait, hoping we live long enough until 
medicine vanquishes all diseases. But this illusion rests on a seri- 
ous misunderstanding of the functions of illness and health in any 
human society. "Physicians must resist the idea that technology 
will some day abolish disease," states Dr. Robert Rynearson in 
the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry. "As long as humans feel threat- 
ened and helpless, they will seek the sanctuary that illness pro- 
vides. The distinguished scientist and humanitarian, Jacob 
Bronowski, cautioned us in this regard: 'We have to cure our- ' 
selves of the itch for absolute knowledge and power. We have to 
close the distance between the push-button order and the human 
act. We have to touch people.' 
" 
Not only do physicians need to resist this illusion, but even 
more do lay people, to whom the idea that medical technology 
will ultimately save them is the most powerful rationalization for 
evading their own responsibility for their health. For human 
beings live-it is their destiny to do so-Jelicately balanced " between health and iliness, and this balance is what is important. 
There is no doubt that we, as a race, are getting healthier. But " will I be misunderstood when 1 affirm that the possibilities of 
illness get proportionately greater at the same time? Certainly, - there is just as much consulting with doctors as there was fifty 
. years ago. What seems to be occurring is the shift in the kinds of 
. illness from infectious diseases-which attack the person from the 
outside-to internal diseases like heart attacks, hypertension, and 
strokes-which are intimately related to anxiety and stress. The 
latter are the greatest killers of our day. 
Illness and health are complexly balanced in each of us, and 
taking responsibility, so far as we can, gives us some possibility 
of restoring the balance when it goes awry. It is not by accident 
. that so many of our greatest persons have struggled with disease 
all their lives. Noting the large number of important creative 
human beings who have had tuberculosis, a physician some years 
. ago wrote a book entitled Tuberculosis and Genius in which he ' 
argued that the tubercular bacilli must eject some serum into the 
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blood to produce the genius. This explanation seems to me 
absurd. It makes much more sense to hold that the way of life of 
the genius-intensive work, unquenchable enthusiasm, the fire in 
the brain-puts too much of a strain on the balance, and hence 
the individual becomes ill as a necessary way of withdrawing into 
himself for a time. 
The struggle between health and illness is part of the source 
of creativity. British doctor George Pickering gathered data 
which he put into a book entitled Creative Malady and subtitled 
Illness in tbe Lives and Minds of Charles Darwin, Florence Nightingale, 
Mary Baker Eddy, Sigmund Freud, Marcel Proust and Elizabeth Bar- 
rett Browning. Each one, he points out, suffered severe illness and 
met it constructively. Pickering speaks of his own osteroarthritic 
hips as "an ally," which he puts to bed when they get painful; 
and in bed he cannot attend committee meetings or see patients 
or entertain visitors. "These are the ideal conditions for creative 
work: freedom from intrusion, freedom from the ordinary chores 
of life." " 
Dr. O. Cari Simonton has pioneered in the treatment of can- 
cer by having the patient himself take responsibility through 
meditation on the cure. He teaches the person with cancer to 
become aware that a fight is going on and to meditate for two ten- 
minute periods each day on the white corpuscles killing the can- 
cer cells. When we look at the drawings of the fantasies of these 
people of their meditation, we see pictures of warfare, of rats and 
tigers, of the white corpuscles as soldiers. A be-all and end-all 
struggle in occurring, and the consciousness of the person is the 
chief participant in the struggle. The old ways of being "patient" 
and handing the responsibility for one's illness over to the doctor 
are simply not relevant any more. 
The art of wellness is described by Hadrian in his facing his 
illness: 
1 was better, but in order to contrive with my body, to impose my wishes 
upon it or to cede prudently to its will, 1 devoted as much art as 1 had 
formerly employed in regulating and enlarging my world, in building the 
being who I am, and in embellishing my life. 

Four 
The Fruits of Freedom 

XII 
The Renewal of Life 
The time bas come to proclaim to a nobler humanity, the freedom of 
tbe spirit, and no longer to have patience witb men's tearful regrets 
for their Jost cbains. 
- FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELUNG 
Freedom is a positive force... flowing up from a spring of boundless 
depth. Freedom is tbe power to create out of nothing, tbe power of the 
spirit to create out of itself. 
- NIKOLAI BERDYAYEV 
At an Independence Day celebration in Norway, Henrik 
Ibsen recited a poem on freedom that he had written expressly 
for this festival. In this poem Ibsen notes how broadly and mean- 
inglessly the word freedom is bandied about, "with salutes and 
holiday flags," and how the crowds are "inspired by a pretty 
word / Which the eye deadens and thought enfeebles." "What is 
Freedom then?" Obviously not merely "To send men to parlia- 
ment every three years- / To sit there dully, wings of thought 
clipped / Like inert prisoners behind a sea of prejudices." 
" 
Freedom, rather, is "life's finest treasure." 
Only he is free who boldly aspires forward, 
Whose deepest craving is the deed, whose goal is an heroic act of the 
spirit.... 
And is it anything more than words and sound, 
If we hail the rosy dawn of freedom, 
And not understand that its finest fruit 
Can ripen only in the light of the spirit? 
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1. Freedom and the Human Spirit 
Freedom can "ripen only in the light of the spirit," as Ibsen 
says. But it is just as true that the human spirit is made possible 
only by freedom. Without freedom, there is no spirit; and with- 
out spirit, no freedom; and without freedom, no self. 
"Man is spirit," proclaims Ibsen's fellow Scandinavian, Sôren 
Kierkegaard. "But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is 
the self.... The self is a relation which relates itself to its own 
self.... Man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the 
temperal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity." 
In our day the word spirit has become less respectable because 
of its association with ghosts, apparitions, specters, fairies, and 
other forms of "spiritualism." "I have the spirit" is the prelude to 
speaking in tongues and other practices in fundamentalist 
churches. It is significant that all of these are endeavors to leave 
behind our humdrum existence and get "free" by leaping imme- 
diately into a spiritual existence. Paul Tillich has stated that 
crossing the boundaries from material to spiritual existence so 
easily was a sign of magic rather than spirit. Whatever one may 
think of these apparitions, I am not talking of this usage of spirit. 
1 use the word spirit in its etymological sense of the nonmate- 
rial, animating principle of human life. Its root is spirare, which 
also means "breath" and is the root ofaspire, aspiration, inspire, and 
inspiration. Thus, spirit is the breath of life. God breathes the 
spirit into Adam, as the creation myth puts it, and from then on 
Adam shares this capacity to pass on the life-giving principle to 
his own descendants in ways that are still a mystery to us. 
Spirit is that which gives vivacity, energy, liveliness, courage, 
and ardor to life. We speak of the Spartans fighting at Ther- 
mopylae "with great spirit." When one is "high-spirited," one is 
lively, active in the sense that Spinoza meant when he described 
the free person as active and not passive. Or one has "lost all 
spirit," meaning that the person is in deep despondency and at 
the point of giving up life entirely. We borrow from the French 
the phrase "esprit de corps," implying the confidence that comes 
from participating in the spirit of everyone else in one's group. 
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Spirit increases as it is shared, and decreases as one's freedom is 
blocked off. Spirit has its psychological roots in each individual's 
inner freedom. Rousseau sees this identity between freedom and 
spirit when he writes, 
Nature commands every animal, and the beast obeys. Man feels the same 
impetus, but he realizes he is free to acquiesce or resist; it is above ail in 
' 
the consciousness of this freedom that the spirituality of the soul is 
shown. 
Spirit can be powerful-indeed, so powerful that it can transcend 
naturai law. Goethe says of Faust, 
For fate has put a spirit in his breast 
That drives him madly on without a pause, 
And whose precipitate and rash behest 
O'erleaps the joys of earth and natural laws. 
The spirit here is described as part of fate, of destiny?r, as we 
would say in contemporary language, it is both born in us and 
developed as our culture influences us from birth. Goethe's 
description can be seen in our day in the patients who come for 
psychotherapy who are workaholics, driven by ambition, who 
not only push themselves into a heart attack, but also miss what 
Goethe calls the "joys of earth" en route. 
Spirit is also an epistemological capacity: one can see into 
things, get insights, perceive things that were covered before. 
This capacity is partially intuition, again as Spinoza sees intui- 
tion. Spirit is a special perspicacity, a keenness, a lucidity. One 
seems to exist on a higher level; one transcends the mundane and 
the boundaries of the mundane. 
The language of spirit is image, symbol, metaphor, myth; and 
these also comprise the language of freedom. This is a language 
that points toward wholeness ; a half image, for example, is still a 
whole image. Each one of these terms, whether it be image, sym- 
bol, metapbor, or myth, deals with the "whole circuit," as Bateson 
would phrase it. The terms point toward the totality of the event. 
Hence, these terms in the language of spirit deal with quality, 
which by its very nature is a wholeness, rather than quantity, 
which by its very nature is partial. We speak, for example, of a 
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painting as being sensitive, powerful, communicating a richness 
of color to us-all terms that deal with qualities. The quantity of 
a painting or piece of music-say, the size of the canvas of a 
Picasso or the number of notes in a concerto-is silly when we 
are talking of works of art. 
This "whole circuit" is Bateson's way of pointing out that log- 
ical, left-brain thinking deals in "arcs"-i.e., parts of the circuit 
rather than the whole. One is thus confined, limited, unfree as 
one sees only part of the reality one is looking at. This confine- 
ment is, of course, necessary in empirical thinking. But when 
freedom and the spirit enter our discourse, we find ourselves 
. bursting out of these limits and dealing with a symbol of the 
" whole, the universality of a myth, or a metaphor which stands 
for the totality. 
This is why Bateson insists on the inclusion of right-brain 
thinking as part of any description and why he puts so much 
emphasis on the contexts in which one does one's thinking. He 
writes: 
Mere purposive rationality unaided by such phenomena as art, religion, 
, dream, and the like, is necessarily pathogenic and destructive of life; and 
v its virulence springs specifically from the circumstances that life depends 
upon interlocking circuits of contingency, while consciousness can see 
only such short arcs of such circuits as human purpose may direct.... 
That is the sort of world we live in-a world of circuit structures-and 
; love can survive only if wisdom [i.e., a sense of recognition of the fact of 
circuitry] has an effective voice. 
2. The Authentic Mystics 
' 
Mystics, such as Meister Eckhart and Jacob Boehme, use the 
language of the spirit with a greater insight than the rest of us. 
Such mystics, as Wittgenstein has told us, "make things man- 
ifest." A German contemporary of Dante, Meister Eckhart de- 
scribes his own experience when he says that "the human spirit 
... can never be satisfied with what light it has but storms the 
firmament and scales the heavens to discover the spirit by which 
the heavens are driven in revolutions and by which everything on 
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the earth grows and flourishes." Though he taught in the four- 
teenth century, his words have a contemporary ring when he 
states that 
the spirit, in knowing, has no use for number, for numbers are of use 
only within time, in this defective world. No one can strike his roots into 
eternity without being rid [of the concept] of number. The human spirit 
must go beyond all number-ideas, must break past and away from ideas 
of quantity and then he will be broken into by God.... God leads the 
human spirit into the desert, into his own unity.... Here the spirit 
achieves unity and freedom. 
Freedom turns out'to be central in the concepts of the mys- 
tics, probably because they exercise their own freedom so inten- 
sively in achieving their inspirations. Arguing that God does not 
constrain the will, Eckhart says, "Rather, he sets it free, so that 
it may choose him, that is to say, freedom. The spirit of man may 
not will otherwise than what God wills, but that is no lack of 
freedom. It is true freedom itself." This sentence expresses the 
curious union of destiny and freedom that characterizes the great 
religions. In them freedom and necessity, or freedom and bon- 
dage, are ultimately identical. Eckhart makes it a condition of 
those who wish to understand him that "your intentions are right 
and your will is free." 
An uneducated cobbler, Boehme spoke with such an amazing 
degree of insight that half a dozen books are necessary to contain 
his wisdom. Though he had never read Heraclitus or any of the 
Greek philosophers or had any systematic schooling, Bôhme 
spoke of God being a fire. "For Boehme, existence is a stream of 
fire. All life is fire. The fire is will." "According to Boehme, will- 
freedom-is the principle of all things." "Freedom is deeper than 
and prior to all nature." "Boehme, first in the history of human 
thought, has made freedom the first foundation of being, freedom 
is to him deeper and more primary than all being, deeper and 
more primary than God himself. The wrath of God is necessary 
if the love of God is to have any meaning. With respect to the 
question of where his wisdom came from, he tells us, "By my 
own powers 1 am as blind as the next man, but through the spirit 
of God, my own inborn spirit pierces all things." 
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Evelyn Underhill speaks of Boehme as "the inspired shoe- 
maker" and "one of the giants of mysticism." Nikolai Berdyayev 
writes in his introduction to one of the books by Boehme: "We 
must salute Boehme as the founder of the philosophy of freedom 
that represents the true Christian philosophy." 
" 
It is important to recall that both of these mystics were con- 
demned as heretics by the institutional church, and their writings 
..' were viewed as dangerous to the ecclesiastical establishment. The 
. Grand Inquisitor's statement that since the eighth century the 
. Church had given up following Christ is not entirely a figment of 
the imagination. Perhaps another characteristic of the authentic 
mystics is that their insistence on freedom of religion cannot be 
stomached by the ecclesiastical organization. 
However one judges them, such authentic mystics have a 
source of wisdom that cannot come from learning (because they ' 
often have so little learning), but must come from insights that 
spring out of an immediate participation in the universe in ways 
we cannot understand but surely can admire. It recalls to mind 
the "participation mystique" that French anthropologist Lévy- 
Bruhl has found in primitive tribes around the world. The mys- " 
tics' wisdom seems to be a combination of empathy, telepathy, 
intuition. This shows how far off the mark are those who criticize 
such things as acupuncture, and placebos of many sorts from a ' 
purely left-brain, rationalistic point of view. Such things as pla- 
cebos may simply represent tangible patterns that act as foci on 
which a person may project the insights and intuitions that come 
from different sources. 
We have said that human freedom gives birth to the human 
spirit and that spirit is necessary if there is to be freedom. But are 
not human spirit and freedom also the sources of evil? What did 
Bôhme mean when he proclaimed that the wrath of God is nec- 
essary if there is to be any love of God? 
3. Compassion and the Meaning of Evil 
In the course of my therapeutic experience 1 have met and 
talked with a number of parents whose son or daughter happened 
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to be in treatment with me. When the parents let their hair down, 
their attitudes varied from tearful regrets on the part of a clergy- 
man high up in the ecclesiastical hierarchy about his son's depres- 
sion to the genuine, if sad, puzzlement of a mother whose 
psychotic episode when her daughter was born had a good deal to 
do with the latter's present promiscuity to the boisterous instruc- 
tions of a Wall Street executive who adjured me to hurry and get 
his son to shape up. The boisterousness of the executive only 
served to emphasize his subconscious realization that his 
authoritarianism had a good deal to do with his son's perpetual 
failures in everything he tried. If these parents could have 
spoken out of the depths of their feeling, each one of them-even 
the Wall Street executive-would have cried out, "Why do 
1 harm the very person 1 love?" 
Scarcely any of us can remain unaffected when we see the evil 
we do, mostly unintentionally, to those in our own family and to 
people we love by our inability to understand what is going on in 
the other's thoughts. Oscar Wilde's line "Yet each man kills the 
thing he loves" may relieve us to some extent in that it presents 
the universal quality of the problem of evil; we are not alone in 
the harm we partly cause. But Wilde also makes it impossible for 
us to forget that each of us participâtes in the inhumanity to other 
human beings. 
The inevitability of evil is the price we pay for freedom. And 
the denial of evil is also the denial of freedom, as Berdyayev states 
in his interpretation of the sayings of Jacob Boehme. Since we 
have some margin of freedom, we have to make some choices; and 
this means the chance of making the wrong choice as well as the 
right one. Freedom and evil presuppose each other, whether we 
accept responsibility for our freedom and evil or not. Possibility is 
possibility for evil as well as good. We can pretend innocence, but 
such retreating to childhood ignorance does not help anyone. 
There is an inescapable egocentricity in all of us, leading to 
the absolutizing of our own perceptions, which then become 
destructive to those closest to us. Schelling was right when he 
spoke of "the tendency in each one of us to be absolute in one's 
self."  Each of us is bound up in his or her own skin, each of us 
sees life through his or her own eyes, and none of us can escape 
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doing some violence to those we long most to understand. "The 
good that I would I do not, and the evil that 1 would not do, that 
1 do" was Saint Paul's classic statement of the problem. There is 
no evading this dilemma. Indeed, Kierkegaard interpreted this as 
original sin: each of us speaks out of his separate individuality and 
thus inexorably runs roughshod over yearnings and perceptions 
that are precious to people we love. And if one tries very hard not 
to do this, if one makes every effort to do "good," one succeeds 
only in adding an element of self-righteousness to the ways one 
confronts one's fellows. 
The problem of evil has been a stumbling block for philoso- 
phers and theologians for millennia. Those who represent the 
rational approach to evil, from Aristotle through Aquinas to the 
rational philosophers of today, hold that the more we solve our 
problems, the less evil will exist. Evil is thus a lack of goodness. 
The more our science progresses, the argument goes, the more 
the mysteries of life and nature are solved, and the less evil there 
is in the world. 1 believe this point of view is wrong. 1 heard this 
judgment much more in my earlier days before the advent of Hit- 
ler, before the Second World War with ail its newly technolo- 
gized ways of killing, before the use of concentration camps as an 
accepted political arm of government, and before the hydrogen 
bomb, with its unutterably cruel mass maiming and slaying. This 
depressing list should make clear the fact that the progress of sci- 
ence and technology has not resulted in our being less evil. 
Human cruelty and capacity for evil increases neck and neck with 
human technological progress. Our ways of killing are made more 
efficient as well as our ways of living. 
The main example of the evil that is present in technology 
along with the good is, of course, nuclear power. If we had any 
doubts about the dangers to health and even life itself in radia- 
tion, nuclear residue, as well as the nuclear bombs per se, we 
have only to listen to the Union of Concerned Scientists to shock 
us out of our delusions. Not only can nuclear fission destroy the 
world population many times over, but there is evidence that 
radiation and strontium 90 may already be seeping into the bodies 
of an unknown number of us. In any case, we walk a razor's edge 
in dealing with nuclear fission. Science and technology deal with 
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the bow of life, and not the wby or what for-which truth reputa- 
ble scientists by the score tell us. Science increases the possibili- 
ties for good and the possibilities for evil, which many esteemed 
scientists have been shouting to us from the housetops. 
There is also another group of philosophers and theologians 
who take a different approach, This group includes Heraclitus, 
who said "war is both king of all and father of ail," through Soc- 
rates, Augustine, Pascal, Boehme, and down to Kierkegaard and 
Bateson. These thinkers directly face the fact that freedom makes 
evil inevitable. As long as there is freedom, there will be mistaken 
choices, some of them catastrophic. But to relinquish the capacity 
to make choices in favor of the dictatorial segment of us called our 
reason is to surrender what makes us human in the first place. 
The modern form of the Grand lnquisitor's plan leads 
people to hand over their responsibility to the scientist in the 
white coat or to the psychotherapist in the comforting office or to 
the priest in the church or to the anonymous environment all 
about us. If we could do these things, we would have the tem- 
porary facsimile'of evading evil. But while we are no longer com- 
mitting evil, we also are no longer commiting goodness; and the 
age of the robot will be upon us. 
The ultimate error is the refusal to look evil in the face. This 
denial of evil-and freedom along with it-is the most destructive 
approach of all. To take refuge with the Moonies, or with Jones- 
town, or any others of the hundreds of cults, most of which seem 
to spring up in California, is to find a haven where our choices 
will be made for us. We surrender freedom because of our inabil- 
ity to tolerate moral ambiguity, and we escape the threat that one 
might make the wrong choice. The mass suicides at Jonestown 
seem to me to be the terrible, if brilliant, demonstration of the 
ultimate outworking of the attitudes with which the adherents 
joined in the first place. They committed spiritual suicide in sur- 
rendering their freedom to evade the partial evil of life, and they 
end up demonstrating to the world in their own mass suicides the 
final evil. 
Religious people have for millennia fervently asked, "How 
could a God of love permit evil?" An answer is given by that 
tributary of Christianity, Gnosticism: 
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God allowed evil to exist, woven into the texture of the world, in order 
to increase man's freedom and his will to prove his moral strength in 
overcoming it. 
But the question the religious people above ask is simplistic. 
Let us recall the words of Boehme, above, that God is a fire and 
it is necessary to confront the wrath of God if the love of God is 
to have any reality. A Hassidic saying points toward the same 
thing: 
God is not nice, God is no uncle. 
God is an earthquake. 
We note that some saints through history have spoken of 
themselves as the "chief of sinners." Obviously, this cannot mean 
sinner in the sense of committing overt, objective crimes. But it 
can mean that the saints, being more highly developed spiritually 
than ordinary people, have a correspondingly deeper awareness 
of their pride, vanity, hardness of heart, and obtuseness of under- 
standing. If we look at sin from the inside, we see that there is 
indeed, sound meaning to their claim. Paul Tillich, in his remind- 
ing us that it is impossible to have a sensitive conscience and a 
good conscience at the same time, points out that if one has a 
sensitive conscience he will be aware of the evils of the world in 
which we as human beings participate. Hence, there is no clear, 
good conscience, but an active concern about the evils. 
It is not at all surprising, then, that in the Garden of Eden 
myth, the knowledge of good and evil comes by virtue of the evil 
of rebellion against God. If Adam and Eve are to have any free- 
dom, any true autonomy or true independence, they must defy 
the orders of God; and whether Yahweh is benevolent or destruc- 
tive does not at that moment matter. This defying of the orders 
of God is essential for this development of their own conscious- 
ness. Otherwise they will forever be the inert appendages of God. 
Is this alienating? Anxiety-creating? Guilt-producing? Of course. 
But what becomes available with these "curses" are the blessings 
of love, responsibility, and the passion and power to create. 
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4. Forgiveness and Mercy 
What, then, shall we do? The only answer is: Be compassion- 
ate. The universality of evil makes human compassion necessary. 
1 often remark to the parents who are sad about the part they've 
played in the problems of their children, "You and I-all of us 
who are human-are in the same boat." Platitude though this is, 
it often helps relieve them of the solitary, pariahlike quality that 
makes them feel they are alone in their mistakes and solitary in 
their evil. 
In his poem "A Dialogue of Self and Soul," W. B. Yeats, 
describes the confrontation between these two, and has the soul 
assert that mere rationalism can never solve the problems of life: 
For intellect no longer knows 
Is from the ought, or Known from the Known- 
That is to say, ascents to Heaven; 
Only the dead can be forgiven; 
But when 1 think of that my tongue's a stone. 
And the poem finally concludes in an act of harmony between the 
two, 
1 am content to follow to its source 
Every event in action or in thought; 
Measure the lot; forgive myself the lot! 
When such as 1 cast out remorse 
So great a sweetness flows into the breast 
We must laugh and we must sing, 
We are blest by everything, 
Everything we look upon is blest. 
The last five lines are an exquisite description of what happens in 
the deeper sense of forgiveness toward oneself. 
The forgiveness extends, in the case of parents and children, 
to the sons and daughters as well; for the regrets are often bound 
up with what seems to be their opposite, resentment on the part 
of the parents at the son or daughter for causing him or her such 
perplexity and suffering. Thus forgiveness of oneself permits one 
to forgive others. Forgiveness, which is one phase of compassion, 
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puts the deeper meaning into our human comedies, and enables 
us to get insight from our tragedies so that they become bearable. 
Forgiveness means to overcome the resentment-to "cast out 
remorse"-which is the curse that accumulates in most human 
relationships. Forgiving ourselves as well as others may be the " 
only way of transcending this resentment. The health-enhancing 
aspect of the forgiving of others is that it helps wipe away the 
resentment toward oneself at the same time. 
Compassion-the capacity to have passion with another- 
implies empathy, the ability to see the world as the other person 
sees it. Compassion gives us fresh perspective on what it means to 
be human, and helps us judge less harshly ourselves as well as the 
persons who impinge upon us. Paradoxical as it sounds, this gives 
us a point outside our remorse from which we can do more to 
correct it. We stop, then, condemning ourselves for being human, 
and we can at the same time stop condemning others for the same 
condition. "This means," as Don Michael puts it, "that every- 
body needs ail the clarity they can muster regarding their ignor- 
ance and finiteness, and all the support they can obtain in order to 
face the upsetting implications of what their clarity reveals to 
them. A compassionate person is one who, by virtue of accepting 
this situation, can provide others as well as self with such sup- 
port. 
" 
Freedom without compassion is demoniacal. Without com- 
passion, freedom can be self-righteous, inhuman, self-centered, 
. and cruel. Anatole France's remark about freedom-that the poor ' man and rich man are both equally free to sleep under the bridges ' 
of Paris at night-illustrates how freedom can turn into cruelty 
toward the underdog. Many of the crusades under the banner of 
freedom-and not merely the ones we read about in history 
books-have consisted of requiring the other person to accept 
one's own concept of freedom. Thus, they have turned out to be 
tyrannical. . This can be seen in some experiences of psychotherapy. The 
therapist may be convinced that his own form of freedom is the 
only thing that is good for the client, which then makes for cold- 
ness, rigidity, inhumanness in the therapist even though what he 
does may be technically correct. 
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1 once supervised a psychiatrist whose patient, a young 
woman of nineteen, was giving him a good deal of trouble. The 
patient was constantly being irritated, changing the subject, and 
in general angry and petulant. I remarked in the supervisory hour 
that the young woman might be trying to get some sign of affec- 
tion from the therapist. The psychiatrist in the next session, 
when the young woman was playing out her petulant drama, 
interrupted her with "You know, 1 like you." The patient 
stopped talking, paused a moment and then said, "I guess that's 
what it's all about." When the therapist reported this to me, 1 
asked, "Do you like her?" And he answered, "No, I really don't." 
There flashed before my mind a glimpse of the whole treatment 
collapsing, for there is no doubt that patients in therapy can sense 
this presence or lack of compassion, despite all pretenses. Surely 
enough, she broke off the therapy after a couple of sessions. 
Compassion on the part of the therapist is the essence of any 
psychotherapy which deserves the name. Patients will see 
through any pretense when the level is as basic as compassion, 
even though they may not speak of it, since they are taught in our 
culture to pretend that they don't see such negative things. 
A therapist colleague of mine was seeing regularly a patient 
whose manner was generally bombastic and insolent. One day 
the therapist's daughter had been seriously hurt. Nothing was 
said by the therapist in the session about the accident, but the 
patient that day, as we heard on the tape, was tender, kind, and 
completely without his usual bombast, as though he were aware 
of the therapist's tragedy-which he could not have known. Does 
this presuppose some degree of mental telepathy in therapy or 
some capacity to pick up the tiny cues such as the sound of one's 
voice? I believe both are probably true. Freud was right, in my 
judgment, in his "moral" theory of telepathy, stating that he 
had learned not to lie in therapy because he had often enough 
experienced the fact that the patient would see through the lie no 
matter how hard Freud tried to cover it up. 
Alfred Adler said time and again, "The technique of treat- 
ment must be in yourself," and went on to point out that the best 
therapist was one who had problems himself but was aware of 
them and was working on them. In psychotherapy one cannot 
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have compassion for another if one never has experienced psycho- 
logical problems of one's own. Note that 1 do not say the same 
psychological problems as the clients-that is not necessary. But 
the therapist must know what the struggle between "self and 
soul," to borrow Yeats's terms, really feels like through his own 
expérience. 
This is why, in interviewing and selecting candidates for two 
different psychoanalytic training institutes, 1 would never con- 
sider the candidate who was "well adjusted" and who had not 
endured the wrestling with his or her own destiny. 1 assumed- 
and 1 believe rightly so-that such persons would not empathize 
with and feel compassion for the patient or client. The two great- 
est therapists I ever knew personally, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann 
and Harry Stack Sullivan, had, individually, almost every prob- 
lem in the book, and both had fantastic insight into the problems 
of their patients and corresponding compassion. One of the 
obvious and central functions of the didactic therapy that the 
trainee is required to go through is to sensitize oneself to the prob- 
lems within oneself in order to have compassion for the other 
persons one is to work with. ' 
Gregory Bateson would have said that the person who lacks 
compassion does not grasp the "whole circuit" in his human rela- 
tionships. Speaking of the importance of art, poetry, religion, and 
other "right-brain" functions, Bateson writes: 
Unaided consciousness must always tend toward hate; not only because 
it is good common sense to exterminate the other fellow, but for the 
more profound reason that, seeing only arcs of circuits, the individual is 
continually surprised and necessarily angered when his hardheaded pol- 
icies return to plague the inventor. 
One of Bateson's heros, Biaise Pascal, likewise points out the 
inadequacy of a solely rational point of view, for reason is "pliable 
to every sense," and in practice reason is often a matter of "Truth 
on this side of the Pyrenees, error on that." 
" 
It is our destiny to live always in some form of community. 
Even the frontiersman who counted it a matter of pride that all of 
twenty miles separated him from his nearest neighbor was still 
bound to that neighbor by language no matter how rarely he 
spoke it, by his memory, by every thought, ad infinitum. The 
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"wolf child" is an anomoly and, indeed, is a proof of what 1 am 
saying in that he became "human" only when he exhibited a 
communal morality. The fact that we belong to a community as 
well as being individual persons requires that we acknowledge 
this destiny and relate to each other with compassion. Compas- 
sion limits our freedom, but it renders freedom human at the 
same time. 
As we have seen in the chapter on narcissism, the refusal to 
admit destiny is to cut ourselves off from others. And now we 
can see its cruelty. Surely it is relevant: "If 1 don't take care of 
myself, who else will?" But if one takes care only of oneself, one's 
freedom can become cruelty to others. Love, of which compas- 
sion is the first step, keeps freedom from becoming tyrannical. 
The universality of evil also makes necessary human mercy, 
the "gentle" virtue, as Shakespeare, in The Merchant of Venice, 
rightly insisted. Mercy not only drops like a soft Spring rain, but 
it is like forgiveness in that it blesses him who gives and him who 
takes. Mercy is 
The attribute to awe and majesty, 
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings; 
But mercy is above this sceptred sway, 
It is enthroned in the hearts of kings, 
It is an attribute to God himself, , 
And earthly power doth then show likest God's 
When mercy seasons justice.... 
Evil will not disappear or shrink away during the night. We 
will never wake up in the morning to find that evil has vanished 
from the face of the earth. The purpose of human life is not to 
avoid mistakes, nor to show an unblemished escutcheon, but to 
rise to meet the challenges as our destiny reveals itself and to 
search out in freedom the challenges we wish to engage. As 1 read 
the human tragicomedy, we will go on struggling, avoiding com- 
plete nuclear catastrophe by the skin of our teeth, trying to 
become aware of the pitfalls in ourselves and our society, so that 
' 
we can make constructive choices whenever possible. In this trag- 
icomedy forgiveness and mercy will season justice and make life 
bearable with the presence of beauty, the emotion of love, and 
the occasional experience of joy. 
XIII 
Despair and Joy 
Beethoven did not turn away from life toward some mystical Nir- . 
vana. He forgot none of the joy, the effort, or the pain. He abandoned 
notbing. Wbat he achieved was sometbing much more wonderful than 
an old man's serenity. "I will take fate by tbe tbroat," Beetboven cries 
' 
in a letter. "It shall not wholly overcome me. Ob, it is so beautiful to 
live-to live a tbousand times!" " 
- j. w. N. SULLIVAN, Beethoven: His Spiritual Developntent 
One of the reasons we are so reluctant to confront the aspect 
of destiny called fate is that we are afraid it will lead us into 
despair. We Americans are taught always to wear a garment of 
optimism, and we believe that with despair all hope is lost. So we 
cling to any false hope we can conjure up to serve as a bulwark 
against despair, unaware that a hope that has to be striven for is 
no hope at all. No wonder T. S. Eliot writes "wait without hope 
/ For hope would be hope for the wrong things." This begging 
for some hope opens us to exploitation by any psychoreligious 
charlatan who appears on the horizon. All to escape the demon 
despair! 
But suppose that despair were basically a constructive emo- 
tion ? Suppose despair is often a necessary prelude to the greatest 
achievement? Virgil wrote in the Aeneid, when telling of the voy- 
age of Aeneas and his men, that darkness was "our guide and our 
leader was Despair." What if Homer were right when, in the 
Iliad, he pointed out that a similar "strength is felt from hope and 
from despair"? 
Let us look again at Philip's experience in his last therapeutic 
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session, as related in Chapter II. He came in feeling sad, hope- 
less, lonely, lost. He felt everybody had died-his mother, his 
sister Maude-and the relation with Nicole was nearly dead, and 
now, at the end of therapy, the relation with the therapist was 
dying. He was in clear, unadulterated despair. But halfway 
through the session he began his recovery. 
1. The Values of Despair 
' 
The despair was essential in bringing Philip to the point 
where he could give up his previous neurotic ways of behaving in 
his overwork and in his failure to have full relationships with 
other people. This experience when he had been a young man 
had been one turning point in his life, just as he and 1 believed 
this therapy, then concluding, would be a turning point in his 
overcoming his love bind with Nicole. 
Thus, despair can lead to highly constructive action. It can be 
a flushing out of the Augean stables. Despair can be a "giving up" 
and a "letting go" of neurotic problems that had been solidifying 
since one was an infant. In this sense despair plays the construc- 
tive role reserved for it in every psychotherapy. 
1 am speaking of despair not as a "cosmic pout" nor as any 
kind of intellectual posture. If it is a mood put on to impress 
somebody or to express resentment toward anybody, it is not 
genuine despair. 
Authentic despair is tbat emotion wbich forces one to come to terms 
witb one's destiny. It is the great enemy of pretense, the foe of 
playing ostrich. It is a demand to face the reality of one's life. The 
"letting go" that we noted in despair is a letting go of false hopes, 
of pretended loves, of infantilizing dependency, of empty con- 
formism which serves only to make one behave like sheep hud- 
dling in a flock because they fear the wolves outside the circle. 
Despair is the smelting furnace which melts out the impurities in 
the ore. Despair is not freedom itself, but is a necessary prepara- 
tion for freedom. The Grand Inquisitor is right: we would not 
choose to go into despair if we consulted only our rational 
choices. But there is no denying destiny or fate, and reality comes 
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marching up to require that we drop all halfway measures and 
temporary exigencies and ways of being dishonest with ourselves 
and confront our naked lives. 
It is well known that Alcoholics Anonymous, that organiza- 
tion which is far and away the most effective in curing alcoholics, 
states frankly that the alcoholic cannot be cured until he or she is 
in complete despair. It is only then that the alcoholic can give up 
the need for alcohol as a solace for his or her forlorn hopes or to 
bolster his or her false expectations. Those who have been 
through AA and then work to help new members simply laugh 
outright at the predespair alcoholic's grandiosity, his pompous I- 
am-the-master-of-my-fate-attitude, his vain resolutions to control 
his drinking by his own will power. This is a beautiful example 
of T. S. Eliot's line of "hope for the wrong things." Hopes them- 
selves can become the most seductive of delusions. 
When a person' has "hit bottom"-i.e., when he has reached 
ultimate despair-he then can surrender to eternal forces; this is 
the dynamic in all authentic conversions. 1 would describe this 
process as giving up the delusion of false hopes and, thus, 
acknowledging fully the facts of destiny. Then and only then can 
this person begin to rebuild himself. It is a superb demonstration 
of the hypothesis that freedom begins only when we confront 
destiny. 
The same was true of Synanon before its deterioration. It is 
also true of the group called Delancey Street in San Francisco, a 
community of young people who have come out of lives of crime, 
drug addiction, alcoholism. The object in Delancey Street is to 
bring the new member to despair-the accomplishment of which 
is done by energetically attacking his rationalizations, his pre- 
tenses, his pompousness, until he is down to the bare bones of his 
existence. Only then, the leaders of Delancey Street believe, will 
the person give up the illusionary hopes that block his transfor- 
mation into a person of authentic freedom. 
2. Despair in Therapy 
We know in psychotherapy that often despair is essential to 
the discovery on the part of the client of his or her hidden 
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capacities and basic assets. The function of despair is to wipe 
away our superficial ideas, our delusionary hopes, our simplistic 
morality. There are some misguided therapists who feel that they 
must reassure the patient at every point of despair. But if the 
client never feels despair, it is doubtful whether he ever will feel 
any profound emotion. Apropos of considering Voltaire's remark 
"Despair has often gained battles," a friend wrote this limerick: 
There once was a man named Voltaire 
Who found his best hope in despair. 
If that sounds perverse, 
It could have been worse. 
Voltaire could declare, "I don't care." 
There is surely value in the client's experience that he has 
nothing more to lose anyway so he may as well take whatever 
leap life requires of him. 1 suggest that this is what is meant by 
that sentence in folklore "Despair and confidence both banish 
fear." It is important to remind ourselves of these points since 
there are a number of signs that we in America may be on the 
threshold of a period as a nation when we shall no longer be able 
to camouflage or repress our despair. 
Those who can feel healthy despair are often those who also 
can at the same time experience the most intense pleasure and 
joy. Sartre was talking about a life-enchancing despair when, in 
his play The Flies, after Zeus has pointed out ail the despair 
Orestes will face, Orestes asserts against Zeus, "Human life 
begins on the far side of despair!" He could as well have said that 
human freedom and human joy also begin on the far side of 
despair. This is why we believe more firmly in the dignity and 
the nobility of being human after seeing a performance of tragedy 
rather than comedy: the characters and the tragic downfall of 
Hamlet, Macbeth, Lear, or even of Harry in Tbe Iceman Cometh 
give us a conviction of the significance of life. As we leave the 
theater, we are not only relieved, we are inspired. The despair 
we have felt in the drama highlights its opposite, the nobility of 
life. 
Despair is a desperate refusal to be oneself. Kierkegaard puts 
it well, citing the different levels of "despair at not willing to be 
one's self, or still lower, despair at not willing to be a self; or 
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lowest of ail, despair at willing to be another than himself." 
Despair is a failure of spirit, a spiritlessness. "Man when he is 
characterized as spirit-less has become a talking-machine, and 
there is nothing to prevent him from learning a philosophical rig- 
marole just as easily as a confession of faith and a political recita- 
tive repeated by rote." Again: "Despair is a qualification of spirit, 
it is related to the eternal in man.... In unconsciousness of being in 
despair a man is furthest from being conscious of himself as spirit. 
" 
This "thing of despairing is inherent in man himself; but if he 
were not a synthesis he could not despair." Kierkegaard holds 
that human beings are a synthesis of finite and infinite, and this 
is what makes despair possible. He also emphasizes that the worst 
condition of all is to boast about never having been in despair, for 
that means that the person has never been authentically conscious 
of himself. 
3. The Link between Despair and Joy 
This link between despair and joy is so important that the 
ancient Greeks devoted one of their central myths to it, that of 
Persephone and Demeter. Persephone was picking Howers with 
her friends one day when Hades, god of the underworld, saw her 
and was stricken with love. He seized her and carried her off to 
his underworld. When her mother, Demeter, goddess of fruit and 
grain and other produce of the fields, heard Persephone's cries, 
she rushed around the world trying to find her. Learning that 
Hades had carried her off to the underworld with Zeus' conni- 
vance, Demeter was filled with a terrible and savage grief. 
Demeter left Olympus and wandered about the earth incog- 
nito. Meeting two young women who sympathized with her 
story that she had been captured by pirates and had escaped, 
Demeter was taken to their home to meet their mother, Meta- 
neira. Demeter continued to be so sad that "a long time she sat 
upon the stool without speaking, never smiling, because of her 
sorrow ... tasting neither food nor drink, because she pined for 
her deep-bosomed daughter." 
" 
Metaneira and her daughters proclaimed to Demeter, 
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"Mother, what the gods send us, we mortals bear perforce though 
we suffer." What an acknowledgment of destiny, an adjuring of 
Demeter to accept fate! Its importance is shown in the fact that it 
is repeated later to make sure we have heard it. Metaneira then 
asked Demeter to be nurse to her newborn son. Demeter came to 
life and bestowed love upon the infant, who then grew amaz- 
ingly. 
Meanwhile, in her grief and rage Demeter had caused the land 
to bear no more fruit and grain, and a cruel famine covered the 
earth. Zeus finally was moved to command Hades to let Perse- 
phone return to earth, though Hades fed "his shy mate" a pome- 
granate seed. 
Persephone returned to Demeter who welcomed her with 
great joy. When Persephone confessed she had unbeknownst 
eaten a pomegranate seed, Demeter knew that her daughter 
would have to return to Hades for one-third of each year-the 
winter-but could remain on earth the rest of the time. 
But this small flaw was quickly drowned in their joyousness. "So did 
they then, with hearts at one, greatly cheer each other's soul and spirit 
with many an embrace; their hearts had relief from their griefs while 
each took and gave back joyousness.... And straightway made fruit to 
spring up from the rich lands, so that the whole earth was laden with 
leaves and flowers." 
Demeter's great grief, to the extent of speaking to no one, 
refusing all comfort and ail food and drink, pining with longing 
for her daughter, amounts to a profound despair. It was a despair 
which carried over to mankind in the cruel famine on earth. But 
Demeter's despair soon became a creative state, shown in her love 
for Metaneira's infant son and his amazing growth. 
Demeter's suffering is followed by this intense joy, which is 
stronger than she would bave felt had the sorrow not preceded it. In other 
words, despair is a prerequisite to the birth of joy. Persephone's 
fearful descent into the underworld is followed not only by joyful 
ascension, but the "earth's period of barrenness is followed by an 
eruption of fruit and flowers." The myth shows "pain followed 
by joy, separation followed by reunion, death followed by 
renewal, winter followed by spring." 
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Winter-the part of the year Persephone must go back to the 
underground-is often considered the dreaded part of the year, 
the time when despair would be most prevalent. But winter is the 
"purifier," as the Magee Indians call it. The snow and the ice 
purify the ground. They cover over the myriad créatures from 
insects to deer who have lived out their span of life ; and the 
ground, being enriched, springs forth with new life after the 
purification. This is the gestation before creativity. Nietzsche 
seemed to have been writing (and beautifully) about the end of 
this experience: 
. 
Out of such abysses, from such severe sickness one returns newborn, 
having shed one's skin, more ticklish and malicious, with a more delicate 
taste for joy, with a more tender tongue for ail good things, with merrier 
sensés, with a second dangerous innocence in joy, more childhood and 
yet a hundred times subtier than one has ever seen before. 
A similar linking of despair and joy is the death and resurrec- 
tion in Christian theology-and all résurrections, seen in the pro- 
totype of the résurrection of flowers and leaves on the trees in the 
spring. This pattern runs through ail of life. It is destiny, the 
design of the universe, the form in which all of existence is 
encompassed. In Europe at Easter time, people turn out en masse 
for the sacrament of Good Friday, since they want to make sure 
Jesus is dead. The celebration of his death is a necessary precur- 
sor to any rising from the tomb. The renewal requires the death 
beforehand. That Christ has risen has meaning only if he has 
been really dead. In America there is scant attendance on Good 
Friday, but the churches are filled to capacity on Easter. This is 
indicative of our lack of belief in tragedy in this country. It is a 
démonstration of our endeavor to overlook the death that must 
occur before the résurrection, the suffering that précèdes joy, the 
tragedy that précèdes achievment, the conflict that précèdes crea- 
tivity. Henry Miller refers to the same thing in terms of emo- 
tional death and résurrection when he writes "those who are dead 
may be restored to life." For Miller this occurs in the emotional 
release, after despair, of the créative process. 
Despair before joy is the meaning of the "dark night of the 
soul" of which the mystic Saint John of the Cross writes. Or, as 
Despair and Joy 241  
John Bunyan metaphorically puts it, the slough of despond must 
be gone through before we can arrive at the gates of the Celestial 
City. Joseph Campbell informs us in his Hero with a Thousand 
Faces that the hero must be willing to endure trial and dismem- 
berment, even a species of death, if he is to achieve the Holy 
Grail. Those who claim to live in a perpetual state of ecstasy or in 
a never-interrupted state of love are either deluding themselves or 
settling for a mediocre state of existence. 
In mystic tradition the state of ecstasy is only the second stage 
and by no means the goal. Persons of lesser devotion or commit- 
ment often want to slide back into this second stage and have to 
be cautioned against selling the mystic experience short. Geth- 
semane is not at all an admission of failure on the part of the 
ministry of Jesus, but a necessary stage that cannot be avoided. It 
turns out not to be possible to "let this cup pass from me." With- 
out the despair, no resurrection. One of the mystics of history 
encourages would-be explorers of the mystic path to "endure the 
pains and the discomfort. For behind this nothingness, behind 
this dark and formless shape of evil is Jesus hid in His joy." 
4. The Nature of Joy . 
In his description of his "fabulous summer," we may recall 
that Philip used the word joy not happiness. What can be the dis- 
tinction ? 
Happiness is a fulfillment of the past patterns, hopes, aims; but 
those are exactly what Philip had had to give up. Happiness is 
mediated, so far as we can tell, by the parasympathetic nervous 
system, which has to do with eating, contentment, resting, pla- 
cidity. Joy is mediated by the opposing system, the sympathetic, 
which does not make one want to eat, but stimulates one for 
exploration. Happiness relaxes one; joy challenges one with new 
levels of experience. Happiness depends generally on one's outer 
state; joy is an overflowing of inner energies and leads to awe and 
wonderment. Joy is a release, an opening up; it is what comes 
when one is able genuinely to "let go." Happiness is associated 
with contentment; joy with freedom and an abundance of human 
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' 
spirit. In sexual love joy is the thrill of the two persons moving 
together toward orgasm; happiness is the contentment when one 
relaxes after orgasm. Joy is new possibilities; it points toward the 
future. Joy is living on the razor's edge; happiness promises sat- 
isfaction of one's present state, a fulfillment of old longings. Joy 
is the thrill of new continents to explore; it is an unfolding of life. 
Happiness is related to security, to being reassured, to doing 
things as one is used to and as our fathers did them. Joy is a 
revelation of what was unknown before. Happiness often ends up 
in a placidity on the edge of boredom. Happiness is success. But 
joy is stimulating, it is the discovery of new continents emerging 
within oneself. 
Happiness is the absence of discord; joy is the welcoming of 
discord as the basis of higher harmonies. Happiness is finding a 
system of rules which solves our problems; joy is taking the risk 
that is necessary to break new frontiers. Tennyson protrays Ulys- 
ses from the point of view of joy;' he sees the old man scorning "to 
rust unburnished, not to shine in use!" 
The good life, obviously, includes both joy and happiness at 
different times. What I am emphasizing is the joy that follows 
rightly confronted despair. Joy is the experience of possibility, 
the consciousness of one's freedom as one confronts one's destiny. 
In this sense despair, when it is directly faced, can lead to joy. 
After despair, the one thing left is possibility. 
We all stand on the edge of life, each moment comprising that 
edge. Before us is only possibility. This means the future is 
open-as open as it was for Adam and Eve, Milton tells us in 
Paradise Lost, after their great despair at the rebuke given them by 
Yaweh. Despair, yes. But it is the beginning of human conscious- 
ness and all of the joys that that opens to us. 
' 
Some natural tears they dropped, but wiped them soon; 
The world was all before them, where to choose 
Their place of rest, and Providence their guide. 
They, hand in hand, with wandering steps and slow, 
Through Eden took their solitary way. 
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Euripides, Belleropbon, Frag. 298. 
127 "This day ... we spin." 
John Greenleaf Whittier, "The Crisis," 10. 
127 "What one individual ... may fulfill it." 
J. W. N. Sullivan, Beetboven: His Spiritual Development (New York: Vintage, 
1960), pp. 165-66. 
l28 "1 must die ... not even Zeus can conquer that." 
Cited in Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 2, Willing (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), p. 29. 
128 "From the beginning ... no freedom of choice." 
" 
Carl G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Rejqections, ed. Aniela Jaffé, trans. Richard 
and Clara Winston (New York: Pantheon, 1961), p. 48. 
128 "Goethe is the man ... problematical task." ' 
José Ortega y Gasset, "In Search of Goethe from Within," in Tbe Dehuman- 
ization of Art (New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 146. 
129 "However much ... troubles him." 
Ibid., p. I50. 





129 "Am 1 poet ... harmony with myself." 
Ibid. , p. 1 54. 
129 Sensé of abandon 
When 1 was in my late teens, 1 picked up a phrase from some long-forgotten 
place: "Life is a thing of cavalry, to be dashingly used and cheerfully haz- - arded." That seems to me to be as relevant now as it was then. Buber speaks 
of "going forward to meet destiny." 
" 
130 "Was the man ... his inner destiny?" 
Ortega, op. cit., p. 158. 
130 Genius and the difficulty of life 
Many students of Goethe would be more generous in their interpretation of 
his life than Ortega, possibly because they did not hold such high standards 
as those Ortega in his essay applies to Goethe. And one might think that if 
one were a poet of Goethe's caliber, one ought to be satisfied with that! For 
example, Ortega writes: "Living is precisely the inexorable necessity to make 
oneself determinate, to enter into an exclusive destiny, to accept it-that is, to 
resolve to be it. We bave, whether we like it or not, to realize our personage, 
our vocation, our vital program, our entelechy-there is no lack of names for 
the terrible reality which is our authentic I" (p. 166). 
130 Life for creative people 
Only rarely does a highly gifted person, like J. S. Bach, find himself in an 
environment in which his creativity can be completely at home. 
130 "troubles and disorients ... its axis." 
Ortega,op. cit., p. 160. 
131 James's books 
His classic was the textbook Psycbology, then Varieties of Religious Experience, 
Pragmatism, The Will to Believe, Talks to Teacbers, etc. 
VII. The New Narcissism 
136 The 1960s 
During that decade 1 attended a hippie wedding on a plateau in the moun- ' tains at Big Sur. It seemed a re-enactment of the gypsy scene in Carmen. 
Seventy-five to a hundred young people were dressed outlandishly but col- 
orfully, all free from clock time since they had been up all the previous night 
and now slept on the ground whenever they felt like it, some dancing, some 
sitting dreamily looking out over the vast Pacific, some passing around bread 
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and wine. But a kind of sad obbligato surrounded the whole in the presence 
of unattached and bewildered small children drifting about as though they 
had no idea who in this group their parents were. Over the whole camp 
there seemed to hang a palpable cloud of pervasive and profound loneliness. 
Whenever one looked in the eyes of a celebrant, one felt this estrangement. 
Everything in this conglomerate demonstration of "freedom" was with- 
out structure, without design, without a sense of destiny. The only element 
of structure was the expectation that the sun would rise in the morning, 
when they would perform some simple marriage ceremony. 
136 "the individual... one's fate." " 
Peter Marin, "The New Narcissism," Harper's Magazine (October 1975), p. 
48. 
136 wgorn often ... all about him." 
Quoted in George Wilson Pierson, Tocqueville and Beaumont in AmerÎl:a (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 119. 
138 "free men ... to be involved." 
Harry Brown, How 1 Found Freedom in an Unfree Worid (New York: Hearst, 
1973), p. 128. 
138 "Of what importance ... happiness for it?" 
Ibid., p. 163. 
138 "Liberated... unsatisfied desire." 
Christopher Lasch, Tbe Culture of Narcissism (New York: Norton, 1979), p. 
xvi. 
141 "How to set myself... self mutiny." 
" 
Quoted with permission. My friend informs me that she has written a later 
series about community and relationships, which means that she sees the 
area that is lacking in the quoted verses and moves to correct the situation. 
141 "I do my thing ... it can't be helped." 
" 
Clint Weyand, Surviving Popular Psycbology (privately published). 
142 "Nothing keeps ... are free." 
Frederick Franck, Tbe Book of Angelus Silesius (New York: Knopf, 1976), p. 
127. 
142 "Reality has come... are shown by caméras." 
Quoted by Lasch, op. cit., p. 48. 
145 "Let us come... lie with me!" 
Robert Graves, Tbe Greek Mytbs: 1 (London: Penguin, 1972), pp. 286-87. 
145 Narcissus and unrequited love 
According to Graves, Narcissus did recognize himself. He did "know him- 
self"in this sense. Is this the reason narcissism leads to death? 
145 "At first he tried ... as he expired." 
" 
Graves, op. cit., pp. 287-88. 
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VIII. Is Sex without Intimacy Freedom? 
flflQ _ 
153 "inability to feel ... more animated outside." 
Christopher Lasch, Tbe Culture of Narcissism (New York: Norton, 1979), pp. 
7-8. 
154 "Brigitte Bardot ... 1 like that." 
" 
Paul C. Vitz, Psycbology as Religion: Tbe Cuit of Self Worsbip (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Eerdmans, 1977), p. 122. 
154 Sex-without-intimacy trend 
See Rollo May, Man's Search for Himself (New York: Norton, 195 3). 
154 "out of a pervasive... in the first place." 
Lasch, op. cit., p. 27. Seymour B. Sarason has written similarly: " 'Stay 
loose,' 'keep your options open,' 'play it cool' are cautions that émerge from 
the feeling that society sets all kinds of booby traps that rob you of the 
freedom without which growth is impossible." 
" 
154 "Our society... pretend to cure." 
Lasch, p. 30. 
I54 Gay Talese 
Gay Talese, Tby Neigbbor's Wife (New York: Doubleday, 1980). 
155 "alone ... sensé of hope." 
Ibid., p. 343.  . 
156 "when a woman ... nearly two months." 
' 
Ibid., p. 541.  . 
' 156 Hugh Hefner ' 
Ibid., pp. 475-76. 
_ = 157 "in times ... confer on it." 
Sigmund Freud., "On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphère 
of Love" ( 1 9 1 2 ) , in vol. X 1 of the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological ' 
Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey (New York: Norton, 
1976), pp. 187-88. 
157 "the books ... about sex." 
" ' 
Joseph Adelson, New York Times Book Review 10 August 1980, p. 13. 
158 Benjamin De Mott and self destruct ' Such books as The Neav Celibacy by Gabrielle Brown are another indication 
of the self-destruct. 
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IX. The Significance of the Pause 
page 
164 "Freedom is ... nothing." . 
John Lilly, personal conversation. 
164 "this conception... the zero." 
" 
Dorothy Lee, Freedom and Culture (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1959), p. 55. 
165 "We put thirty ... makes it useful." 
Lao Tzu, Tao Teh Cbing, trans. John Wu (Jamaica, N.Y.: St. John's Univer- 
sity Press, 1961). 
165 Luther Standing Bear's and Modupe's childhood 
Lee, op. cit., p. 56. 
166 Nô drama 
Ibid. 
173 "We poets ... our knock." 
" 
Archibald MacLeish, Poetry and Exfrrience (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), 
pp. 8-9. 1 have quoted this in The Courage to Create (New York: Norton, 
1975), p. 79. 1 refer the reader to that book for a longer and more thorough 
discussion of creativity and the pause. 
176 "Does this version... to creativity." 
Lee, op. cit., p. 58. Italics mine. 
177 Psyche and ego 
The nature of the self is crucial to any theory of personal freedom. No more 
persuasive demonstration of this is needed than the fact that writers on free- 
dom, even when they are not psychologists, almost always conclude with a 
doctrine of the self. Mortimer Adler, in The Idea of Freedom, which he edited, 
ends the book with a discussion of the self. Christian Bay, in Tbe Structure of 
Freedom, likewise spends a good deal of time on the self. Like the other two 
in that he is not a psychologist, Fritjof Bergmann, in On Being Free, is as 
aware as the others that there is no proper understanding of freedom that 
does not rest on the self. 
178 "analysis does not ... or the other." 
" 
Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, Standard Ed., trans. Joan Rivière (New 
York: Norton, 1962), p. 40. 
181 J "No drives... a free man." 
" 
Quoted in Psycbology Today (March 1977), p. 88. 
182 "The feeling ... is the mystical." 
" 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and 
B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), p. xxi. 
182 "There are ... what is mystical." 
Ibid., p. 73. 
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page 
183 "If we take... in the present." 
Ibid., p. 72. 
183 "Sweet sounds ... the world again." 
" 
In Louis Untermeyer, A Treasury of Great Poems (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1955), p. 1 1 66. 
184 "What we cannot... in silence." 
Wittgenstein, op. cit., p. 74. 
X. The Dizziness of Freedom 
ffl 
185 Anxiety 
Ail of these emotions-wonder, awe, dread, fear-have anxiety within 
them. 
193 "How terrible ... sorrow." 
Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus, in Dramas, trans. Sir George Young (New 
York: Dutton). 
194 "joy and woe." 
" 
This is from a phrase in a poem by William Blake: 
Joy and woe 
Joy and woe 
_ If this we surely know 
Safely through the world we go. 
195 "Consider ... into human psychology." 
" 
Irvin Child, Humanistic Psycbology and tbe Researcb Tradition : Their Several Vir- 
tues (New York: Wiley, 1973), p. 176. 
. 196 "will not solve ... the environment." 
B. F. Skinner, Beyoml Freedom and Dignity (New York: Knopf, 1971), p. 22. 
But how can "environment" be "responsible"? The logic is faulty. 
196 "can be held ... he does." 
Skinner, op. cit., p. 17. 
196 "A scientific analysis... to the environment." 
Ibid., p. 19. 
196 "accept the fact ... of better men." 
" 
Ibid., p. 77. 
197 "autonomous man ... powers" 
Ibid., p. 86. 
197 "A scientific analysis ... by other men." 
" 
Ibid., p. 196. 
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page 
201 "there was nothing ... the whole world." 
Roger Urich, "Some Thoughts on Human Nature and Its Control,"Journal 
of Humanistic PsycboloD 19 9 ( 1 979): 39. 
XI. Freedom and Destiny in Illness and Health 
page 
205 "No improvement ... well-being." 
Quoted in Norman Cousins, Anatomy ojan Illnes (New York: Norton, 1979), 
p. 22. 
205 "Recovery ... résistance to disease." 
Ibid., p. 16. 
205 "vis medicatrix naturae. " 
1bid., p. 15. 
205 The healing power of nature 
When 1 was in bed for several years with tuberculosis, before there were any 
drugs for treating the disease, 1 made a similar and very important discovery. 
As long as 1 gave myself over to the physicians, trying only to follow their 
suggestions at every point in rest and exercise, 1 did not show any improve- 
ment. But when 1 realized that the bacilli were in me, not my doctors, and 
that the physicians knew very little about the disease (which they were the 
first to admit), 1 saw that 1 would have to take responsibility for my cure. 
This meant experiencing more personal anxiety and more guilt feelings since 
1 had to acknowledge that my own previous style of life was a central cause 
of my coming down with the disease in the first place. But admitting this 
was surely a boon to my health. 1 then instituted a program for myself. 1 
learned to listen to my body, to rest when 1 needed rest, to exercise when 1 
felt the strength to do so. 1 learned to use, and rightly so, the active voice in 
the words about illness: we "cure" rather than "we are cured." 1 then began 
to get better. My engaging destiny directly increased my freedom to become 
healthy again. 
205 "Feisty ... women." 
Leonard R. Derogatis, "Psychological Coping Mechanisms and Survival 
Time in Metastatic Breast Cancer,"JAMA 242 (1979). 
206 "They were going ... fighting the disease." 
" 
Ibid. 
206 "If negative emotions ... have therapeutic value?" 
Cousins, op. cit., pp. 34-35. 
207 "when 1 decided ... beginning of the end." 
Ibid., p. 160. 
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page 
207 "Talk of enemies ... than practical ones." 
Ibid., p. 123. 
214 "Physicians must ... abolish disease." 
R. R. Rynearson, "Touching People,"J. Clin. Psycb. 39 (1978):492. 
215 "I was better ... my life." 
Marguerite Yourcenar, Memoirs of Hadrian (New York: Farrar, Straus & 
Young, 1954), p. 252. 
XII. The Renewal of Lift 
page 
220 "Man is spirit ... and necessity." 
" 
Sôren Kierkegaard, "Fear and Trembling" and "Sickness unto Deatb" (New 
York: Doubleday, 1954), p. 146. Where Kierkegaard says "necessity," 1 
would use "destiny." 
" 
221 "Nature commands ... soul is shown." 
Quoted by Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State (N w York: Vintage, 1973), 
p. 391. \. 
221 "For fate ... natural laws." " ' 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust (Baltimore: Penguin, 1949), p. 92. 
222 "Mere purposive rationality ... has an effective voice." 
" 
Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (New York: Ballantine, 1972), 
pp. 
223 "the human spirit ... grows and nourishes." 
Raymond Bernard Blakney, Meister Ekbart (New York: Harper & Bros., 
1941), p. 192. 
223 "the spirit ... achieves unity and freedom." 
' 
Ibid., pp. 192-93. 
223 "Rather, he sets ... true freedom itseif." " 
Ibid., p. 193. 
223 "Your intentions ... free." 
Ibid. 
223 "For Boehme.... The fire is will." " 
Nikolai Berdyayev, Introduction to Jacob Boehme, Six Theosophic Points (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. xiv. 
223 "According ... all things." 
" 
Ibid., p. xx. 
223 "Freedom ail nature." 
1bid., p. xxi. 
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page 
223 "Boehme ... than God himself." ' 
Ibid., p. xxiii. 
' 
223 The wrath and love of God 
Compare this to the Chinese concept that one must go through anger and 
rage if one is to experience joy. (See p. 45). 
' 
224 "We must salute ... true Christian philosophy." 
Berdyayev, op. cit., p. xxxii. 
' 
.224 Placebos as tangible patterns 
This reminds me of one lengthy reading 1 lad of my astrological chart by a 
Hindu astrologer. 1 have never been able to "believe" in astrology nor to 
"dishelievé' in it. But this stranger, who apparently had not even known my 
name or anything about me, came up with a number of amazing insights 
that there seemed no rational way he could have discovered. lmpressed, 1 
accused him of being a psychic. But he smilingly shook his head and said he 
preferred to think of his insights as simply coming from a reading of the 
stars. 
225 "the tendency ... one's self." 
" 
Quoted by Chomsky, op. cit., p. xl. 
228 "God allowed evil ... in overcoming it." 
" 
Cited by Ruth Nanda Anshen, The Reality of the Devil: Evil in Man (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. v. 
228 "God is ... an earthquake." 
Frederick Franck, Tbe Book of Angelus Silesius (New York: Knopf, 1976). 
229 "A Dialogue of Self and Soul" 
W. B. Yeats, Tbe Collected Poemsof W. B. Yeats (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 
pp. 231-32. 
230 Compassion 
Donald N. Michael, "Industrial Society ?l'oday and Tomorrow," World 
Future Society Bulletin I 3 ( 1979). 
232 "Unaided consciousness ... plague the inventor." 
Bateson, op. cit., p. 146. 
232 "pliable ... error on that." 
Blaise Pascal, Pascal's Pensées, or Thoughts on Religion, ed. and trans. Gertrude 
Burford Rawlings (Mount Vernon, N.Y.: Peter Pauper Press, 1946), p. 38. 
XIII. Despair ùnd j0y 
Pùfl 
237 "There once was ... '1 don't care.' " 
Limerick by Tom Greening. 
262 Notes 
pagi 
238 "despair... than himself." 
Sôren Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Deatb, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: 
Doubleday, 1954), p. 186. This book is, in my judgment, the best psycho- 
logical study of despair. 
238 "Man when he ... repeated by rote." 
" 
Sôren Kierkegaard, Tbe Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, 
N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 85. 
238 "Despair... as spirit." 
Kierkegaard, Sickness unto Death, op. cit., p. 1 50. Italics mine. 
238 "thing of despairing... could not despair." 
" 
/hid., p. 149. 
238 "a long time ... deep-bosomed daughter." 
Cited by Robert May, Sex and Fantasy (New York: Norton, 1980), pp. 7-13. 3 . 
238 "But this small Haw ... leaves and flowers." 
Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
238 "earth's period of barrenness ... fruit and Howers." 
Ibid., p. 13. 
238 "pain followed by joy ... winter followed by spring." 
Ibid. 
240 "Out of such abysses... has ever seen before." 
" 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Tbe Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufman (New York: Ran- 
dom House, 1974), p. 37. 
241 "endure the pains ... hid in His joy. 
" 
Walter Hylton, cited by Frederick Spiegelberg, Tbe Religion of No Religion 
(Stanford, Calif. : Delkin, 1953), p. 51.  . 
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